Problems of Communism

Book Reviews

Frank K. Roberts
Hannes Adomeit
Jacques Rupnik
Alexander Kazhdan
Louise I. Shelley
Daniel C. Matuszewski

ULY-AUGUST 1982

EAST EUROPEAN ECONOMIC SLOWDOWN

Jan Vanous

Moscow and Mitterrand

Michael J. Sodaro

Kremlin Politics and the Austrian Settlement

Vojtech Mastny

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Problems of Communism

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JULY-AUGUST 1982 VOL XXXI

Problems of Communism (ISSN 0032-941x) is a bimonthly publication providing analyses and significant information about the contemporary affairs of the Soviet Union, China, and comparable states and political movements. Views of contributors, as well as geographic boundaries and names, do not necessarily reflect the policies of the United States Government.

On all editoral matters, communications should be addressed to: The Editors, *Problems of Communism,* International Communication Agency, United States of America, 1776 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Washington, DC, 20547, USA.
Telephone (202) 724-9801.

On subscriptions, communications should be addressed to: The Superintendent of Documents, US Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 20402, USA, preferably using the subscription form provided at the back of this issue. Outside the United States, please address inquiries to the Public Affairs Section, Embassy of the United States of America.

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An annual index for *Problems of Communism* appears in the November-December issue (No. 6) of each year except in the case of the first three volumes, which are covered in a combined index in the November-December issue (No. 6) of Vol. III. Material from the journal is also indexed in *ABC POL SCI, Bibliographie Internationale des Sciences Sociales* (all sections), *Current Contents, Economic Abstracts, Historical Abstracts, Index to US Government Periodicals, International Political Science Abstracts, Public Affairs Information Service, Social Sciences Citation Index, Social Sciences Index, Strategic Studies Reference Guide,* and *United States Political Science Documents.*

Cover: Sections for a pipeline to boost Soviet energy shipments to Europe, increasingly to West rather than East European markets. Photo from EUPRA.

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David E. Albright, since 1970 an editor and since 1976 Senior Text Editor of *Problems of Communism,* has accepted an appointment as Professor of National Security Affairs at the US Air War College, Maxwell AFB, Montgomery, AL, 36112. His colleagues on this journal wish him the best in his new endeavor.

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IN THIS ISSUE OF

Problems of Communism

Articles

East European Economic Slowdown
Jan Vanous

At the beginning of the 1980's, East European economies are at a crossroads. The pressures that blew the lid off Poland will increasingly build beneath the political leaders and central planners of other East European countries, forcing them to take hard decisions regarding their economic systems. Understanding the causes of the present economic slowdown and the factors likely to affect these economies in the 1980's allows speculation about what responses the East European leaderships may make.

Moscow and Mitterrand
Michael J. Sodaro

The election of François Mitterrand to the presidency of France in May 1981, and his Socialist Party's winning of an absolute majority in the legislative elections shortly thereafter, caught Moscow by surprise. Despite French Communist participation as a junior partner in the government, there has been a high degree of continuity in French foreign policy. If anything, French attitudes toward the USSR seem to have hardened, at least in part as a response to the ongoing Soviet presence in Afghanistan and the imposition of martial law in Poland.

Kremlin Politics and the Austrian Settlement
Vojtech Mastny

The 1955 Austrian State Treaty ended Austria's occupation by Western and Soviet troops and paved the way for its subsequent prosperity as a neutral state in one of the world's most heavily armed regions. The treaty's broader significance lies in the light it sheds on Soviet policies, for after eight years of obstructing negotiations, the Soviets suddenly proved eager to sign an agreement less advantageous than the one initially envisaged. The treaty was perhaps the foremost product of a brief period of East-West détente—the first since the onset of the cold war. The Austrian solution thus offers more than passing lessons on the opportunities for change in Soviet foreign policy in a period of intense leadership competition in the Kremlin.

* * *

Essay-Reviews

The Kissinger Years
Frank K. Roberts

A British diplomat reviews the memoirs of Henry Kissinger and finds they offer much insight into the character and policies of one of the most complex and unusual foreign ministers in modern times. Winner of the Nobel Peace Prize for negotiating an end to the Vietnam war, Kissinger was also instrumental in establishing an effective Sino-American relationship and in bringing Egypt into the Western camp. To the reviewer, even more significant was Kissinger's policy of both resisting Soviet aggression and preserving some prospect of benefit to be derived by the Soviets if they behaved themselves.

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Negotiating, Soviet Style
Hannes Adomeit

Charges that the methods and negotiating style of the Soviet foreign ministry do not conform to accepted diplomatic standards have persisted since the ministry's creation in 1917. While this perspective is open to question, throughout the years Soviet diplomats seem to have shown certain common attitudes and techniques. In analyzing Soviet foreign policy, however, it is more important to concentrate on the reasons behind a particular Soviet negotiating stance, the meaning of Soviet proposals and counterproposals, and the likely goals such proposals are meant to achieve than to explore the interesting byway of style.

The Politics of Economic Crisis in Eastern Europe
Jacques Rupnik

The international economic crisis of the 1970's has coincided with similar difficulties in the Soviet bloc, particularly among the East European economies. The remarkable degree of interdependence between the economies of Eastern and Western Europe appears, however, to be as much a result as a cause of economic problems in the East. Specifically, more than 20 years after the first attempts at a complete overhaul of systems of economic management, the dilemma of political control vs. economic efficiency remains unresolved in East Europe, at great cost both to the societies involved and to the Soviet Union.

An Unsentimental Journey Across Russia
Alexander Kazhdan

Lifting the heavy lid of Soviet secretiveness to capture the essence of Russian life is no easy task. Western journalists, writing of their experiences from work and travel in the Soviet Union, present some useful insights, as seen in a particularly good recent survey volume reviewed here. Yet works in this genre are marred by some inevitable shortcomings and consequently fail to give a fully satisfying image of Soviet reality.

Crime and Punishment Under Socialism
Louise I. Shelley

Contrary to the expectations of Marxist ideologues, crime has not begun to disappear in socialist countries. While embarrassed officials try to explain away the persistence of a phenomenon that was to fade under the socialist way of life, it seems clear that socialism has in fact created new categories of criminal conduct. There is also a great deal of evidence that the existing socialist systems force the average citizen into illegal activity of some kind simply in order to achieve bearable conditions in daily life.

The Turkic Past in the Soviet Future
Daniel C. Matuszewski

Over the last 20 years, there has been a striking emergence of new and intense forms of ethnic and cultural identification in the Soviet Union. The official constructs of a "Soviet" culture have not met the needs of the USSR's many nationalities, prompting a search for more genuine and satisfying social and cultural forms and for an accurate understanding of the past in order to restore a sense of historical identity. This is particularly true in Soviet Central Asia, where literary works increasingly evoke the rich Turkic legacy from the past.

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East European Economic Slowdown

by Jan Vanous

At the beginning of the 1980's, the economies of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Romania—the East European members of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA)—are at a crossroads. The Polish economy is in a crisis the depth of which is beginning to rival the Great Depression of the 1930's. Other East European economies face a slowdown in growth unprecedented in the postwar period.

The same sort of pressures that blew the lid off Poland will increasingly build beneath the political leaders and central planners of the other East European countries, forcing them to make hard decisions to cope with the mounting economic problems. Below, we shall look at the causes of the economic slowdown as it began in the 1970's, the factors affecting the outlook for these economies through 1985, and some specific projections regarding the economic activity of these countries through that year. At the conclusion, we shall speculate briefly about how the leaderships might respond.

The 1970's—An Overview

To evaluate the economic outlook for Eastern Europe in the first half of the 1980's, it is first necessary to review the major economic developments that took place there during the 1970's. The most important was a dramatic slowdown in overall economic growth (see Table 1 on p. 3). The average annual growth of produced national income (net material product) for the six economies taken together declined from 7.3 percent in 1971–75 to 4.0 percent in 1976–80.[1] This slowdown occurred in both industry and agriculture. The average annual growth of East European gross industrial output declined from 8.7 percent in the first half of the decade to 5.7 percent during the second half, while in agriculture the corresponding decline was from 4.0 to 1.3 percent.[2] The slowdown in growth rates also affected the construction industry, transport, communications, and other services. However, it should be pointed out that such a widespread slowdown was not a completely new phenomenon—the growth of aggregate output decelerated in Eastern Europe during 1956–60 and even more during 1961–65.[3]

The economic slowdown was caused by several factors. First, by the early 1970's, the economies of

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[1] It should be noted that official East European statistics of "produced national income" are not strictly comparable to the Western measure of national income ("gross national product"—GNP), for they exclude most services. Except possibly when all sectors of material production grow very slowly—such as in several East European countries in 1981—the "net material product" measure would show faster growth of output than would the GNP measure. An additional problem with the official statistics on net material product is that they contain an upward bias stemming from systematic underestimation of inflation.

[2] Official East European statistics for industrial and agricultural output are imperfect measures because they report gross output rather than net output (value added). This results in considerable double-counting, the extent of which changes over time with the changing degree of intermediate processing/manufacturing. Official statistics on gross output are also subject to the same inflationary bias as the official statistics on national income.

In the case of agriculture, the decline in growth of output during 1976–80 relative to 1971–75 should in part be attributed to bad weather. During the five-year period 1976–80, the weather pattern probably was less favorable than usual—only 1978 and 1980 (except in Poland) were good years; 1976 and 1979 were unfavorable; and 1977 was at best mediocre.

[3] In particular, the East European growth rate for produced national income declined 31 percent during 1956–60 and an additional 42 percent in 1961–65 before increasing 52 percent in 1966–70 and an additional 20 percent in 1971–75. See the table in the continuation of this footnote on p. 2.

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

A tale of two economic models: at left, in Poland a wait in a queue is rewarded with the purchase of a loaf of bread and some parsley; at the right, in Hungary consumers examine wares in a Budapest supermarket.

—Photoreporters and Vincent Mentzel.

Eastern Europe began to run out of sources of what Marxists call "extensive economic growth," i.e., they were no longer able to spur growth by further increases in the physical quantities of production inputs (labor and capital). The need was perceived to shift to intensive economic growth, based on improvements in the quality of inputs (better education and training for labor, technological advances, more efficient organization of production, etc.). But while this necessity had been apparent to East European central planners for quite some time (at least since the mid-1960's), the record of the East European economies in effecting this change has been almost uniformly dismal.

A second factor contributing to the slowdown was the general failure to carry out effective economic reforms and the decision instead to place excessive reliance on a development strategy based on accelerated imports of Western technology. During the 1960's, only two East European countries—Czechoslovakia and Hungary—made a major effort to institute substantive economic reforms based on decentralization of their economies; a reduced role of central planning and its reform away from a command type toward an indicative type of planning mechanism; the introduction of more realistic prices; improvement of the system of economic incentives for both enterprise managers and workers; a shift toward profit and sales, rather than gross output, as measures of economic performance; and, last but not least, the introduction of various measures to encourage innovation, technological improvements, and risk-taking both in utilization of new technologies and in introduction of new, more technologically sophisticated products. The Czechoslovak reform lasted a mere two years (1967–68) and was effectively scrapped after the Soviet-led invasion of August 1968. The Hungarian reform began in 1968, at a much slower pace than the Czechoslovak reform, and it is still advancing—14 years later. In the other four countries, central planners were unable to introduce the type of economic reform which would foster intensive economic growth by means of proper incentives to enterprise managers and workers.

This absence of reform (Hungary's slow-paced efforts being the exception) contributed to the adoption of what quickly became a fashionable "technocratic" cure for growth deceleration: increased imports of superior Western technology and know-how. East European central planners envisaged that these imports would lead to upgrading of the quality of East European capital stock and improvement of productivity, thus reversing the slowdown in economic growth. The imports of Western technology were primarily financed by borrowing from Western commercial banks and governments. The loans were to be repaid a good bit later—in the second

The following data are drawn from official East European statistics, with the exception of figures for Eastern Europe as a whole—these being the author's own aggregations.

Produced National Income
(average annual rate of growth, in percent)

	1951–55	1956–60	1961–65	1966–70
Bulgaria	11.2	9.6	6.7	8.8
Czechoslovakia	8.2	6.9	1.9	7.0
East Germany	13.1	7.1	3.4	5.3
Hungary	5.7	6.0	4.1	6.9
Poland	8.6	6.6	3.4	4.6
Romania	13.3	6.6	9.2	7.5
Eastern Europe	10.0	6.9	4.0	6.1

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Table 1: Growth Trends in Eastern Europe's Produced National Income Gross Industrial Output, and Gross Agricultural Output, 1971–85

(annual or average annual growth, in percent)

PRODUCED NATIONAL INCOME

	1971–75	1976–80	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1981–85
Bulgaria	7.8	6.1	4.5	3.7	3.4	4.4	4.3	4.1
Czechoslovakia	5.6	3.7	0.2	2.9	1.2	2.2	2.2	1.7
East Germany	5.4	4.1	4.5	3.7	3.1	3.0	2.9	3.4
Hungary	6.2	3.2	1.8	1.4	2.2	2.4	2.1	2.0
Poland	9.8	1.6	−13.0	−7.5	1.6	1.7	2.0	−3.3
Romania	11.3	7.3	2.1	2.5	3.0	4.0	4.0	3.1
Eastern Europe	7.3	4.0	−1.2	0.6	2.3	2.7	2.8	1.4

GROSS INDUSTRIAL OUTPUT

	1971–75	1976–80	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1981–85
Bulgaria	9.2	6.0	5.6	4.0	4.7	4.6	4.5	4.7
Czechoslovakia	6.7	4.7	2.0	2.5	2.7	2.7	2.7	2.6
East Germany	6.5	5.1	5.1	4.0	3.8	3.5	3.4	3.9
Hungary	6.4	3.4	2.3	2.5	2.8	2.6	2.5	2.4
Poland	10.4	4.6	−19.0	−10.0	2.5	2.5	2.5	−4.8
Romania	13.0	9.4	4.5	3.5	4.5	5.5	5.5	4.7
Eastern Europe	8.7	5.7	−1.1	0.7	3.5	3.6	3.6	2.1

GROSS AGRICULTURAL OUTPUT

	1971–75	1976–80	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1981–85
Bulgaria	2.9	0.9	4.0	3.0	1.0	2.0	2.0	2.3
Czechoslovakia	2.6	2.1	−3.4	3.5	1.0	1.6	1.6	0.9
East Germany	2.7	1.2	3.0	1.0	2.5	2.3	2.2	2.3
Hungary	4.6	2.5	0.0	3.0	1.0	1.2	1.5	1.4
Poland	3.7	−1.6	4.0	4.8	2.3	1.5	1.6	2.7
Romania	6.5	3.8	−0.9	3.0	2.5	3.5	3.5	2.2
Eastern Europe	4.0	1.3	0.7	3.2	1.9	2.2	2.2	2.0

SOURCES AND METHODOLOGY: For 1971–81, official East European statistics as reported in the respective statistical yearbooks. For 1982–85, forecasts by the Centrally Planned Economies Service of the Wharton Econometric Forecasting Associates (see a discussion in the text below). The figures for Eastern Europe as a whole were aggregated by the author, using for purposes of weighting 1978 US government estimates of the gross national product and sectoral output of the individual countries, denominated in dollars. See Thad P. Alton, "Production and Resource Allocation in Eastern Europe: Performance, Problems, and Prospects," Joint Economic Committee, US Congress, *East European Economic Assessment*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1981, Part II, pp. 355 and 375.

half of the 1970's and in the early 1980's—from increased export sales.

Eastern Europe had little difficulty borrowing from the West on a massive scale. Aggregate net East European debt to the West, which at the end of 1970 had stood at US$6.0 billion, by the end of 1975 had reached US$21.2 billion, and at the end of 1980 stood at US$55.8 billion (see Table 2 on p. 4). The reason for the ease with which Eastern Europe borrowed some US$50 billion during the 1970's was the ample supply of loanable funds at the disposal of Western banks (especially after 1973, when they began to be flooded with surplus funds from member-states of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries—OPEC) and the eagerness of Western governments to stimulate exports (especially since the onset of a prolonged Western recession in 1975 after a fourfold increase in OPEC oil prices in 1974 coming on the heels of major increases in the prices of other raw materials in 1972–73).

Unfortunately, two unforeseen developments largely ruined East European plans to accelerate growth through increased imports of Western technology. First,

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Table 2: Eastern Europe's Net Hard-Currency Debt to Non-Communist Countries, 1970–85

(in billions of current US dollars)

	1970	1975	1980	1981	1985[a]	Percent change in real debt, 1981–85[b]
Bulgaria	0.7	2.1	2.5	2.2	2.5–3.5	4
Czechoslovakia	0.6	1.2	3.4	3.4	4.0–5.0	1
East Germany	1.4	4.8	11.6	12.8	16.0–17.0	–2
Hungary	0.6	2.3	6.6	7.2	8.0–9.0	–10
Poland	1.1	7.7	22.3	22.6	25.0–28.0	–11
Romania	1.6	3.1	9.4	10.1	12.0–13.0	–6
Eastern Europe	6.0	21.2	55.8	58.3	67.5–75.5	–6

[a] Forecast.
[b] Ratio of the mid-point 1985 debt estimate to the 1981 estimate, divided by the projected 7 percent change in the world price level between 1981 and 1985, measured in dollars.

SOURCES AND METHODOLOGY: *Wharton CPE Balance of Payments and Debt Review,* Washington, DC, Wharton Econometric Forecasting Associates, June 1982 edition.

The following methodological considerations should be noted: (1) the net hard-currency debt to the West is defined as gross hard-currency debt to Western banks (including most of the debt owed banks in the Middle East and the less-developed countries, where data are available), to Western governments, and to international financial organizations (the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, in the case of Romania), minus deposits from Eastern Europe in Western banks; (2) hard-currency debt among members of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA)—the total of which is equal to zero, by definition—is not included; (3) hard-currency assets of CMEA countries other than deposits in Western banks (gold, foreign exchange held by the central banks, hard-currency accounts held in banks outside the area of the Bank for International Settlements) are not taken into account; (4) categories of debt included are long- and medium-term debt, most short-term debt, the West German swing credit to East Germany, and some supplier credits (the swing credit—estimated at US$1.75 billion at the end of 1981—is viewed as a cumulative non-interest-bearing liability with no fixed repayment schedule); (5) all debt is evaluated at the appropriate foreign currency/dollar exchange rate applicable at the end of each year (thus, the portion of CMEA debt denominated in DM, French francs, British pounds, and Japanese yen declined in dollar value during 1981 in view of the strength of the dollar).

Western technology, when used in conjunction with Eastern labor without the usual Western market incentives and labor discipline, proved less productive than in the West. In effect, East European planners failed to allow for the impact of the economic, social, and political environment on the productivity of imported technology—something known in the West for some time as the "X-efficiency effect," a term first introduced by Harvey Leibenstein of Harvard University.[4] In addition, East European planners discovered that the primary cost of imports of Western technology—the cost of the machines, licenses, and know-how—was not the only cost. With a lag of a year or two, the imported Western technology generated its own requirements for increased imports of Western raw materials and semi-manufactures, which also had to be bought for hard currencies. Growing hard-currency shortages made it more and more difficult for Eastern Europe to maintain the level of imports of raw materials required for full utilization of the imported technology.[5]

A third major factor contributing to Eastern Europe's economic slowdown was the Western economic recession itself, which lowered demand for East European exports of manufactured and primary goods. As marginal suppliers of Western imports, East European economies were the first to be dropped by Western importers. The impact of the Western recession was greatly reinforced by the inability of East European countries to efficiently utilize the imported capital to cut costs and improve their competitive position vis-à-vis Western exporters. The difficulties due to stagnation or drops in the level of revenue from exports to the West were further aggravated by deterioration of Eastern Europe's terms of trade with developing countries and in most cases also with the developed West.[6]

A fourth factor contributing to the slowing of growth in Eastern Europe was the dramatic deterioration in the area's terms of trade with the Soviet Union, beginning in 1975 (see Table 3). Given the fourfold increase in the world market price of crude oil, as well as large increases in world market prices of other key raw materials, the USSR pressed East European countries into accepting a new price-setting formula in 1975. Prior to

[4] H. Leibenstein, "Allocative Efficiency v. X-Efficiency," *American Economic Review* (Menasha, WI), June 1966, pp. 392–415.

[5] For example, in the case of Poland, net imports (imports minus exports) of machinery and equipment from non-Communist countries began to decline rapidly after 1976, but net imports of raw materials (other than fuels and food) kept increasing in real terms through 1979 before dropping rapidly in 1980 and 1981. However, the decline in net imports of raw materials from US$1.9 billion in 1979 to US$0.2 billion in 1981 took place purely for financial reasons. Its main consequence was a rapid decline in industrial output (and hence also in utilization of industrial capacity), followed by a decline in exports.

[6] For example, aggregate East European terms of trade with developing countries are estimated to have declined 53 percent between 1970 and 1977 (see Jan Vanous, "Soviet and East European Foreign Trade in the 1970's: A Quantitative Assessment," in US Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *East European Economic Assessment,* Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1981, Part 2, p. 699). According to internal estimates by Wharton Econometric Forecasting Associates (Wharton) for the same period, terms of trade with the developed West improved only in the case of Romania (by 5.1 percent). There were declines of 10.8 percent for Czechoslovakia, 8.6 percent for Hungary, 7.5 percent for East Germany, 3.7 percent for Bulgaria, and 1.1 percent for Poland. See *Wharton Centrally Planned Economies Foreign Trade Price Databank, 1960–77,* Washington, DC, July 1981.

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Table 3: Trends in Eastern Europe's Terms of Trade with the Soviet Union, 1975–85

(1970 = 100)

	1975	1980	1981	1982	1985
Bulgaria	90	76	71	66	49
Czechoslovakia	86	77	71	65	48
East Germany	85	74	69	63	47
Hungary	81	68	64	60	44
Poland	95	83	78	74	55
Romania	103	86	85	83	61
Eastern Europe	89	77	72	67	49

SOURCES: For 1975, *Wharton CPE Foreign Trade Price Databank, 1960–77*, Washington, DC, Wharton Econometric Forecasting Associates, Fall 1981. For 1980 and 1981, author's estimates based on official Hungarian and Polish ruble-trade price statistics. For 1982 and 1985, author's own forecasts.

that year, intra-CMEA foreign trade prices had been held constant during five-year periods and had been based on averages of world market prices during the preceding five years. Under the new formula, intra-CMEA prices are changed every year on the basis of five-year moving averages of world market prices. As a consequence, the USSR in 1975 more than doubled the price for its oil exports to Eastern Europe.[7] As of that year, Soviet terms of trade with Eastern Europe had improved by an estimated 12 percent in comparison to 1970. By the decade's end, they had improved a full 30 percent.[8] And even then, as the analysis presented below shows, the Soviet Union had not fully utilized its bargaining potential vis-à-vis Eastern Europe but continued to transfer resources to the region in the form of hidden trade subsidies on a massive scale.

Finally, the USSR, enjoying far superior terms of trade in dealings with the West compared to those pertaining in Eastern Europe,[9] has proved eager to hold back on increases in supplies of fuels and nonfood raw materials to Eastern Europe. Faced with slower growth of these supplies and mounting inability to compensate by purchases in the non-Communist world (because of shortages of hard currencies and increasing difficulties in raising additional credits), East European planners were forced to accept lower growth rates of industrial production and investment.[10]

It should be noted, however, that East European growth rates were slow to reflect the unfavorable external economic conditions—deteriorating terms of trade with the Soviet Union and the West, and the Western recession. The sharp downturn really began only in 1978–80.[11] In part, this delay was due to objective differences in the way centrally planned economies respond to changing external economic conditions as compared with the way market economies do.[12] At the

[7] For a more detailed description of the inter-CMEA price-formation formula, see Jaromir Penkava, "Improvement of Price Formation in the Process of Socialist Economic Integration," *Finance a uver* (Prague), No. 10, 1975, pp. 651–57. The increase in the price of Soviet oil exported to Eastern Europe was calculated from *Vneshnyaya torgovlya SSSR za 1975 god* (USSR Foreign Trade in 1975), Moscow, Izdatel'stvo "Finansy i statistiki," 1976.

[8] The improvement in Soviet terms of trade with Eastern Europe mirrors exactly the deterioration in East European terms of trade with the Soviet Union. Thus, the 11 percent decline in East European terms of trade during 1970–75 represents a 12 percent improvement of Soviet terms of trade (100 divided by 89 = 1.12). Similarly, during 1970–80, Soviet terms of trade improved 30 percent (100 divided by 77 = 1.30).

[9] For example, Vanous, loc. cit., shows that between 1970 and 1977, Soviet terms of trade with the West improved 70 percent, and with Eastern Europe, a mere 23 percent. In addition, the presence of implicit trade subsidies granted by the USSR to Eastern Europe (discussed in detail below) means by definition that the Soviet Union has obtained inferior terms of trade in Eastern Europe compared to those obtainable in the world market.

[10] This type of response to import shortages is characteristic of centrally planned economies. Unable to pass the increased cost of imports on to domestic industrial enterprises and faced with growing payments difficulties, planners cut the domestic growth rate so as to ensure improved balance between aggregate supply of inputs and aggregate demand for the inputs based on targeted growth of output.

[11] Official East European national income statistics show that the downturn in growth rates began in 1978 for Poland and Hungary, in 1979 for Czechoslovakia, and in 1980 for Romania and Bulgaria. On the other hand, the East German growth rate accelerated steadily from 1978 until 1982, when it is likely to slow down.

[12] For a market economy, a deterioration in the terms of trade generally leads to rising trade deficits, followed by a decline in the value of the given country's currency vis-à-vis other currencies, increased cost of imports combined with greater export sales, and a

(fn. 12 continued on p. 6)

Ota Sik, right, former Deputy Premier of Czechoslovakia and architect of that country's economic reform in the mid-1960's, talks with Peter Colotka, Premier of the Slovak Socialist Republic, prior to a May 29, 1969, session of the Central Committee (CC) of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, at which Sik was expelled from the CC for views expressed during travels in the West.

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same time, political leaders were slow to lower growth targets, out of fear of the political consequences of a decline in living standards and increased consumer discontent. They preferred to delay adjustment, offsetting the effect of the unfavorable external developments noted above with an increased implicit transfer of resources from the Soviet Union and continued open borrowing in the developed West.

Implicit Soviet Trade Subsidies

Let us look first at the preferential trade treatment accorded to Eastern Europe by Moscow in the 1970's.[13] Throughout the decade, Soviet terms of trade with the region improved much more slowly under the intra-CMEA price-setting formula than they would have if this trade had occurred at prevailing world market prices. In effect, there was a large implicit transfer of resources from the Soviet Union to Eastern Europe in the form of hidden trade subsidies. The USSR exported relatively underpriced energy and nonfood raw materials to Eastern Europe in exchange for imports of relatively overpriced East European machinery and industrial consumer goods (the degree of "overpricing" of the latter looms even greater if one allows for the relatively low quality and low technological sophistication of East European manufactures relative to Western counterparts). The subsidies can be viewed as a saving of hard currency that Eastern Europe achieved by trading a particular bundle of export and import goods with the Soviet Union rather than with the West. To the Soviets, the subsidies represented an opportunity cost in terms of hard currency forgone by trading with Eastern Europe instead of with the West.

Some impression of the dimensions and trends in the implicit trade subsidies granted by the Soviet Union to Eastern Europe can be seen in Table 4. These subsidies increased dramatically in 1974 as Soviet prices of energy exported to Eastern Europe remained virtually unchanged at a time when the world market price of oil quadrupled. Even in 1975, when the USSR more than doubled the price for the oil it exported to Eastern Europe, the aggregate trade subsidies to Eastern Europe declined by only US$1 billion. During 1974–78, these subsidies averaged US$5.8 billion annually. Further increases in world market prices of energy subsequently pushed the level of Soviet subsidies to US$10.4 billion in 1979 and US$17.5 billion in 1980. Preliminary estimates indicate that subsidies may have increased slightly in 1981 to US$18.6 billion and may be expected to decline to US$15.1 billion in 1982.[14]

A distribution of credits, dollar debt, and subsidies underwritten by the USSR for each East European country and a comparison with the debt to the West (including a small debt to developing countries) accumu-

Table 4: Deficits in Eastern Europe's Trade with the USSR and the West,[a] 1973–82

(billions of current US dollars)

	Deficits in trade with USSR				
Year	Reported	Trade subsidies	Total	Deficits in trade with West[a]	Grand total
1973	–0.6[b]	1.6	1.0	2.2	3.2
1974	0.1	6.3	6.4	4.9	11.3
1975	0.5	5.3	5.8	5.7	11.5
1976	0.7	5.6	6.3	6.0	12.3
1977	1.2	5.9	7.1	5.3	12.4
1978	0.1	5.8	5.9	5.6	11.5
1979[c]	0.9	10.4	11.3	5.0	16.3
1980[c]	1.6	17.5	19.1	3.7	22.8
1981[c]	2.7	18.6	21.3	0.5	21.8
1982[d]	3.3	15.1	18.4	0.7	19.1

[a] Including developing countries.
[b] Surplus.
[c] Preliminary estimate.
[d] Forecast.

SOURCES AND METHODOLOGY: Reported deficits in East European trade with the USSR calculated from official Soviet foreign trade statistics denominated in rubles and converted into dollars at an exchange rate of 1.18 rubles to the dollar. For trade subsidies in 1973–80, see Michael Marrese and Jan Vanous, *Implicit Subsidies and Non-Market Benefits in Soviet Trade with Eastern Europe*, Berkeley, CA, Institute of International Studies, University of California, summer 1982 (1980 is a revised estimate by the author); 1981–82 figures are the author's own estimates. The total deficits in Eastern Europe's trade with the USSR were derived by adding reported deficits and trade subsidies. Deficits in East European trade with the West are from *Wharton CPE Foreign Trade Flow Data Bank*, Washington, DC, Wharton Econometric Forecasting Associates, April 1982 edition.

downward adjustment in domestic aggregate output. This response occurs more or less automatically, and the adjustment is quite rapid—barring government intervention intended to slow the process. In the case of a centrally planned economy, this mechanism of transmission of external disturbances into the domestic economy is absent. The slowdown in the domestic aggregate output is not automatic, but requires direct intervention by central planners (see fn. 10). Since central planners are generally hesitant to make the required adjustment until they are certain that the change in external economic conditions is not just temporary, they tend to respond to these changing conditions with considerable delays and, in fact, generate a socialist version of Western business cycles.

[13] This section draws extensively on material presented in Michael Marrese and Jan Vanous, *Implicit Subsidies and Non-Market Benefits in Soviet Trade with Eastern Europe*, Berkeley, CA, Institute of International Studies, University of California, Summer 1982. Some of the points were also presented in Jan Vanous and Michael Marrese, "Soviet Subsidies to Eastern Economies," *The Wall Street Journal* (New York, NY), Jan. 15, 1982, p. 24.

[14] Estimates of Soviet implicit trade subsidies are sensitive to assumptions about pricing of East European exports of machinery and industrial consumer goods to the Soviet Union relative to prices obtainable on the world market. For example, Soviet trade subsidies to Poland in 1980 were estimated to be in the range of US$3.0–3.6 billion, the lower estimate based on the extreme assumption that Polish machinery was equal in quality to Western machinery and that the official Soviet ruble/dollar exchange rate (1.4:1) was the appropriate conversion rate for translating this ruble trade flow into dollars. For more detail, see Elisabeth Goldstein, "Soviet Economic Assistance to Poland, 1980–81," a paper prepared for the Joint Economic Committee of the US Congress for a volume entitled *Soviet Economy in the 1980's: Problems and Prospects*, Washington, DC, Government Printing Office, forthcoming in 1982.

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Table 5: Eastern Europe's Debt Incurred and Nonrepayable Aid Received, 1972–81

(billions of 1981 US dollars)

	Debt incurred to and nonrepayable aid from Soviet Union					
	Present value of ruble credits	Dollar debt	Present value of trade subsidies	Total	Debt to the West[a]	Total
Bulgaria	1.3	n.a.	17.8	19.1	1.4	20.5
Czechoslovakia	0.7	n.a.	19.5	20.2	2.8	23.0
East Germany	2.2	n.a.	33.5	35.7	11.2	46.9
Hungary	0.4	n.a.	12.2	12.6	6.4	19.0
Poland	2.8	2.0	17.9	22.7	21.6	44.3
Romania	−0.5[b]	n.a.	1.0	0.5	8.3	8.8
Eastern Europe	6.9	2.0	101.9	110.8	51.7	162.5

[a] Including small amount of debt to developing countries.
[b] Negative figure implies that Romania was a net creditor of the Soviet Union during the indicated period.

SOURCES AND METHODOLOGY: Ruble credits were calculated from annual Soviet foreign trade yearbooks, denominated in rubles, assuming a 5 percent interest rate in 1972–81 and converted into dollars at 1.18 rubles to the dollar. The dollar debt is a Wharton estimate based on communication from the Polish government. On the trade subsidies, see Michael Marrese and Jan Vanous, *Implicit Subsidies and Non-Market Benefits in Soviet Trade with Eastern Europe,* Berkeley, CA, Institute of International Studies, University of California Press, Summer 1982. Debt incurred to the West is calculated as the difference between 1971 and 1981 net debt figures in *Wharton CPE Debt and Balance of Payments Data Bank,* Washington, DC, Wharton Econometric Forecasting Associates, Spring 1982.

lated by each are offered in Table 5. During the decade 1972–81, the total transfer of resources from the outside world to Eastern Europe amounted to US$162 billion in terms of 1981 dollars. The Soviet Union accounted for 68 percent of the total, while the West accounted for the remaining 32 percent. The bulk of the Soviet transfer of resources—almost 92 percent—took the form of hidden trade subsidies. The largest share of these subsidies went to East Germany (33 percent), followed by Czechoslovakia (19 percent), Poland (18 percent), Bulgaria (17 percent), Hungary (12 percent), and Romania (1 percent). By 1980, the annual amount of implicit Soviet trade subsidies represented 2.8 percent of combined East European GNP.[15] However, if we consider that these subsidies were embodied in supplies of energy and key raw materials, their importance to Eastern Europe is far greater.

One must question why the Soviet Union has concurred in this seemingly unfavorable arrangement. The benefits to the Soviets are mainly military, political, and ideological, rather than economic. Militarily, the USSR is compensated by the existence of the Warsaw Pact—which provides a buffer of several hundred miles between the Soviet Union and Western Europe, forward military bases in Eastern Europe, a partial substitute for the direct use of Soviet manpower and hardware, and even proxy interventions (particularly by East Germany) in Third World countries on Soviet behalf. Politically, Soviet preferential trade treatment serves to sustain the allegiance of and to maintain dominance over the ruling Communist parties of Eastern Europe. These countries usually vote along alliance lines in international forums, and give informal support to the USSR in government and media statements. Soviet assistance permits East European political leaders to maintain a higher living standard for their populations than otherwise possible (without major reforms) and thereby to avoid economic discontent, which could turn into political discontent. It even wins the support and friendship of certain segments of the East European populaces. Ideologically, Eastern Europe by and large officially accepts the Soviet model and propagandizes it in other countries. Finally, there are even some economic benefits accruing to the USSR in return for its trade subsidies: increased economic stability in Eastern Europe, a reduced risk of disruption in the flow of certain strategic machinery from East Germany and Czechoslovakia (items technologically superior to what the Soviets are capable of producing), and a lower likelihood that Eastern Europe will refuse to purchase Soviet exports for reasons other than their price competitiveness (such as a politically inspired refusal to purchase Soviet gas or oil).

At the same time, however, it is open to question how much better off Eastern Europe really is for having received these subsidies. Clearly, they helped to sustain a significantly higher living standard than would have been possible otherwise assuming adherence to the existing economic model. However, if the Soviet trade subsidies are viewed as "payment" for further limits on East European sovereignty, the answer is probably that

[15] The US government estimates the combined 1980 East European gross national product at US$627 billion. See *NFAC Handbook of Economic Statistics,* Washington, DC, Government Printing Office, 1981, p. 26. In Table 4, the 1980 Soviet subsidies are estimated at $US17.5 billion.

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the region is significantly worse off. An independent Eastern Europe, free to restructure both its internal and external economic relationships, would probably be far more productive. It is unlikely that trade subsidies make up for the low productivity of the current economic system imposed on Eastern Europe by the Soviet Union.

Indeed, the "addictive" Soviet trade subsidies have had an important distorting influence on the East European economies. By providing relatively cheap energy—for example, in 1981 the Soviet price for oil was 70 percent and for gas was 51 percent below comparable world market prices, assuming a realistic ruble/dollar exchange rate of 1.18 rubles to the dollar—the Soviet Union has encouraged energy wastefulness on the part of the economies of Eastern Europe (except in the case of Romania, which has only itself to blame). In comparison with Western Europe, Eastern Europe consumes at least twice as much energy per unit of GNP. Even though this discrepancy in part reflects a higher relative share of energy-intensive industries (metallurgy, machinery, chemicals) in total East European industrial production, a comparison on an industry-by-industry basis reveals that energy consumption per identical unit of output in the East typically runs 50 to 150 percent above that in the West. By distorting the relative price of energy, the USSR has contributed to the lack of preparedness of East European economies for the economic reality of the high energy prices of the world market in the 1980's. Without necessarily intending to do so, the Soviet Union may have seriously damaged the ability of East European economies to become competitive and thereby have threatened their long-term viability.[16]

Key Factors for the Future

The economic outlook for Eastern Europe during the first half of the 1980's depends on a number of important, primarily external, factors. These include trends in Soviet trade, in Soviet assistance, in Western economic recovery and credit policies, and in the crippled Polish economy. To this list, one should add at least two internal factors: the direction of policy regarding economic reforms and measures to reduce consumption of energy and raw materials. And finally, there is the perennial question of weather. Let us examine these factors in brief.

1. Soviet–East European terms of trade. The expected trends in the terms of trade with the USSR are very unfavorable for Eastern Europe. Prices of Soviet exports to the region in 1981 are estimated to have increased 17 percent, while prices of Soviet imports from the region increased only about 8 percent. This differential resulted in a 6 percent deterioration in East European terms of trade with the Soviets.[17] It is virtually certain that a similar deterioration in Eastern Europe's terms of trade is occurring in 1982.

The main cause of the ongoing deterioration is the rapid increase in the prices of fuels (oil, refined oil products, gas, coal, coke, and electricity) imported by Eastern Europe relative to the prices of East European manufactured goods exported to the Soviet Union. This trend is expected to continue at least through 1985 (see Table 3 on p. 5), as the intra-CMEA price-setting formula gradually comes to reflect the near-tripling in world market prices of energy that took place during 1979–81.

Relative to 1980, aggregate East European terms of trade are expected to decline by some 36 percent by 1985. If the comparison is made with 1970, then in relative terms, one ruble's worth of East European exports in 1985 will purchase less than one half the amount of typical Soviet goods it did 15 years earlier. Working from data in Table 3, we can expect the largest deterioration in terms of trade for 1970–85 to occur for Hungary (56 percent), followed by East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria (51–53 percent), Poland (45 percent), and Romania (39 percent).

This trend poses serious dilemmas for both Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. While trying to induce the USSR to maintain or even increase real exports of energy and nonfood raw materials to Eastern Europe, the latter must figure out how to pay for these increasingly costly imports. It must persuade the Soviet Union to increase direct financial assistance to the region either in the form of low-cost ruble trade credits or outright ruble grants. Moreover, Eastern Europe must try to maintain satisfactory levels of exports to the West in order to service its debt obligations there and satisfy domestic needs at a time when it is being pressed to greatly increase exports of manufactures to the Soviet Union to pay for increasingly costly imports. The Soviet dilemma, conversely, is precisely how to induce Eastern Europe to boost the manufacture and export to the USSR of higher-quality manufactured goods (goods more comparable to manufactures that the Soviets can import from the West) to offset the expected rapid rise in Soviet export earnings in Eastern Europe.

[16] "Consequences of Soviet Subsidization of East European Economies," *Wharton Centrally Planned Economies Current Analysis* (Washington, DC), Apr. 29, 1982.

[17] "East European Terms of Trade with the Soviet Union in 1981–82," ibid., May 10, 1982.

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2. Soviet assistance. There is little doubt that the USSR will be compelled to continue large-scale economic assistance (direct and indirect) to Eastern Europe during the 1980's, albeit probably on a somewhat lower scale than during 1980–81, when Soviet assistance averaged the equivalent of more than US$20 billion a year. In this regard, the Soviet leadership, whether Leonid Brezhnev or his successors, faces an increasingly difficult decision. Eastern Europe clearly is a key Soviet political and military asset, but the economic cost of this asset may soon outweigh the noneconomic benefits that it provides.

During the 1970's, the Soviet political leadership did not have to be very seriously concerned with the cost of maintaining its "empire," for the Soviet economy was growing at a fairly satisfactory rate and was enjoying advantageous external economic relations. Between 1970 and 1980, the USSR benefited from extremely favorable developments in the country's terms of trade with non-Communist countries, as world market oil prices increased 20-fold, gold prices increased 14-fold, and prices of many other Soviet raw-material exports tripled. By contrast, the prices of Soviet imports of manufactured goods and grain grew by only 100–150 percent.[18]

Prospects for the Soviet economy in the 1980's are fundamentally different. Soviet national income is likely to grow by at most 3 percent per annum, and more likely at a rate closer to 2 percent.[19] Soviet terms of trade with non-Communist countries are not expected to improve to any significant degree, as most forecasters now conclude that world energy prices will probably follow the general trend of inflation closely.[20] The

[18] Author's own estimates, based on *Wharton Centrally Planned Economies Foreign Trade Price Databank.*

[19] Wharton, *Centrally Planned Economies Outlook* (Washington, DC), April 1982, p. 37.

[20] For example, Wharton predicts that world market prices of energy in US dollar terms will rise 6.0 percent a year in 1980–87, while prices of primary raw materials will grow 4.6 percent, and prices of manufactures will grow 5.1 percent. See Wharton, *World Economic Outlook* (Philadelphia, PA), May 1982, pp. 240–42.

Erich Honecker (left of center), General Secretary of the Socialist Unity Party of the German Democratic Republic, during a March 1980 visit to the new Buna Chemical Works in Halle, designed to produce plastic materials out of East German raw materials and Soviet petroleum.

—Eastfoto.

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

Yugoslav and Hungarian sections of the "Adria" oil pipeline are welded together near Csurgo in southwestern Hungary. The line, begun in 1977, is designed to facilitate importing of oil from the Middle East to the two countries, as well as to Czechoslovakia.

—Interfoto MTI from Camera Press.

mounting burden of defense, as the USSR attempts to maintain parity with the US (or the degree of superiority that the Soviet Union has gained in the 1970's, according to some estimates), will force the Soviet leaders to make difficult choices.

Since the Soviet leaders attach the highest priority to defense, the cutbacks or slower growth can occur in three areas: domestic consumption, domestic investment, or foreign economic assistance. Although it is probable that all three will be affected, the first two are likely to suffer more than the third. Since foreign economic assistance, especially preferential trade treatment of Eastern Europe, serves as a substitute for standard types of military expenditure, it will probably enjoy the second highest priority, behind defense.

Since commodity prices are not expected to rise more rapidly than other prices on the world market in the first half of the 1980's, the intra-CMEA pricing formula should gradually bring intra-CMEA commodity prices closer to those prevailing on the world market, and thereby tend to reduce the scale of implicit Soviet trade subsidies. In this circumstance, we can reasonably expect that the scale of open Soviet aid to Eastern Europe will increase. (The alternative would seem to be to plunge the region into deep economic recession, with serious political consequences.) To hide this aid burden from its own population and to make the aid more palatable to the East Europeans, the USSR is likely to opt for low-interest ruble trade credits or term its aid "development assistance to restructure the economies of Eastern Europe."[21] In this way, the Soviets would recycle some of their "petrorubles" in a fashion similar to that in which OPEC countries recycled "petrodollars" in the West during the 1970's. Such recycling of "petrorubles" would, in turn, ease the economic burden that rapidly deteriorating terms of trade with the Soviet Union will impose on Eastern Europe. Finally, in order to prevent the region from building a rapidly increasing debt to the USSR in the 1980's, we can reasonably expect that the Soviets will periodically write off some of this debt, thereby converting loans into genuine financial aid.

From the Soviet perspective, the shift from transfer of resources through implicit subsidies contained in distorted relative prices to transfer via lump-sum payments should have a positive efficiency effect on the economic policies of Eastern Europe. Lump-sum Soviet transfers combined with more realistic pricing for East European imports, particularly of energy, will tend to force the recipients of aid to consume those imports according to their true scarcity.

3. Western markets and credits. The economic outlook for Eastern Europe in the first half of the 1980's will also depend on the state of Western economies, their demand for East European exports, and the availability of new credits to the East.

A vigorous Western economic recovery is essential for improvement in the level of East European exports to the West. Realistically, however, such a recovery could begin to have an impact no earlier than 1983, and it may not be felt with any strength until 1984.[22]

With regard to the ability of Eastern Europe to obtain new credits from Western commercial banks and governments, one would have to be rather pessimistic at this point. Our current estimate is that between 1981 and 1985, the net hard-currency debt of Eastern

[21] For example, the latter form of economic assistance is advocated by Hungarian economists in informal discussions with Western economists. The important difference between these two types of credits is that ruble trade credits are a form of general-purpose financial (balance-of-payments) assistance, while development loans are tied to particular investment projects. Presumably, the Soviets would invest in projects that would increase East European capacity to export to Soviet markets, thus ensuring the repayment through additional exports in the latter half of the 1980's and in the 1990's.

[22] Wharton predicts that the combined gross domestic product for the members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) will increase a mere 0.8 percent in real terms in 1982, 3.6 percent in 1983, and 3.1 percent in both 1984 and 1985. Wharton, *World Economic Outlook,* May 1982, p. 223. Demand for East European exports is expected to pick up with a time lag of about six months, as Western buyers turn first to their usual suppliers and only later to marginal suppliers in Eastern Europe.

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Europe to the non-Communist world will increase by only US$9–17 billion, or some 16–30 percent in current-dollar terms (see Table 2 on p. 4). If so, the growth of the East European debt will not even keep pace with an expected global average annual rate of inflation of 7 percent, 1982–85.[23] Therefore, Western credits are not likely to be a major factor in increasing Eastern Europe's ability to import from the West. (It might be noted, though, that the expected stability of relative commodity prices on the world market may bring some relief to Eastern Europe. During the 1970's, most East European countries experienced a decline in their terms of trade with non-Communist countries, and the arresting of this trend should be welcome.[24])

4. The Polish factor. The state of the Polish economy will have a major impact on the rest of Eastern Europe. Aggregate Polish output is not expected to regain its 1978 peak level before 1990.[25] This ailing economy will retard economic growth in the region in three principal ways. First, Poland will require increased Soviet economic assistance to keep it afloat, and some, if not all, of this assistance will be diverted by the Soviets from other potential East European recipients (assuming, as seems reasonable, that the USSR will not increase the pool of resources it transfers to Eastern Europe but rather will opt for their redistribution). Second, the continued threat of Poland's default on its debt will exert pressure on Western banks and governments to limit the growth of their exposure in Eastern Europe. A state of no growth (in real terms) in Western credit will curtail the ability of Eastern Europe to accelerate imports from the West and to increase domestic growth rates. Finally, continued disruptions in Polish trade with Eastern

[23] Wharton anticipates a very cautious attitude toward new loans to Eastern Europe on the part of Western commercial banks and governments. Preference will be given to short-term rather than medium- and long-term loans (those over 24 months). Most loans will have to meet criteria required for balance-of-payments (general purpose) loans, which are more stringent than project-loan criteria.

[24] For example, between 1970 and 1977, the terms of trade with non-Communist countries declined 23 percent for Bulgaria and Romania, 22 percent for Czechoslovakia, 18 percent for East Germany and Hungary, and 9 percent for Poland. These estimates are from *Wharton Centrally Planned Economies Foreign Trade Price Databank*, July 1981.

[25] This is the baseline scenario in Wharton long-term forecasts for Poland. See Wharton Econometric Forecasting Associates, *Centrally Planned Economies Longterm Projections*, Washington, DC, Fall 1981, p. 40.



Miners in the Katowice area of Poland: revival of high levels of coal production is critical to Polish economic recovery and meeting the country's obligations to its East European trade partners.

—Vincent Mentzel.

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Europe will cause problems in selected East European industries that depend on Polish supplies. For example, disruption in deliveries of Polish coal, coke, sulfur, and copper have been reported to have caused shortfalls in output of electricity, steel, sulfuric acid, and copper wire in Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and Hungary.

5. *Economic reforms.* Even if meaningful economic reforms were immediately introduced in countries other than Hungary, they would not be likely to have a significant impact on aggregate economic growth during the first half of the 1980's. In fact, economic reforms may have a negative impact on growth in the short run. Substantive economic reform implies changes in the organizational structure of the economy, use of the price mechanism instead of planning as a signal of scarcity, changes in output and input mix, etc. During the "learning period," which may take two to three years, enterprise managers are bound to encounter unfamiliar problems, which will take time to resolve. Thus, during this "learning period" of reform, the output of the economy may well grow more slowly than in the past.

However, even in the short term, reforms could begin to improve the "quality" of economic growth. That is, they could foster a more balanced growth and production of more goods of higher quality, thereby eliminating an imbalanced growth that has tended to produce simultaneous shortages in some areas of the economy and surpluses in other areas. In addition, reforms could prove an important psychological factor in increasing the willingness of people to work, by raising their stake in the performance of the economy, and hence could contribute to higher labor productivity.

6. *Conservation measures.* Another development that could relieve some of the pressure on East European economies during the first half of the 1980's would be the successful introduction of measures to conserve energy and reduce inputs of raw materials per unit of output. Since a significant portion of energy and raw materials is imported and since a 1 percent reduction in domestic consumption of these commodities typically reduces the volume of imports by more than 1 percent,[26] the savings of scarce foreign exchange (hard-currency and increasingly also rubles) could be considerable.

These savings, in turn, could be used to finance other types of imports or to reduce the volume of exports of those goods which are urgently needed by the domestic economy. In either case, the domestic supply of other scarce inputs could increase, permitting faster growth in sectors previously subject to foreign-exchange constraints. In view of the considerable uncertainty surrounding the developments in this area, we assume only very slow improvement during 1982–85. Better-than-expected performance by East European economies in implementing conservation measures could lift the projected annual growth rates of net material product and industrial output perhaps by as much as 1 to 2 percentage points.

7. *Weather.* As was pointed out earlier (fn. 2), the weather pattern in 1976–80 was less favorable to agriculture than usual (two good years, two bad years, and one year that was at best mediocre). Given that 1981 was a relatively good year and 1982 promises to be at least as good as 1981, there is a good chance for better-than-average weather during 1981–85. This, in turn, should give an important break to East European performance in agriculture.

Prospects Through 1985

At this point, it is possible to make some specific projections regarding the economic outlook for Eastern Europe through 1985. These projections are based on the following assumptions with regard to factors described in the preceding section:

- Aggregate East European terms of trade with the Soviet Union will decline by about one third by 1985 relative to 1980.

- The Soviet Union will maintain significant economic assistance to Eastern Europe in the form of a combination of implicit trade subsidies and ruble loans—by 1985, this assistance should still be about two thirds of the 1980 level in real terms, or an equivalent of US$16–18 billion in current-dollar terms.

- Western economic recovery will begin in late 1982, but will not have an appreciable impact on East European exports to the West before mid-1983.

- The ability of East European countries to obtain new credits from Western commercial banks and governments will be significantly constrained over the next few years—East European debt to the West (including debt to Latin American and Arab countries) will increase to no

[26] For example, if the domestic supply of a particular raw material satisfies only 50 percent of domestic demand, then a 1 percent increase in output of a good using this raw material requires a 2 percent increase in imports—(101 minus 50) divided by 50 = 1.02. Hence, in this particular case, if domestic consumption of this raw material declines 1 percent, thanks to conservation measures, then imports will fall 2 percent.

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more than US$67.5–75.5 billion by 1985, and thus will probably not keep pace with inflation.

- Aggregate Polish output will not regain its 1978 peak level before 1990, unless the West aids Poland in a massive way during the next few years.

- Economic reforms are unlikely to have a significant impact on aggregate East European economic growth during the first half of the 1980's.

- Prospects are not good for a rapid reduction of unit requirements of energy and raw materials through conservation measures.

- Weather is likely to be more favorable for East European agriculture in 1981–85 than it was in 1976–80.

The projections below were prepared with the aid of macroeconometric models of each of the six East European economies, constructed by the Centrally Planned Economies Service of Wharton Econometric Forecasting Associates. The forecast represents the "baseline" scenario, i.e., the forecast we believe is most likely. Forecasters frequently prepare alternative scenarios—high-growth or low-growth—based on different assumptions about the impact of exogenous variables. However, for reasons of space and in view of the much lower probability we would attach to such alternative scenarios, I have restricted discussion here to the "baseline" scenario.

There are advantages and weaknesses in using an econometric model for such forecasting. On the positive side, the results reflect a comprehensive, integrated, internally consistent view of developments in each economy. Since the model is an interdependent system of technical and behavioral relations, the analysis is able to encompass, in quantitative terms, the indirect as well as the direct effects—the total system impact—of the various assumptions under consideration in the alternative scenario projections. On the negative side, the results of projections are not precise. Much depends on

A private farmer sowing seed near Kolno, Poland, in September 1981.

—Jean Pierre Laffont/SYGMA.

the judgment and insight of the analysts. Finally, since the model has been specified to reflect past behavior or trends, it is not likely to provide much guidance in projecting events if the basic structure of the system changes radically.[27]

Let us turn now to the actual forecast. Table 1 (on p. 3) gives projections of the annual growth rates of three major economic indicators—produced national income (or net material product), gross industrial output, and gross agricultural output—for individual East European countries and for the region as a whole for the years 1982–85.[28] For the whole period 1981–85, aggregate East European national income is expected to increase at an average annual rate of only 1.4 percent, as compared with 7.3 percent in 1971–75 and 4.0 percent in 1976–80. After a 1.2 percent decline in East European national income in 1981 (largely because of a 13 percent decline in Polish national income), a mild

[27] While there is insufficient space here to go with any detail into the structure of the individual country models, several points should be made. First, theoretical analysis of centrally planned economies considers the supply (production) side as dominant, in contrast with the demand factors stressed in analysis of Western market economies. Thus, broadly speaking, the direction of major causality in these models runs from fully employed inputs (labor and capital) through the production process to final uses.

Second, labor and capital investment are "allocated" to three major sectors—agriculture, industry, and "other." For agriculture, production functions link levels of output to available land, labor, capital and/or current purchases (primarily fertilizer). Similarly, production functions for the other major sectors link production to available capital stock and labor. A major source of differences among projections is the differing assumptions regarding the rate of growth of total factor productivity.

Third, energy consumption is derived from the level of economic activity, with deficits of energy covered by imports of fuel. (Of course, one can iterate the solution of a particular model so as to reach growth compatible with an "acceptable level of net imports of fuels.")

Fourth, in linking imports and exports in trade with the West, the model takes into consideration the use of Western credits to finance imports. The ratio of imports to exports is modeled as a function of an assumed "acceptable" (to Western creditors) debt-service ratio.

Finally, total national product is divided among end uses—the major categories being accumulation (investment, capital repair, changes in inventories), consumption (both private and public), and other uses (including defense, net trade, losses, etc.). This allocation is largely based on exogenously set parameters and thus provides another major source of differences among projections.

[28] See fns. 1 and 2 above for qualifications with respect to the meaning of these statistics.

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recovery is anticipated in 1982 (0.6 percent growth), followed by a modest 2.3–2.8 percent annual growth for the remaining three years. For the period 1981–85, the Polish economy should show an average 3.3 percent annual decline in national income.[29] During 1981–85, the fastest economic growth is projected for Bulgaria (with an average annual growth rate of 4.1 percent), followed by East Germany (3.4 percent), Romania (3.1 percent), Hungary (2.0 percent), and Czechoslovakia (1.7 percent).

The pattern of projected growth of gross industrial output both for Eastern Europe as a whole and for individual countries tends to be very close to that of national income and requires little additional comment. The most important aspect of the forecast is the anticipated dramatic deceleration in the 1981–85 average annual growth rate—to 2.1 percent for the region as a whole, as compared with 8.7 percent in 1971–75 and 5.7 percent in 1976–80.

As for gross agricultural output, the average annual East European growth rate is expected to reach 2.0 percent in 1981–85, somewhat higher than the 1.3 percent in 1976–80 but still a mere one half of the 1971–75 rate of 4.0 percent. Gross agricultural output is anticipated to increase fastest in the case of Poland (2.7 percent per annum, reflecting recovery from the relatively depressed level of the period 1976–80), followed by Bulgaria and East Germany (2.3 percent), Romania (2.2 percent), Hungary (1.4 percent), and Czechoslovakia (0.9 percent).

Developments in East European trade with the Soviet Union and with non-Communist countries are projected in Table 6. In both cases, the anticipated structure of exports and imports in 1985 is compared to that in 1980.

Most notable in the trade with the USSR is the projected aggregate deficit for East Europe of 4.0 billion rubles in 1985.[30] While the structure of East European exports to the Soviet Union is expected to change hardly at all, in the case of East European imports from the USSR, an increase in the share of fuels from 41 percent in 1980 to 54 percent in 1985 is anticipated. In value terms, East European imports of fuels from the Soviet Union are expected to increase 138 percent by 1985, although the quantity of these imports is projected to decline only about 3 percent relative to the 1980 level

[29] Reflecting the Wharton baseline projection (see fn. 25).

[30] If implicit Soviet trade subsidies decline dramatically over the next four years, this deficit could well be substantially higher. It is anticipated here that in 1985 the combined size of the Soviet ruble trade surplus with Eastern Europe and the implicit trade subsidies should amount to an equivalent of about US$16–18 billion, i.e., about two thirds of the 1980 amount, measured in real terms.

Table 6: Eastern Europe's Trade with the USSR and with Non-Communist Countries, 1980 and 1985

(in millions of current rubles, percent of total in parentheses)

TRADE WITH THE USSR

	Exports				Imports			
	1980		1985		1980		1985	
Machinery	10,800	(56)	19,900	(59)	6,171	(30)	8,100	(21)
Fuels	401	(2)	700	(2)	8,599	(41)	20,500	(54)
Nonfood raw materials	2,912	(15)	4,200	(12)	5,440	(26)	8,300	(22)
Food	1,942	(10)	2,800	(8)	146	(1)	400	(1)
Nonfood consumer goods	3,403	(17)	6,400	(19)	467	(2)	700	(2)
All goods	19,458	(100)	34,000	(100)	20,823	(100)	38,000	(100)

TRADE WITH NON-COMMUNIST COUNTRIES

	Exports				Imports			
	1980		1985		1980		1985	
Machinery	6,718	(22)	10,100	(22)	7,257	(21)	8,300	(18)
Fuels	6,395	(20)	9,300	(20)	6,192	(18)	12,600	(28)
Nonfood raw materials	9,102	(29)	13,650	(29)	14,430	(41)	16,550	(37)
Food	3,948	(13)	5,900	(13)	5,319	(15)	6,100	(13)
Nonfood consumer goods	4,934	(16)	7,400	(16)	1,582	(5)	1,800	(4)
All goods	31,907	(100)	46,350	(100)	34,780	(100)	45,350	(100)

SOURCES: For 1980, *Wharton CPE Foreign Trade Databank*, Washington, DC, Wharton Econometric Forecasting Associates, April 1982 edition. For 1985, author's own forecast.

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Table 7: East European Oil Consumption, Production, and Trade, 1980–85[a]

(millions of metric tons)

	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985
Apparent domestic consumption	97.6	93.9	94.0	96.0	98.0	100.0
Exports	22.0	18.1	18.0	18.0	18.0	18.0
Total oil requirements	119.6	112.0	112.0	114.0	116.0	118.0
Domestic production	14.1	14.2	14.0	14.0	14.0	14.0
Imports	105.5	97.8	98.0	100.0	102.0	104.0
Of which:						
From Soviet Union	80.6	79.3	76.5	75.5	74.0	72.5
From OPEC and other sources	24.9	18.5	21.5	24.5	28.0	31.5

[a] Consumption, exports, and imports include refined oil products. The table concerns itself only with oil as a primary energy source—hence domestic production of oil excludes refined oil products, which are a secondary (derived) energy source based mostly on imported crude oil.

SOURCES: For 1980–81, *Wharton CPE Energy Databank,* Washington, DC, Wharton Econometric Forecasting Associates, March 1982 edition. For 1982–85, author's own forecast.

(with reduced oil deliveries to be compensated by additional deliveries of gas and electricity—see below).

Trade with non-Communist countries is expected to be more in balance. Most significant is the sharp projected increase (a doubling) in the cost of energy imports from the 1980 level. This, it is anticipated, will bring the share of energy in the total import bill from non-Communist partners to 28 percent in 1985, as compared with 18 percent in 1980.[31] This is a reflection of a projected decline in the quantity of Soviet oil deliveries, which will have to be offset by increased imports from OPEC, primarily in 1983–85 (see Table 7). In quantitative terms, it is anticipated here that Eastern Europe will be able to increase oil imports from non-Soviet sources (mostly OPEC) to 31.5 million metric tons in 1985, as compared with 24.9 million metric tons in 1980.

The increase in the share of fuels in total East European imports from non-Communist countries will lead to a corresponding decline in the share of imports of all other goods. In value terms, the latter are expected to increase a mere 15 percent by 1985, which, because of inflation, should actually represent a 15–20 percent decline in the physical quantities of such imports. It is not anticipated that the structure of East European exports to the West will change at all.

Greater detail on the projected development of trade of individual East European countries with the non-Communist world during 1982–85 as well as the actual results for 1980–81 are presented in Table 8 (see p. 16). Between 1980 and 1985, East European exports to non-Communist countries are expected to increase 49 percent, from US$31.1 billion to US$46.4 billion. This implies a growth of roughly 6 percent in real terms over the entire five-year period, or about 1 percent a year. East European imports from these countries are projected to rise only 30 percent, from US$34.8 billion in 1980 to US$45.4 billion in 1985. In this trade, Bulgaria's exports and imports are expected to grow the fastest (72 and 172 percent respectively, the latter figure reflecting the relatively low level of imports in 1980). In all other cases, it is anticipated that the growth of exports will exceed that of imports: for Czechoslovakia, 40 percent vs. 39 percent; for East Germany, 55 percent vs. 26 percent; for Hungary, 44 percent vs. 13 percent; for Poland, 28 percent vs. 4 percent; and for Romania, 66 percent vs. 30 percent. The net result should be an aggregate surplus in East European trade with non-Communist countries amounting to some US$1 billion in 1985, as compared with a deficit of US$3.7 billion in 1980.

The implications of the projected developments in East European trade with the non-Communist world for East European debt to these areas were set forth in Table 2 (on p. 4 above). While it is anticipated that the aggregate East European debt will amount to US$67.5–75.5 by 1985 in nominal terms, this debt is expected to fall in real terms (i.e., as corrected for expected inflation) for all countries except Bulgaria. If one takes the median projection, there would be an estimated 6 percent decline of debt in real terms for the region.

Conclusions

The economic slowdown in Eastern Europe through 1985 depicted in these projections is a serious one.

[31] On the assumption that the world market price for oil of will be US$43 per barrel in 1985.

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Table 8: Hard-Currency Exports and Imports in Eastern Europe's Trade with Non-Communist Countries, 1980–85

(millions of current US dollars)

EXPORTS[a]

	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985
Bulgaria	3,027	3,191	3,150	3,800	4,500	5,200
Czechoslovakia	4,526	4,283	4,650	5,050	5,700	6,350
East Germany	5,277	5,206	5,750	6,400	7,250	8,200
Hungary[b]	3,966	3,733	4,000	4,500	5,050	5,700
Poland	7,496	5,431	5,900	6,900	8,050	9,600
Romania	6,805	7,724	8,150	9,100	10,150	11,300
Eastern Europe	31,097	29,568	31,600	35,750	40,700	46,350

IMPORTS[c]

	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985
Bulgaria	2,039	2,545	2,950	3,700	4,700	5,550
Czechoslovakia	4,519	3,967	4,550	5,100	5,700	6,300
East Germany	6,932	6,506	7,150	7,650	8,200	8,750
Hungary[b]	4,604	4,483	4,450	4,600	4,900	5,200
Poland	8,478	5,365	5,650	6,500	7,600	8,850
Romania	8,208	7,173	7,550	8,400	9,650	10,700
Eastern Europe	34,780	30,039	32,300	35,950	40,750	45,350

[a] Exports are projected on the basis of Wharton estimates of growth of demand for imports by members of the OECD and by the less-developed countries in 1982–85. See Wharton Econometric Forecasting Associates, *World Economic Outlook* (Philadelphia, PA), May 1982.

[b] Although all centrally planned economies (CPE's) conduct some trade with one another in hard currency, only Hungary publishes information of such trade. With these transactions included, Hungarian hard-currency exports were US$905 million in 1970, US$2,299 million in 1975, US$4,939 million in 1980, and US$4,893 million in 1981. Hungarian hard-currency imports, including imports from CPE's were US$943 million in 1970, US$2,714 million in 1975, and US$5,041 million in 1980, and US$4,976 million in 1981.

[c] Given our assumptions about the availability of Western credits and permissible level of current-account deficits (surpluses), we then derived feasible imports as a residual category.

SOURCE: *Wharton CPE Balance of Payments and Debt Review*, Washington, DC, Wharton Econometric Forecasting Associates, June 1982.

During the first half of the 1980's, the region as a whole is expected to grow at an average annual rate roughly one third that recorded in 1976–80 and one fifth that in 1971–75. In 1985, the Polish economy will only have begun to reverse its precipitous decline of the last several years, its output by then having only recovered to the 1974 level, not the 1978 peak. While none of the other East European countries is expected to register an absolute decline in aggregate output such as Poland is experiencing, in all cases the slowdown will be significant. Romania should experience the sharpest growth deceleration (55 percent from the 1976–80 average annual rate of growth in net material product), followed by Czechoslovakia (54 percent), Hungary (38 percent), Bulgaria (33 percent), and East Germany (17 percent).

This trend will pose a major challenge to the existing political leaderships throughout Eastern Europe—most notably (after Poland), in Romania and Czechoslovakia.[32] What are possible East European responses to growing economic difficulties in the first half of the 1980's? One can envisage three possible scenarios.

The most sensible, though not necessarily the most likely, solution would be to undertake large-scale, meaningful economic reforms of the Hungarian type. Aside from significantly decentralizing East European economies and improving the system of labor incentives, such reforms would require large-scale restructuring of economic activities toward a pattern of production reflecting the comparative advantage of Eastern Europe in the world economy. This "reindustrialization" would involve scrapping inefficient and obsolete industries, those with excessive energy requirements, and those with inordinate requirements for imported inputs. It would concentrate on production of light manufactured goods, on development of agro-industrial complexes, and on specialization in those segments of machinery industries in which Eastern Europe has superior export potential.

[32] In both countries, it is likely that a more technocratically oriented group within the party will seize this opportunity to mount a challenge to President Nicolae Ceausescu's and Gustav Husak's economic policies. In the case of Czechoslovakia, we may well witness a replay of the 1963–64 economic difficulties, followed by another attempt by more enlightened members of the party leadership to mount a major economic reform.

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These reforms would have to be supported by both the Soviet Union and the West, and indeed there are valid reasons why both might be so inclined. Although the USSR would naturally be concerned about the political implications of such reforms, its leaders must also be concerned about the growing economic burden Eastern Europe places on the Soviet economy. It would be much easier to reduce this burden if the economies of the region could be made more efficient. From the Western perspective, reforms would make the economies of Eastern Europe more efficient and less dependent on the Soviet Union. Moreover, they could demonstrate to the Soviets themselves what the USSR could potentially achieve through implementation of similar reforms. While the reforms could not be expected to have a major impact on growth performance during the first half of the 1980's, they would fundamentally change the economic outlook for Eastern Europe for the rest of the decade.

The second scenario is that of "muddling through," i.e., enactment of limited reforms and ad hoc measures designed to prevent the development of a full-fledged crisis of the Polish type elsewhere in Eastern Europe (only in Hungary does this threat seem distant). Since the West would not be interested in supporting this type of "non-strategy," we could reasonably expect the political leaders of Eastern Europe to turn more and more to the Soviets for help as periodic crises develop, as shortages of goods grow, as labor discontent increases, and as challenges to the economic policies of Communist parties mount. In the second scenario, the Soviet Union would always provide "just enough to prevent the pot from boiling over."

The third scenario is that of a full-blown crisis with many elements similar to recent Polish developments. Despite mounting economic problems, East European political leaderships would refuse to undertake reforms (or would be prevented from initiating them by the



Modern harvesting machinery at work in the vineyards of the Sopron State Farm in western Hungary.

—Interfoto MTI/Photoreporters.

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One of the successes of East European export efforts—the articulated Ikarus 286 bus being produced in Budapest in 1981 for export to the United States.

—Eastfoto.

Soviets), growing discontent would lead to violent outbursts on the part of the population, the regimes would grow more repressive and probably weaker, and finally there would be Soviet intervention. The output of East European economies would then drop to "subsistence" level, and a new form of totalitarian regime would be institutionalized in Eastern Europe. This would be characterized by repression far more extreme than anything now existing in the area.

Given the present information, the author's own assessment of statistical probabilities attached to the above scenarios is 40 percent for the first, 50 percent for the second, and 10 percent for the third. In all cases, the probabilities attach to developments in the period through 1985.

We anticipate that in the first half of the 1980's, East European leaders will tend to pursue the first or second scenario outlined above, with somewhat greater likelihood of "muddling through," turning toward more serious reforms only after 1985.[33] We expect that Poland will adopt a major economic reform of the Hungarian type in 1983 or 1984, to be followed by Czechoslovakia probably in 1984 or 1985.[34] The outlook for Romanian reform is more clouded, because it is unlikely that the present political leadership can bring itself to institute a genuine economic reform involving significant decentralization of economic and ultimately also political power. The leaderships in both Bulgaria and East Germany will be less pressed to reform their economies, because the expected slowdown in growth should not be nearly as serious there. Nevertheless, both countries are likely to take steps toward a substantive reform, probably with a lag of one to two years after Poland and Czechoslovakia. Finally, the Hungarian economic reform may be expected to progress at a steady pace through the first half of the decade, with its impact on growth felt mainly after 1985.

Should events follow this scenario, we would still

[33] The main reason for the delay in introduction of reforms is that they will require the removal of a significant portion of existing party leaderships. It should be expected that individuals and factions affected will try to hold onto power as long as possible, and a prolonged struggle for power should be expected, particularly in Czechoslovakia and Romania. In the meantime, the "muddling through" strategy is likely to prevail.

[34] This speculation is based on the expectation that economic pressures for reform will then be sufficiently strong to overcome political resistance to reform.

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anticipate continuation of current trends in Eastern Europe's external economic relations. First, there will be growing dependence on trade with the Soviet Union, and in *increasingly visible form.* For example, between 1980 and 1985, the value of East European imports from the Soviet Union is expected to rise 82 percent in nominal ruble terms, while the value of imports from non-Communist countries is projected to grow a mere 30 percent in nominal dollar terms. This seemingly sizable increase in dependence, however, represents merely the continuation of a trend that has actually been operative since 1974 but was previously hidden from public view because of preferential Soviet trade treatment for Eastern Europe. Now, if anything, the trend may begin to be "overstated," because ruble-price inflation on the intra-CMEA market is likely to significantly outpace dollar-price inflation on the world market, as intra-CMEA relative prices gradually approach relative world market prices.

A slowing of the growth of Eastern Europe's trade with non-Communist countries seems unavoidable. The East European countries have little choice but to balance their current accounts in hard-currency transactions. As noted above, this nominal deceleration covers an expected absolute decline in the amount of real goods imported annually by 1985. Similarly, while East European debt to the non-Communist world should continue to grow in nominal terms, it may be expected to decline in real terms.

On balance, the economies of Eastern Europe and the context in which they function are undergoing significant transformations that will be felt not only through the first half of this decade but probably well beyond.

Leaders representative of two different approaches to dealing with Eastern Europe's economic problems seen at the 36th Session of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance held in Budapest on June 8, 1982: at the left, Wojciech Jaruzelski, First Secretary of the Polish United Workers' Party; at the right, Janos Kadar, First Secretary of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party.

—Eastfoto.

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Moscow and Mitterrand

by Michael J. Sodaro

The election of François Mitterrand to the presidency of France in May 1981 probably evoked as much surprise in the Soviet Union as it did in the rest of the world. This surprise was no doubt compounded when, in the following month, the new president's Socialist Party (PS) scored an overwhelming triumph in the legislative elections, capturing a solid majority of the seats in the National Assembly and thus ensuring the party's dominance over national policymaking for at least the next five years. To top things off, the plunge in electoral support for the French Communist Party (PCF) to its lowest level in the postwar period provided yet another unexpected shift in the French political landscape.

The Soviet leadership was clearly disappointed as it surveyed these results. Prior to the elections, Soviet commentators made no attempt to conceal the Kremlin's preference for the reelection of Valéry Giscard d'Estaing and its strong reservations about Mitterrand.[1] Once the results had come in, the Soviets also voiced their disappointment with the Communists' dismal showing at the polls.[2]

Now that Mitterrand has been in power more than a year, how have the Soviets reacted to the new administration? More broadly, what general considerations guide Soviet policy toward France, and how are they likely to be affected by the foreign policy undertakings of the Mitterrand government? What is the new role of the PCF, and how does it relate to Soviet calculations? Finally, from the opposite perspective, what is the French government's orientation toward the Soviet Union, and what factors influence that orientation? While answers to some of these questions can only be tentative, review of relevant statements and policy actions by the various political forces involved provides a basis for attempting them.

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Soviet Views of France and NATO

It is important to recognize that ever since Charles de Gaulle pulled the French out of the military structure of NATO in 1966, France has occupied a pivotal position in Moscow's policy toward the Western alliance. Soviet international affairs specialists continue to praise de Gaulle for having been the first West European leader to challenge American dominance of NATO and for encouraging independent European initiatives toward the Soviet Union.[3]

Since 1969, to be sure, France's singularity as the Soviet Union's *interlocuteur privilegié* in Western Europe has been eclipsed somewhat by the Federal Republic of Germany. After de Gaulle's retirement in that year and the election of a new West German government under Willy Brandt, the Soviets found in Bonn fresh opportunities to realize coveted foreign policy goals which they could not achieve in Paris. It was Germany, after all, which was the crux of postwar Europe's most intractable problems, beginning with the question of the territorial status quo and extending to such vital issues for Moscow as the nature of the Federal Republic's military posture and the necessity of securing international recognition for the USSR's key ally, the

[1] See, for example, Yu. Kharlanov's articles in *Pravda* (Moscow), Mar. 13 and May 9, 1981; V. Danilenko, "Presidential Elections in France," *International Affairs* (Moscow), April 1981.

[2] A. Kudryavtsev, "France—Political Shifts," *Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya* (Moscow—hereafter *MEMO*), No. 10, 1981, p. 109.

[3] For a major Soviet biography of de Gaulle, see N. N. Molchanov, *General de Goll,* (General de Gaulle), 2nd ed, Moscow, Mezhdunarodnyye Otnosheniya, 1980.

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Members of the French Communist Party and of the Communist-dominated General Confederation of Labor (CGT) demonstrate in a Paris suburb in September 1981 against use of the neutron bomb.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

German Democratic Republic. On these and related matters, only Bonn could make the concessions necessary for an accommodation of Western and Soviet interests in Europe. Beyond such political assets, West Germany also offered strong economic advantages to the Soviet Union, reinforcing Moscow's incentive to shift the main focus of its European policy to the FRG. This shift took place quite dramatically in the early 1970's, as the political and economic accords stemming from Bonn's Ostpolitik went into effect. More than a decade later, the Federal Republic is still Moscow's principal interlocutor in Western Europe.

In spite of these developments, however, France continues to enjoy high status on Moscow's scale of international priorities. Above all, it remains one of the leading proponents of greater foreign policy autonomy from the United States on the part of Western Europe. Some indication of how the Kremlin views the French role in this respect may be gleaned from the writings of Soviet academic specialists about France itself and about the Atlantic alliance as a whole.[4]

Contrary to the assumptions of a number of Western analysts of Soviet foreign policy, Soviet writers do not seem to regard the "Finlandization" of Western Europe as a likely prospect in the foreseeable future. Indeed, they do not see tendencies toward neutralism or toward a fundamental reliance on the Soviet Union as the paramount trend in any leading West European state. Rather, they tend to take a more dialectical approach to the subject of US–West European relations. Although Soviet scholars emphasize the growing intensity of the "contradictions" between the United States and its West European allies, they also recognize the enduring elements of partnership that bind the trans-Atlantic allies together. More specifically, while some writers may stress the conflictual side of the relationship and others may emphasize the cooperative aspects, all admit the presence of these two tendencies simultaneously in relations of capitalist states.

[4] See, for example, *SShA–Zapadnaya Yevropa: partnerstvo i sopernichestvo* (USA–Western Europe: Partnership and Rivalry), Moscow, Nauka, 1979; G. A. Vorontsov, *SShA i Zapadnaya Yevropa* (The USA and Western Europe), Moscow, Mezhdunarodnyye Otnosheniya, 1979; M. K. Bunkina, *USA versus Western Europe: New Trends,* trans. by Jane Sayer, Moscow, Progress, 1979; A. Kirsanov, *The USA and Western Europe,* trans. by David Skvirsky, Moscow, Progress, 1975; and D. Ye. Mel'nikov, Ed., *Mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya v Zapadnoy Yevrope* (International Relations in Western Europe), Moscow, Mezhdunarodnyye Otnosheniya, 1974.

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This dialectical approach results in a rather nuanced Soviet perception of the Atlantic alliance. On the one hand, Moscow sees the conflicts of interest which frequently rend Western unity as opening opportunities for it to promote fissiparous tendencies. Indeed, since the early 1970's, Soviet specialists have pointed to Soviet détente policy as a major factor contributing to the disarray in the Western alliance. In the view of many Soviet authors, détente itself is desirable precisely *because* it has this disruptive effect on the West (and on US–West European relations in particular), whereas they regard rising international tensions as driving the capitalist states closer together.

On the other hand, Moscow, in light of the dialectical nature of Soviet perceptions of relations among capitalist states, virtually rules out the possibility of an imminent break-up of NATO. Economic interdependence, expanding military cooperation, and broadly construed "common class interests" among Western allies, all receive detailed coverage in Soviet analyses of the West. Far from expecting these unifying factors to disappear, Soviet commentators contend that in many cases they are growing stronger—often in spite of (or alongside) the continuing trend toward disintegration. Thus, as far as one can judge by Soviet academic specialists (and assuming that their views are at least to some extent shared by Soviet leaders), the Kremlin does not appear to consider the collapse of the NATO alliance to be a realistic foreign policy goal.

As the Soviets characterize the situation, what has occurred in the NATO alliance since de Gaulle's daring initiatives is not an irreparable breach between the West Europeans and the Americans, but rather a shift in the "correlation of forces," or balance of power, between the West European and the American components of the alliance. In contrast to the conditions that prevailed before the mid-1960's, the United States can no longer impose its will on its allies but must instead coordinate its policies with them on the basis of mutually acceptable compromises. As a consequence, the Soviets currently regard the alliance as a means for getting the West Europeans to influence American policy in a favorable direction and, when appropriate, to induce the United States to influence the West Europeans to move in a similar direction. In sum,the Soviets currently envisage US–West European ties in terms of what might be called a relationship of reciprocal influence.[5]

The implications of these perceptions have been particularly apparent in Soviet overtures toward France. In the immediate aftermath of de Gaulle's withdrawal from the NATO military command, some Soviet scholars rushed to the conclusion that the French démarche would inspire other West European states to follow suit. Kremlin decision-makers apparently shared this hope, and Soviet policy initiatives during this period (such as the Warsaw Pact's Bucharest Declaration of July 1966[6]) set out to entice Western Europe into joining an all-European security system without the participation of the United States or Canada.

At the same time, however, other Soviet specialists offered reminders of France's continuing membership in the Atlantic alliance and drew attention to de Gaulle's unswerving support for the US troop presence in West Germany and for other US policies.[7] Subsequent events justified this cautionary analysis, underscoring the inherent limits of France's declaration of independence from the United States.

Soviet policymakers accordingly scaled down their expectations of French—and West European—desires for a clean break with the United States, and the Bucharest Declaration became a dead letter by the end of the decade. A more modest approach, stressing the opportunities available for manipulating the Franco-American relationship while acknowledging the limited results to be expected from such manipulations, tends to characterize the bulk of Soviet writing on this subject today.

From De Gaulle to Giscard

Any evaluation of how the Soviet Union might regard its prospects with respect to France under Mitterrand must begin with an assessment of Soviet relations with his predecessors at the helm of the Fifth Republic. Only by comparing the outlooks and policies of the new French president with those of de Gaulle, Pompidou and Giscard d'Estaing is it possible to determine how much has been gained or lost, from the Soviet point of view, as a result of the change of leadership in Paris in 1981.

If the Soviets were to construct a balance sheet of the positive and negative features of Charles de Gaulle's foreign policy, the final tally would surely be strongly positive. It would certainly have on the "plus" side of the ledger the fact that France under de Gaulle was the first NATO state to assert its full autonomy in foreign policy matters, even moving to pursue a direct dialogue with the USSR independently of the United States. Other positive features of de Gaulle's foreign policy, from

[5] For a comprehensive treatment of these issues, see Michael J. Sodaro, "Soviet Studies of the Western Alliance," presented at the Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies, Washington, DC, May 6, 1982.

[6] "Declaration on Strengthening Peace and Security in Europe," *Pravda*, July 8, 1966.

[7] For an example of the first view, see the essay by O. N. Bykov in D. Ye. Mel'nikov, Eds., *Zapadnaya Yevropa i SShA* (Western Europe and the USA), Moscow, Mysl', 1968, Ch. 1; for the second view, see the piece by Yu. I. Rubinskiy in ibid., Ch. 3.

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Moscow's vantage point, would include France's withdrawal from NATO's military organization, its assault on the dollar's privileged status in the world economy, and its veto of British entry into the Common Market. On the negative side, the Soviets had to reconcile themselves to de Gaulle's continuing adherence to the Atlantic alliance, to the expansion of France's independent nuclear strike force, and to de Gaulle's efforts to break down the barriers between Eastern and Western Europe with his conceptual designs for *l'Europe des patries,* extending "from the Atlantic to the Urals." On balance, however, these "minuses" were minor in comparison with the unprecedented breakthrough to a more autonomous foreign policy which de Gaulle had charted for France.

Over the course of the 1970's, de Gaulle's two successors gradually distanced themselves from the more blatantly anti-American aspects of the Gaullist legacy and sought to smooth over at least some of the conflicts with the United States that de Gaulle had exacerbated. Thus, Georges Pompidou made way for the enlargement of the European Economic Community (EEC) to include Britain and reached a compromise with President Richard Nixon on monetary matters. More important, Pompidou substantially moderated the shrill anti-American tone of French foreign policy under de Gaulle, and this change in tone was even more evident under his successor, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing.

Giscard went even further than Pompidou in promoting policies that could be regarded only with consternation in Moscow. Above all, Giscard brought France into closer military cooperation with NATO. In addition, he presided over the strengthening of all aspects of the French nuclear triad, and in 1980 he announced his government's readiness to commence production of neutron weapons. Finally, at a time when the Soviets were deeply involved in assisting various clients in Africa, Giscard enlisted American help in sending French paratroopers to the beleaguered Shaba Province of Zaire in 1978, backed the Mauritanian government's struggle against the Polisario guerrillas, and, until 1980, maintained French military units in Chad.

Despite frequent criticisms of these manifestations of French solidarity with the West, the Soviet analysis of

French Legionnaires inspect a Soviet 120 mm mortar captured in June 1978 when France helped Chad suppress an insurgency by Frolinat (the Chad National Liberation Front).

—Criton/SYGMA.

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Pompidou and Giscard nonetheless remained on the whole positive. Soviet authorities noted, for instance, that France had helped block the elaboration of a "new Atlantic Charter," as proposed by Henry Kissinger in 1973, and had opposed US support for Israel at the time of the October 1973 war. "Contradictions" of this sort were even held to be paramount in the area of defense policy. In the opinion of several Soviet experts writing in 1978, "French military policy objectively weakens American positions in Western Europe."[8] Thus, at least some Soviets appeared to regard France's growing military potential more as a political disadvantage for the United States than as a military danger to the Soviet Union.

In fact, the essential point for Moscow was that neither Pompidou nor Giscard had surrendered France's freedom of maneuver once that had been wrested from the United States by de Gaulle. On the contrary, France under Pompidou and Giscard was perceived, despite occasional lapses into "class solidarity" with the United States, as having secured Washington's grudging acknowledgment of its independent course. The very nature of the compromises reached between the United States and France during the terms in office of these two French leaders reflected America's willingness to consider the French equal partners. Soviet analysts duly recorded, for example, that the annual summit meetings of the major capitalist powers—an initiative proposed by the French in 1975—generally ended with a communique that made no reference to the "leadership" of the United States.[9] As far as Moscow was concerned, Washington in the 1970's "was forced to treat France as the catalyst of West European centrism."[10]

It was not surprising, therefore, that the Soviets quietly supported Giscard's Center-Right coalition in the 1978 legislative elections. As the campaign began to heat up in 1977, Leonid Brezhnev arrived in Paris with great fanfare for meetings with Giscard but did not get together with PCF leaders while there. The visit resulted in a joint declaration proclaiming the mutually beneficial effects of détente.[11] The PCF, meanwhile, was undergoing a painful identity crisis, and its relations with Moscow increasingly soured as it struggled to define its own brand of "socialism in French colors" while paired

Leonid I. Brezhnev confers with French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing upon the Soviet President's arrival at Chateau Rambouillet on June 20, 1977.

—SYGMA.

with the Socialists in an uneasy electoral alliance. When, in the summer of 1977, the Communists demanded a renegotiation of the Common Program which they had concluded with the Socialists in 1972—and thereby in effect scuttled the unity of the Left—Soviet commentary tended to parrot PCF condemnations of the Socialists rather than suggest the desirability of a reconciliation of the alliance partners. Without saying so explicitly, Moscow conveyed the distinct impression that the rupture of the French Left was eminently preferable to its victory in the parliamentary elections.

The Soviets continued to show their appreciation for Giscard by granting him a warm reception in Moscow in 1979, during the last of a string of annual Franco-Soviet summits initiated by Pompidou. As the 1981 presidential elections approached, Moscow continued to tilt in Giscard's direction. Soviet statements favorable to both Giscard and the PCF candidate, Georges Marchais, were perfectly consistent in their ultimate purpose—to deny attention to, and support for, the candidacy of François Mitterrand. Once again, the Soviets seemed motivated primarily by Giscard's record as a leader of European autonomy within the Atlantic alliance.

The notion that Giscard could be helpful in modifying American opinion on major questions of East-West relations assumed particular significance when the French

[8] V. F. Davydov, T. V. Oberemko, and A. I. Utkin, *SShA i Zapadnoyevropeyskiye "tsentry sily"* (The USA and the West European "Power Centers"), Moscow, Nauka, 1978, pp. 108, 165.

[9] Ibid., p. 147.

[10] Ibid., p. 133. See also Yu. V. Dubinin and V. N. Kelin, *SSSR–Frantsiya. Opyt sotrudnichestva* (USSR-France. The Experience of Cooperation), Moscow, Politizdat, 1979; and A. Kudryavtsev, "France in the System of Inter-Imperialist Contradictions (The Economic Aspect)," *MEMO*, No. 4, 1981.

[11] *Pravda*, June 23, 1977.

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president dramatically journeyed to Warsaw in the spring of 1980 for talks with Leonid Brezhnev. Coming at a time when the Carter administration was trying to galvanize the West behind various efforts to protest the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Giscard initiative represented a sharp rebuff to American diplomacy and encouraged the Soviets in their belief that détente was still alive in Western Europe, if not in the United States.[12] Giscard's close personal relationship with Chancellor Helmut Schmidt took on special significance in this connection. Although the Soviets may have had some misgivings about the emergence of a strong Franco-German combination at the core of a united Western Europe,[13] they presumably welcomed Giscard's efforts to reinforce Bonn's commitment to détente, especially in the troubled atmosphere of 1980. Beyond these considerations, the Soviets probably preferred dealing with a familiar incumbent like Giscard rather than an unknown entity like Mitterrand, who drew Soviet criticisms for his vagueness. At least one authoritative Soviet analyst indicated that the Left's growing political strength in France was undesirable in itself, as it only pushed the country's "ruling circles" further to the right and ultimately into closer ties with the world's leading anti-Communist power, the US.[14]

Moscow and the Two Mitterrands

In keeping with the spirit of surprise created by the magnitude of his party's victory at the polls, François Mitterrand has thus far provided a number of foreign policy surprises since assuming office in 1981. Observers have been struck, for example, by the remarkable amount of continuity French foreign policy has displayed in a variety of areas, despite the transition from a Center-Right government to one headed by a Socialist. Like his predecessors, Mitterrand has confirmed his fidelity to the Atlantic alliance while reiterating France's determination to set its own course; he has taken steps to expand the French nuclear arsenal while rejecting reintegration into the NATO command; he has affirmed France's commitment to détente while demonstrating support for French security interests in Europe and the Third World; and he has asserted French acceptance of European economic integration while showing little inclination to promote efforts at supranational political integration in Europe. On these and other counts, Mitterrand has much in common with de Gaulle, Pompidou, and Giscard.

From the Soviet perspective, however, Mitterrand has interrupted the continuity of French foreign policy in at least one important respect. The new French president has suspended, for an indeterminate period, the summit-level Franco-Soviet dialogue which had become an annual ritual for his two predecessors and a cornerstone of de Gaulle's opening to the East. While talks between French and Soviet officials proceed at the ministerial level, Mitterrand has up to now refrained from meeting with his Soviet counterpart, Brezhnev. (More recently, Mitterrand is also reported to have turned down a meeting with Soviet Politburo member Konstantin Chernenko, considered a possible successor to Brezhnev.[15]) That such a meeting has not as yet taken place reflects a conscious decision on Mitterrand's part, rooted in his concerns about Moscow's share of the responsibility for the recent aggravation of East-West tensions. It thus appears that, for the moment, the Soviet Union is no longer an *interlocuteur privilegié* of France.

In addition, the Soviets have had to confront a number of discontinuities in Mitterrand's own thinking on several major foreign and defense policy issues. In a sense, the Soviet Union has been dealing with two Mitterrands over the course of the last 10 years—one with a highly critical orientation toward the United States, the other, of somewhat more recent vintage, with pronounced anti-Soviet proclivities. If Soviet analysts were right about anything in their attempts to understand Mitterrand during the 1981 presidential campaign, it was that he failed "to concretize his positions on a number of questions."[16] Indeed, Mitterrand's characteristic evasiveness, which only reinforced traditional Soviet suspicions of West European social democratic leaders, was perhaps the chief factor that worked against his acceptance by the Soviets over the years, including the period of his most assertive anti-Americanism, when the PS–PCF alliance was in full bloom.[17]

To a considerable extent, these two sides of Mitterrand's political character reflect the practical considerations of a political realist who, on the one hand, shares the Gaullist commitment to French independence from American dictates and, on the other, expresses alarm at evidence of Soviet expansionism and disproportionate Soviet military growth. In these respects, Mitterrand affirms traditional French national interests.

[12] S. Vorontsova, "The USA and France: Spheres of Mutual Action and Contradictions," *MEMO*, No. 11, 1980.

[13] See Pierre Hassner, "Moscow and the Western Alliance," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), May–June 1981, p. 51.

[14] See V. Kuznetsov, "France in the World Economy and Politics," *MEMO*, No. 1, 1981, p. 81.

[15] *Paris Match*, Feb. 17, 1982, p. 101.

[16] Kudryavtsev, "France—Political Shifts," p. 108.

[17] On the unpredictability of the PS, see E. A. Arsen'yev, *Frantsiya: problemy i politika* (France: Problems and Politics), Moscow, Politizdat, 1978, pp. 126, 130.

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There is, however, an important ideological element in his outlook. Somewhat ironically, both the anti-American and the anti-Soviet facets of Mitterrand's political makeup tend to be reinforced by his identity as a French Socialist. Thus, his criticism of the United States has firm ideological roots in his rejection of capitalism, in his vision of a Third World liberated from external economic exploitation and internal political repression, and in his quest for genuine disarmament culminating in the dissolution of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact. While Mitterrand's attachment to these ideals is more emotional than dogmatic, and tends to condition rather than determine his actual policy choices, it nonetheless constitutes an integral part of his world view, resulting in a predisposition to oppose the United States whenever it appears to run counter to these broadly proclaimed principles.

By the same token, Mitterrand's Socialist predilections also buttress the anti-Soviet strain in his outlook. Although a Socialist, Mitterrand has never been a Marxist, and his deliberate attempts to model himself on such figures as Jean Jaurès and Léon Blum imply a rejection of Leninist socialism *à la russe.* Added to this historically rooted Socialist antipathy to communism, Mitterrand has an intimate personal acquaintance with the PCF, a relationship marked by rivalry during periods of cooperation and by bitterness following the rupture of the Union of the Left.

These twin strands in Mitterrand's political orientation, both of which are on display in such books as *L'abeille at l'architecte* (The Bee and the Architect) and *Ici et maintenant* (Here and Now),[18] derive an additional impetus from the Socialist Party. Despite the fact that Mitterrand is very much his own man, and on occasion takes positions at odds with the majority of PS activists, he cannot ignore the manifest wishes of his party colleagues. Indeed, he is usually in sympathy with them. Here, too, ideologically motivated denunciations of US policy coexist along with equally sharp condemnations of the Soviet Union.

What this means for the Soviets is that Mitterrand's occasional manifestations of anti-Americanism do not automatically imply a pro-Soviet point of view. Just as important, the Socialist Party's ideological inclinations at times impart an emotional tinge to its criticism of Soviet actions that can only complicate Moscow's efforts to resume its privileged dialogue with the French leadership. The PS congress held in October 1981 provides a graphic illustration of this point. Delegates booed the Soviet representative, Boris Ponomarëv, and showered applause on a representative of the Afghan freedom fighters. The party's harsh reaction to the proclamation of martial law in Poland (about which more below) offers another example of how the PS, with its instinctive support for the independent trade unionism represented by Solidarity, has brought ideological fervor to its rejection of Soviet-inspired policies.[19]

Although these contrasting elements of opposition to both American and Soviet positions influence Mitterrand's approach to world politics simultaneously, one tendency has at times gained the upper hand over the other. Whereas the anti-Atlanticist viewpoint tended to dominate Mitterrand's public pronouncements prior to the mid-1970's, his criticism of the USSR gradually escalated in subsequent years, and it has reached a new peak since his assumption of the presidency.

To be sure, the views that Mitterrand put forward from the early 1970's until the latter half of the decade could hardly be considered unfavorable to the Soviet Union. On a whole range of foreign and defense policy issues, he displayed considerable sensitivity to the priorities of the left wing of the Socialist Party (which, from its inception in its present incarnation in 1971, has always represented an amalgamation of several strands of Socialist thought) and to those of the French Communists. As Michael M. Harrison has written of this period:

. . . the dominant opinion in the PS seemed to be that the Soviet Union was essentially a defensive state, compensating for an inefficient economic system by building up exaggerated military power in Europe and on the seas. The leftist wing of the PS was especially determined that the specter of Soviet military imperialism should not again be manipulated to divert the socialists from their ideological goals and induce them to compromise with Western capitalism.[20]

Even prior to the formation of the PS, Mitterrand's own grouping, the Republican Institution Convention (CIR), formally denounced the Atlantic alliance in 1970 as an instrument for France's "economic colonization by the United States." Party spokesmen went so far as to say that, in the event of a leftist victory at the polls, the principal threat to the existence of a Socialist government in France would be not the USSR, but the United States.[21] In accordance with these sentiments, the

[18] *L'abeille et l'architecte,* Paris, Flammarion, 1978, and *Ici et maintenant,* Paris, Fayard, 1980.

[19] See, for example, the article by Guy Perrimond in the PS weekly, *L'Unité* (Paris), Dec. 24, 1981.

[20] Michael M. Harrison, *The Reluctant Ally: France and Atlantic Security,* Baltimore, MD, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981, p. 120.

[21] Michael M. Harrison, "A Socialist Foreign Policy for France?" *Orbis* (Philadelphia, PA), Winter 1976.

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Common Program committed its signatories to renounce the independent French nuclear strike force and halt all construction on it, while working toward the ultimate dissolution of both the Western and Soviet military blocs.[22] Although Mitterrand himself, and the majority of the Socialists, insisted that existing alliance ties with the United States should be maintained until the hoped-for disappearance of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, and refused to commit themselves to a timetable for dismantling France's nuclear force, their basic aversion to close Atlantic ties was manifestly clear in this period.

In general, Mitterrand's stance in the early 1970's was characterized by a series of positions that could only be regarded as encouraging in Moscow. These included: (1) the dependence of the Socialists on the PCF (regarded as a virtual necessity in view of the unlikely prospects for a PS majority in the National Assembly); (2) commitment to substantial domestic economic and constitutional change, with the relegation of foreign policy to a secondary priority; (3) emphasis on major increases in budgetary outlays for social programs, and a concomitant reduction in military spending; (4) refusal to reintegrate France into the NATO military command, coupled with advocacy of a reduction in French forces; (5) ideological hostility toward the United States and a more accommodating posture toward the Soviet Union; (6) opposition to French and American military intervention in much of the Third World; (7) closer attachment to the Center-Left segment of the West German Social Democratic Party, identified with Willy Brandt, than to the Center-Right wing, led by Helmut Schmidt; (8) commitment to curtail the construction of nuclear power plants in France, thus leaving the country more dependent on imports of petroleum and natural gas.

Despite such considerations, however, the Soviets failed to warm up to Mitterrand in the 1974 presidential elections. Only after the elections were safely over did the Soviets receive a PS delegation led by Mitterrand in Moscow in April 1975 (just weeks after they had entertained Prime Minister Jacques Chirac). During his stay, they registered satisfaction that the positions of the PS and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union were either similar, or nearly so, on a number of important international issues.[23]

Shifting Away From Moscow

Beginning in the mid-1970's, both Mitterrand and the shifting majority inside the PS began edging away from the more extreme views they had expressed earlier. This movement to the right gathered momentum in late 1977, after the French Communists had taken the first critical steps toward breaking the leftist alliance. The PS Executive Bureau noted that the USSR was the only state to have used military force in Europe since the end of World War II, and in January 1978, Mitterrand proclaimed that "the Americans ought to know that we will be loyal allies, if there is a war."[24]

More extensive transformations along these lines ensued after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan at the end of 1979. The PS condemned the Soviet aggression and declared that the Soviets were now embarked on a "general offensive" of global proportions. Although the Socialists stopped short of approving US sanctions against Moscow, such as an economic embargo and boycott of the Olympic games, the party's majority had taken a decisive step away from its previous attitudes toward the Kremlin.

As the presidential campaign began to gather steam in the spring of 1980, Mitterrand felt sufficiently sure of his political position to criticize the negative results of Giscard's visit with Brezhnev in Warsaw.[25] With his own suspicions of Soviet intentions growing, Mitterrand let it be known that his defense policies were also undergoing a profound modification. Shortly before the elections, Mitterrand privately warned that the security of Western Europe (not to mention that of France's own nuclear strike force) required a drastic reduction in the number of Soviet SS-20 missiles. Nevertheless, the Socialist Party, despite its criticism of the SS-20's (and Mitterrand's own public acknowledgment of Soviet military superiority in Europe), for the moment refrained from formally approving NATO's December 1979 decision to deploy 572 new intermediate-range Pershing II and cruise missiles and called instead for negotiations to redress the European nuclear balance.[26]

To no small extent, the Soviets themselves were responsible for the major shifts in Mitterrand's positions. Both Mitterrand and the majority of PS members have swung against the Soviets in the last several years largely under the pressure of events—in particular the invasion of Afghanistan, the recent changes in the European military balance in Moscow's favor, and the attempt to suppress Solidarity in Poland.

Since Mitterrand's inauguration as president, these problems have only deepened, prompting France's Socialist government to adopt a much more censorious

[22] *Programme commun de gouvernement du parti communiste et du parti socialiste* (Common Program for Government of the Communist Party and Socialist Party), Paris, Editions sociales, 1972, pp. 171–76.

[23] See the communique in *Pravda*, Apr. 27, 1975.

[24] Harrison, *The Reluctant Ally . . .*, p. 211.

[25] *Le Monde* (Paris), May 23, 1980.

[26] Michael M. Harrison and Simon Serfaty, *A Socialist France and Western Security*, Washington, DC, SAIS Occasional Papers in International Affairs, 1981, p. 24.

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attitude toward the USSR than might have been predicted prior to the elections. For their part, the Soviets have scored few successes in their dealings with Mitterrand so far, and they have been able to do little more than voice their displeasure at the new administration's initiatives.

Perhaps the most striking of these initiatives is the Socialist government's defense program. Even before it was announced in November 1981, both President Mitterrand and Defense Minister Charles Hernu had indicated that significant increases in defense spending were in order. Mitterrand attracted considerable publicity with a visit to a French nuclear submarine in July. In the same month, Hernu stated that his earlier advocacy of a less robust defense posture, as outlined in a book published in 1980 (which the Soviet press was still citing approvingly), was no longer valid in view of the continuing buildup of Soviet theater missile forces. Hernu also rejected the inclusion of the French nuclear forces in any negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union on the European nuclear balance.[27] Before the end of July, Mitterrand consented to the continued production (but not deployment) of neutron weapons—a position sharply attacked by the Soviets.[28]



President François Mitterrand inspects a French nuclear submarine at the L'Ile Longue base on July 27, 1981.

—Keystone.

The new defense budget itself, when finally unveiled, called for a 17.6 percent increase in defense spending, including funds for the construction of France's seventh missile-carrying submarine, for the upgrading of the existing force of submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and for the development of a new surface-to-surface missile to replace the Pluton. These measures gained added force with the government's official endorsement of NATO's plan to station the Pershing II and cruise missiles in Western Europe.

The Mitterrand government combined its advocacy of a strong defense in response to the Soviet arms buildup with a refusal to support the peace movement that swelled into massive antinuclear demonstrations throughout Western Europe in the fall. Although a throng of more than 100,000 people gathered in Paris in October 1981 to protest the latest escalation in the arms race, the Socialists did not formally participate, and the bulk of the demonstrators turned out to be Communists.[29]

Mitterrand's reproachful attitude toward the neutralist and anti-American tendencies associated with the peace movement stirred ripples of discord in his relationship with the German Social Democrats. Although Mitterrand was known to have closer personal and political attachments to Willy Brandt than to Helmut Schmidt, Brandt failed to convince the French president that the protesters deserved a measure of sympathy for their peaceful intentions.[30] A number of French Socialists, in fact, feared that the German Social Democrats (particularly those associated with the SPD's left wing) were more interested in pursuing an accommodation with the German Democratic Republic and the Soviet Union for narrowly defined national purposes than in responding to the SS-20's or to Soviet involvement in Afghanistan and Poland.[31] Furthermore, PS leaders recognized that one of the reasons for the relative quiescence of the peace movement in France was that the French possessed their own nuclear force and were

[27] *Le Monde*, July 11, 1981. For a discussion of the renewed debate on French nuclear strategy that surfaced in 1981, as well as of other issues related to this article, see Daniel Goldberg, "Franco-Soviet Relations and the Election of a Socialist Government in France: January-November 1981," unpublished ms.

[28] *Pravda*, July 30, 1981.

[29] *Le Monde*, Oct. 27, 1981.

[30] On Mitterrand's meeting with Brandt, see *Der Spiegel* (Hamburg), Aug. 24, 1981, pp. 22–24.

[31] See, for example, the interview with André Gorz in ibid., Jan. 25, 1982, pp. 34–41.

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therefore in a militarily more independent position than the Federal Republic, whose total reliance on the American deterrent contributed to feelings of helplessness and anxiety on the part of many West German citizens.[32]

Meanwhile, the Socialist Party itself, convening in October for its first party congress since assuming power, not only withheld support from the peace movement but explicitly endorsed NATO's view that the nuclear balance in Europe was changing decidedly in Moscow's favor. Although CPSU foreign policy spokesmen such as Boris Ponomarëv, Vadim Zagladin, and Georgiy Zhukov attended the congress (Ponomarëv subsequently met with Foreign Minister Claude Cheysson), *Pravda* launched its bluntest attack to date on the Mitterrand government just one week prior to the congress and followed it up with sharp criticism of the PS resolutions.[33]

The Soviets seem to have taken particular offense at Mitterrand's repeated assertions of Atlantic solidarity and his cordial ties with the administration of Ronald Reagan. Contrary to popular expectations, the French Socialist and the American conservative for the most part have not let ideological divergences obstruct common interests in dealing with the Soviets. (The chief exception to this overall harmony—President Reagan's determination to block West European agreements with the USSR on natural gas sales and pipeline technology—will be considered in greater detail below.) The Soviet press has reacted by deploring Mitterrand's incipient Atlanticism while at the same time pointing to the "contradictions" between the United States and France—e.g., in their economic relations or with respect to the Third World.

The Third World itself represents an area of ambiguity, both for French policy and for Soviet evaluations of that policy. Although the Soviet press applauds Mitterrand for opposing US policy in Central America, it understandably overlooks the fact that Mitterrand justifies his position in terms of the West's need to avoid pushing leftist revolutionaries into an exclusive reliance on Soviet support.[34] By the same token, the Soviets tend to focus on Mitterrand's approval of a Palestinian state in the Middle East while ignoring his support for Israel.[35] The Soviets have been considerably less ambiguous, however, in their criticism of Mitterrand's decision to ship military supplies to Chad.[36]

Boris Ponomarëv, right, and Vadim V. Zagladin, left, Chief and First Deputy Chief respectively of the International Department of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, attend the Congress of the French Socialist Party in October 1981.

—Daniel Simon/Gamma-Liaison.

The Polish crisis, and particularly the declaration of martial law by Wojciech Jaruzelski's regime on December 13, 1981, has inevitably exacerbated Franco-Soviet relations. That event prompted Mitterrand to remark cryptically that "anything that will permit us to get away from Yalta will be good."[37] Moreover, the French government moved much earlier than the German government to assign culpability for the action to Moscow. Once again, tensions emerged between Paris and Bonn over West Germany's initial reluctance to take a firm attitude against the Soviets on the Polish question, and matters were only partially smoothed over when Helmut Schmidt visited Paris in January 1982. For a time it even appeared that French efforts to wrap up a major natural gas agreement with the USSR were in jeopardy. Although the two sides had just recently come to terms on pricing arrangements, after December 13 there was increasing pressure from certain energy experts in the French government to seek a substantial reduction in the amount of natural gas to be imported from Siberia.[38]

[32] On this point, see Claude Estier, "Ambiguities of Pacifism," *L'Unité*, Oct. 17, 1981.

[33] For the precongress attack, see the articles by A. Afanas'yev in *Pravda*, Oct. 16 and 17, 1981. For *Pravda*'s reaction to the PS congress, see the issues of Oct. 24 and 26.

[34] For an elaboration by one of Mitterrand's ministers of the view that the "true ground for competition between East and West is the South," see Jean-Pierre Cot, "Winning East-West in North-South," *Foreign Policy* (Washington, DC), Spring 1982, p. 5. See also Dominique Moisi, "Mitterrand's Foreign Policy: The Limits of Continuity." *Foreign Affairs* (New York, NY), Winter 1981/82.

[35] *Pravda*, Mar. 6, 1982.

[36] Ibid., Oct. 29, 1981.

[37] *Le Monde*, Jan. 2, 1982.

[38] Ibid., Feb. 4, 1982.

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Ultimately, the French government decided to go ahead with the gas deal as negotiated, providing Moscow with its greatest achievement to date in its relations with the Mitterrand government. On the night of January 22–23, authorities representing Soyuzgaseksport and Gas de France signed an agreement providing for the purchase by France of 8 billion cubic meters of Soviet natural gas annually over a 25-year period beginning in 1984. Although the base price was not announced, it was thought to be in the neighborhood of US$4.65 per million BTU—the price West Germany agreed to pay for Soviet gas in its agreement of November 20, 1981. The upshot of the arrangement was that within 10 years, France would be obtaining from the USSR approximately 35 percent of its natural gas, or 5 percent of its total energy needs.[39]

The French government's decision was taken in spite of intense pressure from the Reagan administration to forgo the agreement. American efforts to obstruct the implementation of this and similar agreements by West Germany and Italy became particularly forceful in June 1982, when President Reagan imposed an embargo on the export of equipment to be used in the Soviet pipeline. The embargo affected both US firms and European manufacturers holding licenses from US companies to build pipeline technology intended for the Soviet Union (e.g., Alsthom-Atlantique in France, a producer of gas turbines). This decision produced a particularly sharp reaction among the French. President Mitterrand pressed for a strong statement of protest by the Common Market in response to the American action and accused the US of "a grave lack of solidarity" with its allies that contradicted the spirit of the recently concluded Versailles summit of American, European, and Japanese leaders.[40] Mitterrand, in turn received criticism for the timing of the gas deal (in light of the Polish crisis) from both the opposition and erstwhile friendly quarters such as *Le Monde* and the French Democratic Confederation of Workers (CFDT).[41]

At least to some extent, the French approved the transaction with the Soviets because of continuing difficulties in reaching a pricing accord for Algerian gas. In response to concerns expressed by the US government and domestic critics about the possibility of French dependence on Soviet natural gas, Prime Minister Pierre Mauroy and other official spokesmen suggested that any attempt by the Soviets to shut off gas supplies would be akin to an act of war. Moreover, they contended that the shoe might be on the other foot as far as political leverage was concerned. The Chairman of the National Assembly stated, for example, that if the Soviets invaded Poland, the French government would cancel the contract.[42]

The Soviets, for their part, were also anxious to close the deal, and settled for a price well below the amount subsequently negotiated between France and Algeria. Once the agreement was signed, they lavishly praised French "realism" and vocally denounced US efforts to stop the deal.

Aside from the gas accord, however, the course of Soviet-French relations since Mitterrand took office has not been very smooth. This situation has placed the PCF in a particularly vulnerable position.

The PCF's Dilemmas

The PCF is caught between the need to demonstrate its loyalty to the Socialist government in which it serves and its desire to defend the Soviet Union against French assaults on Moscow's foreign and defense policies. Meanwhile, the party leadership is still reeling from the stunning losses it suffered in the elections of April, May, and June 1981. Deserted by one-fourth of its constituency, the PCF sank to a postwar nadir of 15.5 percent in the first round of the presidential elections, in which PCF chief Georges Marchais was a candidate. In the parliamentary elections held in June, the party managed to inch its way back up to 16.2 percent of the first-round vote. Devastated by abstentions and defections to the Socialists, however, it ended up with only 44 seats in the National Assembly—an embarrassing total when measured against its possession of 86 seats in the previous legislature, and especially when set against the Socialists' 269 of the Assembly's 491 seats.

For Moscow, the PCF's electoral debacle means that the Kremlin cannot exercise even the modicum of leverage over the Mitterrand government which it would have enjoyed had the PS fallen short of an absolute majority in the Assembly. The irony of this development is that the Soviets lost the opportunity to influence Mitterrand's policies through the PCF at the very moment when the PCF leadership had come closer to supporting Soviet policies than at any time during the Communist-Socialist alliance. More ironically still, it was at least in part because of this swerve in Moscow's direction, a move which took the Communists further away from what remained of the unity of the Left, that the PCF suffered such a precipitous decline.

[39] Ibid., Jan. 25, 1982.
[40] *The Washington Post*, June 30, 1982.
[41] *Le Monde*, Jan. 25, 1982.
[42] See Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Western Europe* (Washington, DC), Jan. 28 and 29, 1982.

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The four Communist members in the government of Socialist President François Mitterrand arrive at the Elysée Palace on June 24, 1981, for their first cabinet meeting. From left to right: Marcel Rigout, Minister of Vocational Training; Anicet Le Pors, Minister Delegate to the Prime Minister in Charge of Civil Service and Administrative Reform; Charles Fiterman, Minister of State for Transportation; and Jack Ralite, Minister of Health.

—Daniel Simon/Gamma-Liaison.

Indeed, the restoration of the ties with the Kremlin that had been damaged during the days when the PCF disparaged Soviet policies for the sake of demonstrating its independence from Moscow constituted the *coup de grâce* for the moribund leftist alliance in the months leading up to the 1981 elections. Like the decision of the Communist leaders in 1977 to pull out of the alliance rather than risk participation in a government dominated by the PS, their decision to close ranks with the Soviets represented the outgrowth of a choice taken largely for domestic reasons. Once Marchais traveled to Moscow in early 1980 to broadcast his approval of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan to French television audiences, there was no way back to a reconciliation with the Socialists.[43] If the Moscow meeting represented Marchais's "journey to Canossa" (as the Communist dissident Jean Elleinstein put it),[44] he got there by crossing the Rubicon.

Of course, it is highly doubtful that at any time prior to the elections of 1981 Marchais expected to be in his present straits. Indeed, the PCF is now somewhat less than a junior partner of the Socialists, it is a dispensable partner. The Communists' decision to accept four cabinet posts (all well removed from the key ministries of interior, foreign affairs, and defense)[45] probably reflected their fears that a rejection of the offer would

[43] For PS reactions to Marchais's address and to the Soviet invasion, see *L'Unité*, Jan. 4, 11, 18, and Feb. 1, 1980.

[44] *Le Monde*, Jan. 8, 1980.

[45] The posts and their occupants are Charles Fiterman, Minister of Transportation and Minister of State; Anicet Le Pors, Minister of Civil Service and Administrative Reform; Jack Ralite, Minister of Health; and Marcel Rigout, Minister of Vocational Training.

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only deepen their political isolation and further reduce the party's chances of regaining its former stature. It was a measure of the PCF's desperation at this point that it entered the cabinet fully cognizant of the Socialists' ability to circumscribe its freedom of action (in fomenting strikes, for example). Just as significant, the Communists took their places in the cabinet only after the two parties signed a document which called, among other things, for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan and for the continuation of the process of economic and political renewal then under way in Poland.[46]

Since joining the government, the PCF seems to have found sufficient latitude to criticize Socialist policies in a number of areas without exceeding the bounds of Mitterrand's tolerance. For example, the Communist leadership has attacked the government's decision to build the neutron bomb and launched demonstrations in support of Soviet proposals for a moratorium on intermediate-range nuclear missiles. On the domestic front, the PCF has prodded the Socialist leaders to move faster to meet their social and economic pledges, and has differed with PS proposals regarding the voting system to be employed in the municipal elections of 1983.

The most serious complication in PCF–PS relations thus far, however, has centered upon Poland. In marked contrast to the position of the Socialists (and to that of the Italian Communist Party), the PCF adopted an attitude of understanding, if not of outright approval, of the establishment of the martial law regime. Marchais argued that the imposition of martial law was a regrettable but necessary step required to prevent a civil war in Poland brought on by Solidarity's attempts to take power.[47] In support of this position, the Communist-dominated General Confederation of Labor (CGT) refused to join in strikes called by other trade unions to protest the suppression of Solidarity. Even the May Day parade of 1982 saw the CGT and the more Socialist-oriented CFDT march separately rather than under a banner of unity, in part because the CGT refused to join in the CFDT's appeal for the release of imprisoned Solidarity members.

The Polish events have further weakened the PCF's position within the government, placing the Communists on the defensive in the face of the Socialists' widely popular repudiation of the martial law regime. For the present, however, the PS leadership has chosen not to force the issue, preferring instead to narrow the Communists' area of maneuverability by retaining them in the cabinet. Meetings between PS and PCF leaders in early January confirmed their commitment to maintaining their collaboration in spite of differences on Poland and other issues.[48]

Meanwhile, the Polish issue has aggravated discord that was already pronounced inside the PCF. Not only have many rank-and-file Communists opposed the repression of Solidarity, but a sizable number of party officials have also voiced similar views. Twenty-five PCF journalists issued a statement on December 23 enjoining the party leadership to "denounce the coup unambiguously," and local PCF officials have joined with the PS in signing resolutions condemning Jaruzelski's actions.[49] These developments came in the wake of mounting criticism of the general strategy pursued by the PCF leadership over the past several years. Intellectuals grouped around Henri Fizbin, who had earlier resigned his post as first secretary of the Paris Federation of the PCF following his criticism of the party's decision to break with the Socialists in 1977, repeated their demands for more open discussion within the party.[50] The leadership moved quickly after the 1981 parliamentary elections to "exclude" a number of these dissidents but was unable to expel them from their party cells. Criticisms of PCF procedures and policies also surfaced in the pages of the party newspaper, *L'Humanité*, during the months that preceded the 24th PCF Congress in February 1982. Some party members questioned the wisdom of Marchais's speech on Afghanistan in the Kremlin and vigorously denounced the absence of democracy in the party's implementation of "democratic centralism." One writer went so far as to oppose Marchais's reelection to the post of Secretary General.[51]

Once the congress convened, Marchais admitted the need for "a critical examination" of the party's preelection strategies but offered no concrete suggestions for opening up an in-house debate. He also affirmed that the decision to break the alliance with the PS prior to the 1978 elections had been correct.[52]

For their part, the Soviets have praised Marchais's efforts to clamp down on dissenters in the party,[53] and surely welcome the PCF's support of Soviet foreign policy actions. Nevertheless, the relationship between the PCF and the Kremlin still contains elements of potential disharmony. PCF leaders continue to insist on

[46] For the text, see *Le Monde*, June 25, 1981.

[47] See the text of Marchais's letter to Wojciech Jaruzelski in *L'Humanité* (Paris), Dec. 24, 1981, and his remarks in ibid., Dec. 31, 1981.

[48] *Le Monde*, Jan. 9 and 11, 1982.

[49] Ibid., Dec. 24, 1981.

[50] See Fizbin's book *Les bouches s'ouvrent* (The Mouths Are Opening), Paris, Grasset, 1980, as well as the dissidents' publication, *Rencontres communistes*.

[51] *L'Humanité*, Dec. 4 and 11, 1981; *Le Monde*, Jan. 9, 1982.

[52] *L'Humanité*, Feb. 9, 1982.

[53] See V. Semyonov's article in *New Times* (Moscow), No. 30, 1981.

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Now-dissident member of the French Communist Party, Henri Fizbin, shown in February 1977, when he was the party's candidate for Mayor of Paris.

—Katherine Young.

their right to formulate their own brand of socialism, free from any reference to the Soviet model. (Marchais himself reaffirmed this position in his speech at the recent party congress.) While Soviet leaders since Khrushchev have publicly endorsed this notion, authoritative statements indicate that the Kremlin still has doubts concerning the legitimacy of the parliamentary path to socialism.[54] Furthermore, the PCF may at some point try to recover from its recent electoral defeats and massive defections in membership by distancing itself from the Soviets and adopting a more moderate domestic and international image.[55]

At present, the PCF leadership is too weak to be useful to Moscow as a lever on the PS, too constricted to challenge the Socialists, and too ossified in its commitments to relatively orthodox Communist policies and organizational norms to stem the rising currents of internal dissent and voter disaffection. Where the party goes from here depends largely on Mitterrand's prospects and on what Moscow elects to do in relation to him.

Conclusions

The foregoing *tour d'horizon* has attempted to demarcate both the possibilities and the limits inherent in the Soviet relationship with France. Over the years since Soviet leaders discovered that de Gaulle's assertive policies offered them significant opportunities for manipulating US–West European relations, they seem to have developed a realistic estimate of what they can hope to gain from their French connection. First and foremost, they value the special dialogue with France in its own right for the simple reason that it interferes with US attempts to coordinate Western policies. Hence, the Soviets place highest value on France's independence from the United States, but probably entertain few illusions about the likelihood of establishing French dependence on the Soviet Union. Beyond that, the Soviets have encouraged French efforts to promote US policies in support of détente and to oppose US policies in most other areas. They have also sought to elicit French approval for Soviet arms control proposals, for greater economic cooperation with the USSR and Eastern Europe, and for Germany's détente policies.

The Soviets can look back on some substantial successes over the years in these domains. However, they must also keep in view a number of countervailing factors which have acted to circumscribe the scope of these accomplishments. First, the initiative in most of the spheres just enumerated has come (and has to come) from the French; Moscow can at best encourage and respond to French desires to cut an independent figure in world affairs and to conduct a privileged dialogue with the USSR. This was certainly the case with de Gaulle's quixotic pursuit of French grandeur, and the same was also true for the more modest attempts by Pompidou and Giscard to assert France's political and economic interest and to play an interlocutory role in East-West relations. It is precisely this fillip of initiative in reaching out toward Moscow that has not as yet come forth from Mitterrand.

Second, many of the most favorable aspects of French policy from Moscow's point of view are often double-edged and carry disadvantages as well as advantages. Thus, France's independent nuclear force, while regarded in Moscow as a detriment to NATO's

[54] See Joan Barth Urban, "Moscow and the West European Parties," presented at a conference on "Recent Soviet Policy Toward Western Europe," University of Washington, Seattle, WA, Apr. 23, 1982. See also J. W. Friend, "The CPSU and the PCF," *Studies in Comparative Communism* (Los Angeles, CA), forthcoming in 1982.

[55] The ambiguity of the PCF's relationship with Moscow is reflected in the nature of the speculation about the purposes of the recent trip to Beijing by PCF Secretariat member Maxime Gremetz and of Marchais's forthcoming trip there in September 1982. While some have suggested that these visits have been arranged with Moscow's blessing, others surmise that the PCF was responding on its own to Chinese initiatives.

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Konstantin U. Chernenko (right), member of the Politburo of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and Georges Marchais (center), Secretary General of the French Communist Party (PCF), address a rally promoting "International Solidarity" and "Peace and Friendship," held in a Paris suburb on February 5, 1982. Chernenko was in France to attend the 24th Congress of the PCF.

—Alain Mingam/Gamma-Liaison.

military cohesion, also complicates Soviet attempts to negotiate a comprehensive agreement on intermediate-range nuclear forces with the West, and it has helped retard the emergence of a mass-based peace movement in France such as those existing in West Germany and the Netherlands. Similarly, the special ties between French and West German leaders are good for Moscow if they reinforce Bonn's interests in cooperating with the Soviet Union and its allies, but unfavorable if they serve to stiffen the West German government's resolve to oppose Soviet policies on missile deployments, Afghanistan, and Poland. Up to now, the Soviets have perceived Mitterrand as stressing the negative aspect of these cross-cutting policies.[56]

The third factor concerns the question of "levers," a favorite Soviet term. Here, too, there are limits to what the Kremlin can do to influence French policy or to exploit France's differences with the United States. Above all, Moscow has fewer means available for exerting political pressure on France than it has with respect to the Federal Republic, and France usually has less influence on Washington—in part because of its political and military autonomy—than West Germany does. As a consequence, France will continue to take a back seat to the Federal Republic as a target of Moscow's attentions—or at least so long as the Social Democrats retain power in Bonn. Whether the emergence of a new government headed by Christian Democrats would alter the situation remains to be seen. While the Christian Democrats may be more willing to risk a deterioration in West Germany's relations with the Soviet Union than the SPD, the Federal Republic will continue to be a prime object of Soviet overtures, in view of its central role in the Euromissile controversy and of continuing popular support in the FRG for stable relations with the German Democratic Republic and for trade with the East.

To be sure, the Soviets possess two potential levers in dealing with France. Both, however, are of questionable effectiveness. The first is economic. The recent conclusion of the gas deal has no doubt buttressed Soviet con-

[56] *New Times*, No. 10, 1982.

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victions about France's interest in economic cooperation with the Soviets—convictions openly voiced by Soviet economists, particularly in connection with discussions of Europe's thirst for energy.[57] Moreover, trade with the USSR benefits certain sectors of the French economy, and the case of the gas turbine industry mentioned earlier is but one example. The Kremlin will accordingly continue to advertise the mutual advantages to be derived from expanding trade.

It is doubtful, however, that flourishing economic ties between France and the Soviet Union can be converted into political profits. Thus far, Mitterrand has shown no signs of budging in his defense policies or in his opposition to the martial law regime in Poland despite the gas deal. Furthermore, France does not obtain as many economic rewards from its East-West trade as does West Germany.[58]

The second, at least potential, lever is the PCF. The obstacles restricting PCF influence on Mitterrand at the moment have already been explained. But things could change. Should the French economic situation deteriorate, sparking discontent within the ranks of the working class, the PCF could seek to capitalize on Mitterrand's troubles by reverting to its accustomed role as "people's tribune." (In this connection, it is instructive to recall the words of PCF Politburo member Roland Leroy, who described the PCF as a party "in" the government but not "of" the government.[59] Strikes and a vigorous propaganda campaign, perhaps accompanied by the resignation of the Communist cabinet ministers, could be used to pressure the government into cutting defense expenditures while having the added effect of boosting the PCF's recently shattered prestige. To the extent that such a strategy were coordinated with Moscow, it could be modulated with the aim of inducing a more pro-Soviet foreign policy on the part of the Socialist leadership.

Yet the implications of an economic downturn are by no means predictable. Such a turn of events could actually diminish Mitterrand's ability to conduct an active foreign policy and push him further to the right, by compelling him to make compromises with centrist forces to secure broader popular support for his government. The results of the cantonal elections of March 1982 indicate that such a process may already be under way.

French Defense Minister Charles Hernu, left, confers in Bonn with his West German counterpart, Hans Apel, in July 1981.

—Poly-Press/Katherine Young.

In the end, perhaps the most effective thing Moscow could do to ease relations with France and damage the foundations of French-American cooperation in opposing Soviet policies would be to return to a more relaxed international atmosphere, especially in Western Europe. This would require meaningful Soviet compromises in the negotiations on theater nuclear weapons at Geneva as well as a normalization of affairs in Poland. Without some movement along these lines, it appears that the Soviets can only expect the Mitterrand government to expand its nuclear forces and demonstrate traditional French solicitude for the Polish people (coupled with PS solicitude for Solidarity).

Should tensions diminish substantially, however, the Soviets might anticipate that France and the United States would resume their normal bickering over a host of international issues, including East-West relations. As indicated earlier, many of Mitterrand's ideals and preferences contain the seeds of potential conflict with the United States on a broad agenda of questions. His continuing reluctance to join in Western military undertakings beyond the NATO periphery, his willingness to maintain economic links with the Soviet Union, his sympathy for revolutionary movements in the Third World, and his commitment to disarmament—these aspects of the "other" Mitterrand have lately been forced into the background primarily by Soviet actions themselves over the past several years. But they remain part and parcel of his political outlook, and perhaps they would resurface as primary in the context of a more relaxed Soviet posture. As Robert Legvold has pointed out, the Soviets

[57] See, for example, A. Kudryavtsev, "France: The State and Energy," *MEMO*, No. 11, 1981.

[58] Although French imports from the USSR more than tripled between 1977 and 1981 and exports rose by more than one-third, by 1981, trade with the Soviet Union accounted for only 2.8 percent of France's total imports and 1.8 percent of its exports. *Commerce extérieure de la France 1981* (Foreign Trade of France 1981), Paris, Centre Français du Commerce Extérieur, 1982.

[59] *Le Monde*, May 7, 1982.

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

Franco-Soviet economic ties: at the left, three French technicians (in the center) demonstrate to Soviet operators the installation and use of a vertical two-spindle boring machine sold by the French firm "Forest" to the Soviet "Atommash" plant in Volgodonsk, which manufactures nuclear equipment; at the right, construction in France of a section of pipeline which delivers natural gas to France from the Ural Mountains under a contract between Gas de France and Soyuzgazeksport.

—TASS from Sofvoto.

appear not to have reached any firm conclusions about Mitterrand as yet and remain open to the possibility of reestablishing their dialogue with the president of France.[60]

For now, in sum, the most that Moscow can hope for is to replace the current, somewhat reluctant, Mitterrand with the more accommodating one. Turning him around, however, will entail some effort. At the very least, it will require the Soviet leadership to heed the message of those Soviet scholars who write that a relaxation of tensions sharpens capitalist contradictions while confrontation and crisis only promote Western unity.

[60] "The Soviet Union and France," presented at a conference on "Recent Soviet Policy Toward Western Europe," University of Washington, Seattle, WA, Apr. 23, 1982.

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Kremlin Politics and the Austrian Settlement

by Vojtech Mastny

Visitors enter the Vienna office of the Austrian Chancellor through an anteroom evocative of memories. It is the room where in 1934 an earlier chancellor, Engelbert Dollfuss, bled to death after having been shot by intruding Nazi conspirators—a vivid reminder of Austria's precarious position at the time. It is also the room where, as if to exorcise the ghost, the Austrians have hung an enormous painting depicting a happier event—the signing, in May 1955 in the Belvedere Palace not far away, of the Austrian State Treaty, which ended Austria's occupation by Western and Soviet troops and laid the foundation for its subsequent prosperity as a neutral state in one of the world's most heavily armed regions. Present Chancellor Bruno Kreisky, himself a prominent figure in the events of 1955, delights in reminding visitors of the startling contrast between Austria's bright present and sorry past.[1]

But the broader significance of Austria's good fortune lies in the extraordinary light it sheds on Soviet policies. Not only did the Soviets in 1955 abandon their obstruction of the State Treaty, a draft of which had been ready for signature for the past eight years. They also proved suddenly so eager to sign it that in the end they settled for terms less favorable than the original terms and came to an agreement with the Austrians even before the Western powers entered the final negotiation process. US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles judged the outcome as "just one of these breaks that come if you keep on steadily, steadily, keeping the pressure on. And all of a sudden you get a break."[2]

There is a broader significance, too, for the Soviet Union's relations with the West. The Austrian State Treaty, reversing the previous trend in East-West relations, inaugurated what might be called the first period of détente. Détente did not last, but this brief period was extremely significant. In the opinion of André Fontaine, the distinguished French commentator, "a unique opportunity for getting out of the Cold War once and for all may have been lost" when East and West failed to come to any further agreement beyond the Austrian settlement.[3] According to Austrian President Rudolf Kirchschläger, however, the Austrian settlement proved that

even agreements of a very fundamental nature, namely, those affecting spheres of influence, are possible; it put into practice for the first time in Europe the theory of peaceful coexistence which has by now become the foundation for conducting relations without regard to ideological divisions.[4]

With the permanence of that foundation again in doubt, it is of more than academic interest to reexamine the events that led to the signing of the Austrian State Treaty. Does the signing of the treaty show that Moscow was prepared to make substantial concessions only when faced with unrelenting Western pressure? Or were there other reasons why the Soviet leaders were so accommodating? Was their change of policy related to the internal struggle for power and to differences of

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[1] *Interview with Chancellor Bruno Kreisky, Vienna, Apr. 29, 1982.*

[2] "Television Report to the President by Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles," May 17, 1955, Dulles Papers, Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ.

[3] André Fontaine, *History of the Cold War,* New York, NY, Random House, 1969, Vol. 2, p. 126.

[4] Quoted by Marion Dönhoff in "Symposium on the International Situation," *Europäische Rundschau* (Vienna), No. 2, 1980, p. 138.

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

Signing of the Austrian State Treaty on May 15, 1955, in Vienna's Belvedere Palace: from left to right, US Ambassador, Llewellyn Thompson; US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles; Soviet Ambassador, Ivan Il'ichëv; Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov; Austrian Foreign Minister Leopold Figl; British Foreign Secretary Harold Macmillan; British Ambassador, Geoffrey Wallinger; French Foreign Minister Antoine Pinay; and French Ambassador, Roger Lalouette.

—USIS.

opinion about priorities? In particular, how did the condition of their East European empire influence their posture toward the West? What conclusions can be drawn about the constancy of Soviet security requirements and the tactics the Soviets employ when they conclude that changes are necessary? Finally, what factors lay behind the rise and fall of the first détente, of which Austrian neutrality was the foremost, and possibly unique, product? The lessons still to be learned from the Austrian State Treaty—an episode concluded more than 25 years ago—can perhaps make the difference between the success or failure of détente in the future.[5]

Stalin and Austria

Until the end of World War II, Austria did not figure high on the list of Soviet priorities. Stalin, ever the great-power snob, had long questioned its very raison d'être as a separate state—as did also, to be sure, a great many Austrians during the unhappy interwar period. In March 1938, Moscow's much-publicized protest against Austria's *Anschluss* with Nazi Germany was little more than the last cry in its waning campaign to drum up Western resistance against Adolf Hitler.[6] Following Stalin's subsequent deal with Hitler in August 1939, the Soviet leader took care not to contravene the Nazi notion that Austria was an integral part of the German Reich. Even after the two dictators fell out with each other in 1941, Stalin still saw fit to publicly contrast *Anschluss* with the Nazis' other conquests. Privately, his Comintern aide Dmitriy Manuilskiy paid Austrian Communist exiles the dubious compliment of describing their compatriots as "a charming variety of Germans."[7]

Once the war had begun, however, the Soviets no longer had a vested interest in tolerating the absorption of Austria by Germany. In December 1941, Stalin suggested to British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden the restoration of an independent Austria, among other daring ideas he expounded during their memorable meeting held as the Germans were knocking on Moscow's doors.[8] But at the October 1943 conference of foreign ministers in Moscow, it was Great Britain, not the Soviet Union, that took the initiative in proposing that Austrian

[5] While the relevant Soviet archives remain closed to foreigners, the Austrians aptly celebrated the State Treaty's 25th anniversary by providing access to theirs. Even though they have more recently seen fit to close the archives again, enough new evidence about the contacts between Vienna and Moscow has come to light to clarify the picture of Soviet policy drawn in the three best available accounts: Robert L. Ferring, "The Austrian State Treaty of 1955 and the Cold War," *Western Political Quarterly* (Salt Lake City, UT), December 1968, pp. 651–67; Sven Allard, *Russia and the Austrian State Treaty: A Case Study of Soviet Policy in Europe*, University Park, PA, Pennsylvania State University Press, 1970; and William L. Stearman, *The Soviet Union and the Occupation of Austria: An Analysis of Soviet Policy in Austria, 1945–1955*, Bonn, Siegler, 1962.

[6] Press statement by Maksim Litvinov, Mar. 17, 1938, in Jane Degras, Ed., *Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy*, Vol. 3, London, Oxford University Press, 1953, pp. 276–77.

[7] Report by Iosif Stalin, Nov. 6, 1941, in Andrew Rothstein, Ed., *Soviet Foreign Policy During the Patriotic War*, Vol. 1, London, Hutchinson, 1944, p. 29. See also Ruth von Mayenburg, *Blaues Blut and rote Fahnen* (Blue Blood and Red Banners), Vienna, Molden, 1969, p. 292.

[8] Minutes of Eden-Stalin conversation, Dec. 16, 1941, WP (42) 8, CAB 66/20, Public Record Office, London.

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independence be formally declared an Allied war aim. The Soviets concurred, but acted as if they favored the idea less on its intrinsic merits and more as a convenient means to weaken postwar Germany. They inserted into the joint declaration a clause proclaiming Austria's shared responsibility for Hitler's war, a clause that not only established a Soviet claim to reparations but also implied that the Austrians had neither fought for the Führer any less willingly than the Germans themselves nor resisted his rule at home any more actively.[9] Edvard Kardelj, the Yugoslav Communist chief who knew Stalin well, judged him indifferent to Austria except in relation to Germany.[10]

The Soviet Union acquired a direct stake in Austria only when its troops moved onto Austrian territory in early 1945. Between October 1944 and February 1945, Stalin had more than once encouraged his Western coalition partners to advance on Vienna from the south.[11] Contrary to his stated preferences, however, it fell to the Red Army to spearhead the occupation of Austria. The Soviet presence in the eastern part of the country, in turn, added substance to the Allied agreement on the division of Austria into occupation zones, an agreement concluded in 1944 after the Soviets had persuaded the reluctant Americans to accept one of the zones.[12] As the end of the war neared with no clear understanding about the future of Germany, moreover, the four-power arrangement in Austria assumed special significance as reinforcing the principle of joint responsibility for the settlement in Germany as well.

As a result of these developments, the Soviets began to view the future of Austria in more ambitious terms. In April 1945, they established in Vienna a provisional government designed to exercise authority under their tutelage throughout Austria, without regard to the temporary occupation zones. They installed as chancellor a Socialist, Karl Renner, whom they expected to be their puppet.

The story of how the Soviet scheme fell apart is too well known to need recounting. In Austria, Renner confounded expectations by proving no puppet at all. In Germany, the quadripartite regime proved abortive, and the repercussions soon spilled over into Austria. As the East-West confrontation grew into the cold war, previously insignificant Austria emerged as an important part of the battlefield where Stalin clung to what he had lest any concession be interpreted as an incipient rout in the zero-sum game he imagined himself to be playing with the United States. Under such circumstances, no progress toward a settlement was likely unless one side or the other faltered.

Austrian Initiatives

After Stalin's death in 1953, it was the Soviet side that began to falter. Stalin's successors could not possibly hope to preserve the formidable grip he had maintained. No sooner had he gone than they began gingerly to alleviate some of the rigors of their occupation regime in eastern Austria.[13]

The Vienna government reacted quickly. Chancellor Julius Raab now saw the time as ripe for a breakthrough in the stalemate. Raab was under pressure from his own People's Party, which, having recently lost votes, badly needed a foreign policy success. He was ready to explore channels of communication with Moscow independently—a tendency that disturbed the Western powers, particularly the United States.[14] Eleanor Dulles, the administration's leading Central European expert, took a dim view of Raab's qualities as a statesman, describing him to her brother, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, as a "simple person" who is "more or less a farmer, and likes to climb mountains."[15]

Norbert Bischoff, Austria's resident representative in Moscow for many years, also urged a separate initiative. On November 15, 1953, Bischoff (a career diplomat reputedly inclined to have an excessive attachment to any milieu where he happened to be serving[16]) sent a private letter to Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov in which he asserted that the time had come for a Soviet-Austrian rapprochement, preferably a relationship much like the one between the Soviet Union and Finland. Alluding to the recent resignation of Austria's pro-American Foreign Minister Karl Gruber, Bischoff alerted Molotov that "Raab had staked his political

[9] "Amended Draft on Austria" and "Declaration on Austria," *Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1943*, Vol. 1, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1963, pp. 724, 761.

[10] Edvard Kardelj, *Boj za priznanje in neodvisnost nove Jugoslavjie, 1944–1957: Spomini* (The Struggle for the Recognition and Independence of New Yugoslavia, 1944–57: Memoirs), Ljubljana, Drzavna zalozba Slovenije, 1980, p. 32.

[11] Vojtech Mastny, *Russia's Road to the Cold War: Diplomacy, Warfare, and the Politics of Communism, 1941–1945*, New York, NY, Columbia University Press, 1979, pp. 211, 236, 240.

[12] Ibid., p. 236.

[13] Stearman, op. cit., pp. 131–34.

[14] "Austria Attempts Independent Foreign Policy," Office of Intelligence Research, US Department of State, Aug. 31, 1953, Intelligence Report No. 6403, National Archives, Washington, DC.

[15] "Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, John Foster Dulles and Eleanor Lansing Dulles, Nov. 23, 1954, telephone conv.—Nov. 1, 1954–Dec. 31, 1954 (3)," Papers of John Foster Dulles, 1951–59, Eisenhower Library, Abilene, KS.

[16] Gerald Stourzh, *Geschichte des Staatsvertrages, 1945–1955: Österreichs Weg zur Neutralität* (History of the State Treaty, 1945–55: Austria's Road to Neutrality), Graz, Styria, 1980, p. 115; interview with Austrian Ambassador to Switzerland Hans Thaberg, Bern, Aug. 4, 1981.

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future on his being able to establish good relations with the Soviet Union, as it conforms with the deepest permanent interests of Austria." The message, which Bischoff himself characterized as "very unusual," implored the Soviets to respond with a signal that would prove Raab right.[17]

It is not clear whether Bischoff acted entirely on his own or with at least the implied consent of Raab, with whom he had recently consulted in Vienna. What is clear is that the unusual character of the probe did not save it from total failure. When Bischoff paid a visit to the Foreign Ministry a few days later, he found Molotov "if possible even a degree stiffer and more reserved than formerly."[18] It was a frustrating but indisputable fact of life for the Austrians that by themselves they were powerless to sway Moscow.

For almost a year thereafter, the Soviets were unyielding. To be sure, at the January 1954 conference of foreign ministers in Berlin, Molotov professed a readiness to sign the State Treaty if the Red Army could keep bases in Austria until the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany.[19] But Molotov was being disingenuous, since any such indefinite Soviet military presence was known to be unacceptable to the Western powers and Austrians alike. Moscow's higher priority remained the German question, then at a critical juncture because of the impending rearmament of West Germany under the auspices of the projected European Defense Community. As their Soviet mentors stepped up a campaign to thwart the project, the Austrian Communists in May 1954 even ceased their previous advocacy of Austria's neutralization, insisting that nothing short of a continued Soviet military presence would enable Austria to withstand the peril of a resurgent Germany.[20]

The defeat of the proposed European Defense Community by the French National Assembly on August 30, 1954, was greeted in Moscow with undisguised relief and jubilation. Soviet officials suddenly began to display an unaccustomed bonhomie in conversations with Austrian representatives.[21] Whether this presaged a change of policy is an interesting but moot question, for no new Soviet policy had the time to mature before the German question took an altogether unexpected turn. By the end of September, the Allies had devised a different solution, one that envisaged West Germany's admission into NATO. For the Soviets, this was a prospect even more alarming than the one that had just been averted.

On October 21, anxious about the unexpected turn of events in Germany, Bischoff visited Mikhail Gribanov, the head of the Austrian desk at the Foreign Ministry in Moscow, to urge continued dialogue between the two governments. Going a step further than Vienna's latest official pronouncements, he hinted at the possibility of

[17] Bischoff to Molotov, Nov. 15, 1953, Norbert Bischoff Papers (in possession of Mrs. Holda Bischoff, Vienna).

[18] Bischoff to Karl Wildmann, General Secretary of the Austrian Foreign Office, Nov. 17, 1953, in Alfons Schilcher, Ed., *Österreich und die Grossmächte: Dokumente zur österreichischen Aussenpolitik, 1945–1955* (Austria and the Great Powers: Documents on Austrian Foreign Policy, 1945–55), Vienna, Geyer, 1980, p. 180.

[19] Stourzh, op. cit., pp. 120–22.

[20] Ernst Fischer, *Das Ende einer Illusion: Erinnerungen, 1945–1955* (The End of an Illusion: Memoirs, 1945–55), Vienna, Molden, 1973, p. 367.

[21] Records of Josef Schöner-Andrey Timoshchenko and Franz Matsch-A. E. Kovalev conversations, Sept. 20 and 22, 1954, in Schilcher, op. cit., pp. 225–31.

Occupation forces in postwar Vienna: at the left, Western MP's; at the right, Soviet soldiers.

—Photoreporters.

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satisfying Soviet security needs by preserving an otherwise unspecified "control machinery" *(Kontrollapparat)* in Austria even after the conclusion of the State Treaty.[22] Gribanov was friendly enough, though noncommittal. Nevertheless, after the signing two days later of the Paris agreements, which set the procedure for West Germany's early admission into NATO, the Soviets stiffened. On November 1, Deputy Foreign Minister Valerian Zorin told Bischoff that the ratification of the agreements would leave "nothing more to negotiate about"—a position confirmed in the Soviet note to the Western powers on December 10.[23] Austria had lost its value in Moscow's campaign to prevent West Germany's remilitarization. Soviet assent to an Austrian settlement had never seemed so remote.

Soviet Response

It was not long, however, before signs of a change in Soviet attitudes began to appear. In mid-December 1954, even as Soviet officials were pouring cold water on the Austrians' heads, Czechoslovak Ambassador to Belgrade Vilém Pit'hart intimated to his American colleague, James W. Riddleberger, that Moscow would be ready to negotiate about Austria "in a few months."[24] This confidence seemed rather farfetched in view of the further deterioration that followed. On December 21, Soviet High Commissioner Ivan Il'ichëv summoned an emergency session of the Allied Control Council in Vienna to accuse the United States of threatening Austrian unity by maintaining a military depot in the French occupation zone. The charge was both preposterous and puzzling, for the depot had been there for several years—as had some minor Soviet facilities in the American zone—without anybody's minding.[25] Only in retrospect does the uproar seem to make sense. By invoking the phantom threat, Moscow was really preparing a rationale for the policy change that Pit'hart had predicted.

If, regardless of Il'ichëv's posturing, nothing serious had happened in Austria, much had been happening in Moscow, where a leadership crisis was about to break out. On one side were Premier Georgiy Malenkov and his deputy Anastas Mikoyan. On the other were Party Secretary Nikita Khrushchev and Foreign Minister Molotov. At issue—apart from personal animosities—was the management of Stalin's difficult legacy, particularly the stability and security of his East European empire. Malenkov favored increased production of consumer goods at the expense of the defense-related heavy industries, a position that conveyed both his greater concern for domestic stability and his stronger faith in the possibility of international accommodation. He had overturned a hoary Stalinist dogma by declaring that nuclear war would result not in a victory of "socialism" over "capitalism" but in a universal catastrophe without regard to ideological distinctions.[26] To Seweryn Bialer, then a Polish Communist party activist with access to some high-level Moscow communications, Malenkov "was the only man in the Soviet Politburo that really wanted coexistence," but his colleagues feared "difficulties with the satellite countries."[27]

The nexus between power struggle and foreign policy is revealed in an extraordinary incident, curiously ignored in most literature on the subject.[28] On February 8, 1955, a Soviet-sponsored conference of parliamentarians and other public figures from East and West Europe met in Warsaw to discuss the German question. After hearing the Soviet representatives, it passed a resolution calling not only for the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Germany but also for a Soviet withdrawal from Poland, free and supervised all-German elections (as proposed by British Prime Minister Anthony Eden ten days before), and international guarantees of the integrity of a united, nonaligned Germany. This was the very day that saw Malenkov's forced resignation in Moscow—the probable reason why the Soviet press never published the resolution, which appeared only in the Polish party newspaper, *Trybuna Ludu*.[29]

The coincidence suggests strongly that it was Malenkov's readiness for a far-reaching accommodation in Central Europe that cost him power. Thereafter, the Soviet government proceeded on the assumption that the Paris accords made the division of Germany permanent for the foreseeable future. It thus abandoned the last remnants of flexibility that had been evident in its handling of this crucial problem of European security.

Malenkov's fall led to the reassertion of some of the Stalinist principles he had put in doubt, such as the

[22] Bischoff to Foreign Office on conversation with Gribanov, Oct. 21, 1954, ibid., pp. 231–32.

[23] Bischoff to Foreign Office on conversation with Zorin, Nov. 2, 1954, ibid., p. 232; "Note of the Soviet Government to the Governments of France, England and USA," *Pravda* (Moscow), Dec. 10, 1954, p. 2.

[24] Walter Wodak to Leopold Figl, Dec. 13, 1954, cited in Manfried Rauchensteiner, *Der Sonderfall: Die Besatzungszeit in Österreich 1945 bis 1955* (The Special Case: The Occupation Period in Austria, 1945–1955), Graz, Styria, 1979, p. 329.

[25] Stourzh, op. cit., p. 128.

[26] Herbert S. Dinerstein, *War and the Soviet Union: Nuclear Weapons and the Revolution in Soviet Military and Political Thinking*, New York, NY, Praeger, 1962, pp. 101–105, 112–14. Cf. Paul Marantz, "Internal Politics and Soviet Foreign Policy: A Case Study," *Western Political Quarterly*, March 1975, pp. 133–35.

[27] US Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, *Scope of Soviet Activity in the United States*, Part 29, Session of June 8, 1956, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1957, pp. 4292 and 4389.

[28] An exception is Michael Howard, *Disengagement in Europe*, Harmondsworth, Middlesex, Penguin, 1958, p. 21, despite factual errors in some of the references.

[29] *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw), Feb. 9, 1955.

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Anastas Mikoyan, left, and Georgiy Malenkov, right, were aligned on one side of a Kremlin power struggle in late 1954.

—EUPRA and UPI.

traditional primacy of heavy industry. In a keynote speech at the Supreme Soviet session that accepted Malenkov's resignation, Molotov painted the picture of a perilous world in which unrelenting antagonism between the two power blocs left no room for complacency. He asserted that Moscow's East European dependencies "have so far taken only the first, though very important, steps toward socialism" and that they remained threatened by the United States. He charged that the prospective remilitarization of West Germany increased "the danger of another war."[30] Soon afterwards, Malenkov's thesis about the catastrophic effects of a nuclear war was rejected because it allegedly gave comfort to the "imperialists."[31]

However, Molotov's speech was a strangely convoluted piece of rhetoric, full of inconsistencies suggestive of last-minute editing, presumably to take into account another twist in the Kremlin intrigue that elevated to the premiership not him but Khrushchev's protégé, Marshal Nikolay Bulganin.[32] Despite his grim account of the international situation, Molotov hinted at possibilities for détente in different parts of Europe. In particular, he declared that "there is no justification for any further delay in concluding a state treaty with Austria" and that this need not await the final settlement of the German question, although he did insist that a four-power conference on both questions should convene first. Molotov further noted prospects for better relations with Yugoslavia, whose leadership, he claimed, had "to some extent departed from the position" it had held previously.

Seen against the background of continuing strife in the Kremlin, the peculiarities of Molotov's speech raise questions about the coherence and direction of subsequent Soviet policy. Had Khrushchev imposed already a concept of his own which Molotov but reluctantly implemented? Or were there actually two concepts which temporarily competed, pending the resolution of their rivalry? The Soviet rush for a decision in Austria offers a number of clues.

The Rush for Decision

Events moved rapidly beginning on February 25, 1955, when Molotov summoned Bischoff to the Foreign Ministry and expounded on the relevant passages of his Supreme Soviet speech. Asking rhetorically whether progress toward a settlement was possible, Molotov then proceeded to outline how it might be—if an ironclad guarantee against *Anschluss* could be devised. Although he conceded that there was no acute danger

[30] "The International Situation and the Foreign Policy of the Soviet Government," Feb. 8, 1955, *New Times* (Moscow), Feb. 12, 1955, pp. 12, 14, 16, 20, 23.

[31] Carl A. Linden, *Khrushchev and the Soviet Leadership: 1957–1964*, Baltimore, MD, Johns Hopkins Press, 1966, p. 23–31; Robert Conquest, *Power and Policy in the USSR: The Struggle for Stalin's Succession, 1945–60*, London, Macmillan, 1961, pp. 260–61.

[32] Uri Ra'anan, *The USSR Arms the Third World: Case Studies in Soviet Foreign Policy*, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 1969, pp. 102–22.

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of *Anschluss* at present, he demanded safeguards for the future. He suggested that the Soviet Union and Austria reach a basic agreement the Western powers could not reject.[33]

Bischoff was gratified to observe that this was the very procedure he had recommended to Gribanov the previous October. He promised a quick answer from his superiors and volunteered to keep the conversation secret from Western diplomats in Vienna, who, to his embarrassment, had found out about his earlier conversation with Gribanov. Nevertheless, Vienna advised Bischoff in no uncertain terms that "negotiations conducted unilaterally or with but one of the occupation powers is not the appropriate means to achieve the guarantee." Nor did it allow him to pursue his idea of preserving "control machinery" as part of a guarantee. On March 1, the Austrian government duly informed the three Western Allies about Molotov's proposal.[34]

On March 2, when Bischoff again met with Molotov, he brought along a rather cautious reply from Vienna. Gratefully acknowledging the Soviet initiative, the Austrians expressed a willingness to supply the desired guarantee but insisted on proceeding in close cooperation with the other occupation powers to ensure the departure of all foreign troops. They implored Molotov to clarify the Soviet position.[35]

Seemingly dismayed, Molotov countered that the Soviet position was clear enough and challenged the Austrians to clarify theirs. Two days later in Vienna, Soviet Minister Semën Kudryavtsev pursued the same line with two leading Austrian Socialists, including State Secretary Bruno Kreisky, whom he had invited to dinner. Would they agree to let the Soviet Union reoccupy bases in its former Austrian zone if it saw a danger of *Anschluss*? To this transparent allusion to the 1939 Soviet doctrine of "indirect aggression," the Austrians' answer was understandably negative.[36]

Pressed to take the next step, Austrian officials agonized about how to assess the seriousness of Soviet intentions. The prevailing opinion was skeptical.[37] But at this critical moment, Bischoff proved the right man in the right place. He not only grasped that the Soviets wanted an agreement. He also offered convincing reasons why, singling out as crucial the impending ratification of the Paris accords. As Bischoff saw it, Moscow was now ready for a gesture of goodwill that could ameliorate an international situation it saw tilting uncomfortably to its disadvantage, and the Soviet leaders were genuinely concerned that "the splitting of Germany as a result of the Paris deal and the front line thus created . . . would extend to the Austrian soil."[38]

If Bischoff's analysis was correct—and nothing in the Soviet behavior contradicted it—then what the Soviets really meant by their insistent references to *Anschluss* was the integration of most of Austria into the Western defense system—a possibility underscored by the expected preeminence of rearmed West Germany in that system. (Another experienced diplomat on the spot, US Ambassador to Moscow Charles E. Bohlen, arrived at the same reading as Bischoff although he knew even better than Bischoff that there was no such Western policy.[39]) Moreover, the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Austria offered Moscow the immediate advantage of disrupting NATO's lines of communications between Germany and Italy. Yet, in the absence of actual hostilities—the likelihood of which the withdrawal would actually diminish—this narrow military consideration could have hardly warranted the risky Soviet initiative. For the Soviets, the political challenge was much more important.

The need to respond to the challenge of Western ascendancy also underlay the Soviet quest for some sort of rapprochement with Yugoslavia. Khrushchev was the key advocate of this course. By luring Tito back into Moscow's fold, he hoped in one bold stroke to counter the West and check the subversive appeal of Titoism in Eastern Europe. Molotov, by contrast, harbored misgivings—not so much about the desirability as about the extent of accommodation. The chief accomplice in Stalin's ill-fated scheme to topple Tito in 1948, he was prepared to tolerate an arrangement between governments but not—as Khrushchev contemplated—an entente between parties.[40] There was a difference in substance, as well as in style, between the quietly defensive nature of the Austrian settlement for which Molotov had the main responsibility and the exceedingly ambitious ploy Khrushchev was hatching in Yugoslavia.

The Yugoslav and Austrian projects, although proceeding simultaneously, competed with rather than complemented each other. On March 10, *Pravda* printed verbatim and without comment Tito's angry rebuttal of Molotov's patronizing statement about the supposed change in Yugoslav policy that made better

[33] Bischoff to Foreign Office, Feb. 25, 1955, in Schilcher, op. cit., pp. 238–40.

[34] Foreign Office to Bischoff, Feb. 28, 1955, and notification of Western powers, Mar. 1, 1955, ibid., 240–41.

[35] Soviet press statement, Mar. 11, 1955; "Documents on the Austrian Question," *Europa-Archiv* (Bonn), No. 10, 1955, p. 7484.

[36] Allard, op. cit., pp. 169–70.

[37] Interview with Herbert Grubmayr, head of Western Department, Austrian Foreign Office, Vienna, Apr. 30, 1982.

[38] Bischoff to Foreign Office, Feb. 28, 1955, in Schilcher, op. cit., pp. 241–45.

[39] Charles E. Bohlen, *Witness to History, 1929–1969*, New York, NY, Norton, 1973, p. 374.

[40] US Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, op. cit., p. 1562.

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Yugoslav party Chief Josip Broz Tito, right, welcomes Soviet party leader Nikita Khrushchev to Belgrade in June 1955.

—Camera Press.

relations possible.[41] This was an affront to Molotov, a signal that his position was slipping. In order to shore it up, he tried to get quick results in Austria. Two days later, without prior consultation with the Austrians, the Soviet Foreign Ministry published Molotov's recent exchanges with Bischoff. The account, published in *Pravda*, pointedly omitted Molotov's original admission that no *Anschluss* was imminent, thus implying that there was danger in delay. By dwelling on Moscow's concession that the German question need not be settled first, Molotov was urging the Austrians to respond in kind.[42]

The key question for the Austrians was the Soviet insistence that a four-power conference must meet before the Paris agreements could take effect. In Bonn, most officials still believed that Moscow wished primarily to influence events in Germany. But in Vienna, their counterparts were more astute in grasping that "the Russian initiative had nothing to do with preventing the ratification of the Paris agreements," which was by then a foregone conclusion.[43] In another conversation with Kudryavtsev, Kreisky commented that if the Soviets were making the conference a precondition to the Austrian settlement, they were asking the impossible and could not be taken seriously. Tacitly admitting that they were bluffing, Kudryavtsev protested—and rightly—that his government did want the settlement.[44]

In a note on March 14, the Austrians tried to clarify their position, as Molotov had been urging them to do. Unlike the Soviets, however, the Austrians kept basically to the same position. They reaffirmed their determination neither to join any alliances nor to allow foreign bases on their territory. While stressing their readiness to discuss a formal declaration to that effect, however, they reiterated that this could be achieved only through talks with all the occupation powers.[45] The Austrian statement wisely eschewed any mention of neutrality, which in official Soviet doctrine was no more than an ill-concealed form of collusion with the Western "imperialists." (Neither were the "imperialists" comfortable with an idea that to them smacked of collusion with the Russian Communists. Dulles's remark at the 1954 conference of foreign ministers in Berlin that true neutrality is honorable seemed to be in the realm of abstraction rather than reality.[46])

Under these difficult circumstances, the leading Austrian politicians displayed considerable dexterity in trying to reconcile their national aspirations with Moscow's seemingly undetermined preferences. When Kreisky invited Kudryavtsev and other guests for dinner on March 17, he introduced the question of his country's future in a dramatic fashion. Taking a copy of the *Dictionnaire diplomatique* from his bookshelf, he loudly recited from it the provisions of the 1815 treaty that had established the permanent neutrality of Switzerland. Kudryavtsev was attentive and seemed interested.[47]

With the benefit of hindsight, the incident at Kreisky's home may be regarded as the turning point on the way to an agreement. But Kreisky has candidly admitted that he did not attach exceptional significance to it at the time.[48] Nor is there any evidence that Chancellor Raab saw it as a breakthrough. When he spoke of the Austrian settlement in a radio speech three days later and proposed an arrangement like Swiss neutrality in all but name, he was merely demonstrating the impressive unity of purpose in Vienna. Deftly but unequivocally outlining Austria's future obligation to shun alliances and foreign bases, Raab stressed that the obligation be freely assumed rather than imposed by outside powers, which, he suggested, would merely add a guarantee of

[41] "Address by President Tito at the Session of the Yugoslav Parliament," *Pravda*, Mar. 10, 1955, p. 4.

[42] "In the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR: Concerning the Question of the Austrian Treaty," ibid., Mar. 12, 1955.

[43] Record of conversation between Austrian ambassadors and Foreign Office officials, Mar. 28, 1955, Schilcher, op. cit., p. 251. Cf. Adrian Rotter to Foreign Office, Apr. 18, 1955, ibid., pp. 290–91.

[44] Allard, op. cit., pp. 172–73.

[45] *Europa-Archiv*, No. 10, 1955, pp. 7484–85.

[46] On the Soviet concept of neutrality, see Heinz Fiedler, *Der sowjetische Neutralitätsbegriff in Theorie und Praxis: Ein Beitrag zum Problem des Disengagement* (The Soviet Concept of Neutrality in Theory and Practice: A Contribution to the Problem of Disengagement), Cologne, Wissenschaft und Politik, 1959. Statement by John Foster Dulles, Feb. 13, 1954, US Department of State, *Foreign Ministers Meeting: Berlin Discussions*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1954, p. 190.

[47] Allard, op. cit., pp. 174–75. Bruno Kreisky, *Die österreichische Neutralität* (Austrian Neutrality), Vienna, Verlag des Österreichischen Gewerkschaftsbundes, 1960, p. 6.

[48] Interview with Bruno Kreisky, Vienna, Apr. 29, 1982.

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Austria's territorial inviolability.[49]

The Soviet reticence about the exact terms of the Austrian settlement reflected less a tactical ploy than genuine uncertainty about the virtues and vices of neutrality. The Soviets were still ambivalent toward Sweden, where a public debate was considering whether Sweden should acquire nuclear weapons. While Molotov's deputy Andrey Gromyko praised Swedish neutrality during a friendly visit to Stockholm, the military newspaper *Krasnaya Zvezda* indulged in a broadside against "reactionary Swedish generals."[50] There was also dissension over Yugoslavia. During a secret Politburo session at about that time, Molotov and Khrushchev clashed about the proper strategy toward Yugoslavia.[51] Yet it was becoming increasingly clear that the Soviet answer to the consolidation of the Western alliance was to be disengagement not only in Austria but elsewhere along Europe's ideological divide. The question remained how to manage the consequences of disengagement for Moscow's East European empire.

On March 21, Soviet bloc representatives tackled this weighty question at a conference convened in Moscow to prepare the formation of what was eventually to become the Warsaw Treaty Organization. Once established six weeks later, this organization would add nothing to the military potential the Soviets derived from the network of bilateral treaties they already had with their dependencies. Nor was it expected to halt West German rearmament. Conceivably, the treaty—as indicated by its very wording, which closely followed the NATO model—might have been intended to facilitate the eventual dissolution of both alliances in the event of some still-unforeseeable improvement in East-West relations. In practical terms, however, its main purpose initially was to reinforce and institutionalize Eastern Europe's dependence on Moscow—a relationship soon to be tested by the Soviet legitimation of both the Austrian and the Yugoslav varieties of independence.[52]

Molotov's new message to Vienna on March 24 no longer set preconditions. He dropped the demand for a four-power conference to precede the ratification of the Paris agreements, and invited the Austrians to Moscow for discussions about the conclusion of the State Treaty.[53] So rapid was the pace of events that many Austrians, notably Foreign Minister Leopold Figl, suspected a trap.[54] But there was no trap, as could be seen from the pains the Soviets took to camouflage their retreat. On March 23, the day before Molotov sent the message to Vienna, *Krasnaya Zvezda* had resurrected the spurious story about the American plot to divide Austria—the phantom dragon that the Soviet knight could now pretend to slay while posing as the savior of the Austrian maiden. To generate a sense of urgency in foiling the West's evil design, the Soviet media published Molotov's letter even before it reached the Austrians.[55]

On March 27, predictably, the French Council of the Republic ratified the Paris agreements. It thus removed the last obstacle to West Germany's entry into NATO and thereby brought to completion a series of developments that the Soviets had a mere three months ago insisted would make any further negotiations impossible. Not only were negotiations on Austria about to begin, and at Soviet initiative; on March 26, even before the French vote, Premier Bulganin had also announced

[49] Text of the address in Alois Mock et al., *Neue Fakten zum Staatsvertrag und Neutralität* (New Facts on the State Treaty and Neutrality), Vienna, Politische Akademie des ÖVP, 1980, pp. 249–52.

[50] V. Prokof'yev, "The Swedish Military Establishment Pushes the Country onto a Dangerous Path," *Krasnaya Zvezda* (Moscow), Mar. 24, 1955.

[51] Kurt Gasteyger, "Reciprocal State Visits as a Part of the New Course in Soviet Foreign Policy," *Europa-Archiv*, No. 11, 1956, p. 8898; testimony by Seweryn Bialer, in US Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, op. cit., pp. 4390, 4392.

Bruno Kreisky, currently Austrian Chancellor, a participant in the negotiations leading to the conclusion of the Austrian State Treaty.

—Poly-Press/Katherine Young.

[52] On the origins of the Warsaw pact, see Robin A. Remington, *The Warsaw Pact: Studies in Communist Conflict Resolution*, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 1971, pp. 10–27.

[53] *Europa-Archiv*, No. 10, 1955, p. 7485.

[54] Interview with Bruno Kreisky, Vienna, Apr. 29, 1982.

[55] K. Ivanov, "The Question of the Allied Control in Austria," *Krasnaya Zvezda*, Mar. 23, 1955, p. 4.

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that he was prepared to meet with his Western counterparts at a summit conference. Responding to setbacks through an increased readiness for accommodation, the Soviet Union set the stage for the first détente since the onset of the cold war.

The Moscow Memorandum

The Austrian representatives, arriving in Moscow on April 11, soon gained the impression that the Soviets had already written off Austria—a good omen for haggling over details. At the onset of the talks on April 12, Molotov demanded that his negotiating partners make the first proposals—the familiar technique that had served him well in wartime negotiations with the Western allies. Raab lost no time in proposing the conclusion of the State Treaty. Molotov then shifted to the question of the troop withdrawals. At that point, the discussion quickly zeroed in on the guarantee against *Anschluss,* which was Molotov's preeminent concern. With the issues thus posed, the conference adjourned until the next day.[56]

That evening, at a gala dinner reception, Bulganin offered, perhaps unwittingly, the most candid explanation of the Soviet volte-face:

We had thought that the German and Austrian problems could be solved together but this proved not possible. Now a solution of the German problem has been found that is unfortunate. We had to take this into account and draw the consequences for ourselves.[57]

As if uncertain whether he might not have said too much, Bulganin, a novice in international affairs, then turned to Molotov for reassurance: "Am I right in giving this explanation?" There was a touch of quiet resignation in Molotov's reply: "Yes, entirely."

The next day, the Soviets insisted on a declaration of neutrality, their only remaining condition. Now, however, the Austrians demurred. Vice Chancellor Schärf was especially apprehensive about the ambiguity of the term and about possible adverse reaction by the Western powers. But Molotov's logic was compelling: "If what you are offering is indeed neutrality, then why don't you use the proper word for it?" Once again Ambassador Bischoff offered timely advice for his compatriots: "Everything can be achieved if only one uses the word neutrality."[58]

Bischoff was right, of course. The word mattered less than the specifics behind it. No sooner did the Austrians speak of neutrality than they were able to pin Molotov down on an earlier date for the departure of the Soviet troops than he had originally proposed and on the repatriation of all remaining Austrian prisoners of war as well. The Soviet Union was prepared to make substantive concessions if it could preserve the appearance of dictating the terms.

The talks stumbled only over certain Austrian assets held by the Soviets in their occupation zone. The Soviets claimed this property, which included oil wells, shipping facilities, and a variety of industrial plants, under the pretext that it was German property. It is not easy to understand Soviet intransigence on this point. The property in question made little difference to the big Soviet economy but a great difference to the small Austrian economy. Yet the Soviets bargained hard about the relatively modest amount of oil they would require Austria to deliver as the price of getting its wells back.

It is difficult to avoid the impression that the issue was prestige, not substance. Chancellor Raab later mused about the supposed Armenian bargaining habits of Deputy Premier Mikoyan, who had conducted this part of the negotiations. But Raab missed the more important point. Mikoyan, as Malenkov's former associate who had saved himself by joining the winning Kremlin team at the eleventh hour, was under particular compulsion to prove tenacity in defending Soviet interests. As Molotov reminded him in the course of the negotiations, however, there was a "political price to pay," presumably in consenting to the Austrian settlement.[59]

In the end, the difficulty was resolved easily. The Soviets consented to reduce the Austrian oil deliveries and financial obligations, thus clearing the way for final agreement. Austria pledged to "perpetually maintain neutrality in the same manner as practiced by Switzerland."[60] The agreement was summed up in the "Moscow memorandum," signed in the Kremlin on April 15.[61]

[56] The official Austrian record of the conversations by Josef Schöner, preserved in the Vienna Foreign Office, has not been published. Notes about the talks by Vice Chancellor Adolf Schärf, supplemented by extensive inserts by Kreisky, appear in "Recollection of the Moscow Journey: Stenographic Notes of April 11–15, 1955," *Die Zukunft* (Vienna), 1980, No. 4, pp. 23–30. See also the memoir by the Austrian interpreter, Walter Kindermann, *Flug nach Moskau* (Flight to Moscow), Vienna, Ullstein, 1955, pp. 31–32, 93.

[57] Schärf, loc. cit., p. 26.

[58] Ibid. See also Ludwig Steiner, "Report on the Moscow Negotiations of April 1955," in Mock et al., op. cit., pp. 40–43.

[59] Karl-Heinz Ritschel, *Julius Raab, Der Staatsvertragskanzler* (Julius Raab: The Chancellor of the State Treaty), Salzburg, Reinartz, 1975, pages not numbered.

[60] Printed in Stourzh, op. cit., pp. 226–29.

[61] The next day, *Pravda* published an unprecedented eulogy to neutrality, which commended the Swiss for the very conduct that a decade earlier Stalin had found so despicable as to call them "real swine." See "An Important Step on the Road Toward Strengthening Peace in Europe," *Pravda,* Apr. 16, 1955. See also Notes on Stalin-Churchill conversations, Oct. 11–12, 1944, FO 181/990/2, Public Record Office, London.

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Molotov's remark to Mikoyan was not the only indication of high-level Soviet disagreement over the Austrian settlement. During the reception on the evening of April 14, Khrushchev had grumbled in front of the Austrian guests that "we shall examine it, and if it has been done wrong we shall take comrades Molotov and Mikoyan to task."[62] Admittedly, not every rumination of that compulsive talker had some important hidden meaning—on the same occasion, for example, he teased Raab to become a Communist. But neither was his comment entirely meaningless. At the very least, it was suggestive of a greater measure of doubt than any of the other Soviet leaders ever let slip. Nor was his simultaneous diatribe against the West calculated to gain Khrushchev credibility as an advocate of détente; that reputation came later.

For a brief period in the spring of 1955, that distinction belonged to Molotov, despite—or rather because of—his particularly close association with Stalinist policies. Molotov not only praised the outcome of the Austrian talks but struck a conciliatory note toward the United States as well. He assured the Swedish and Finnish ambassadors that if "the Austrians seem satisfied with the results of their visit, we are *very* satisfied." And he delayed Bohlen's long-planned trip to Central Asia simply because he wanted personally to report to Bohlen that in return for economic concessions the Soviet government no longer demanded the right to reintroduce troops into Austria.[63]

More Soviet Concessions

The Moscow memorandum was not to be the final word on the Austrian settlement, for further negotiations—this time among all four occupation powers—modified the agreement in small but significant ways. The Soviets, of course, wished to regard the Moscow memorandum as the essence of the final Austrian settlement. The Austrians, too, were quite happy about what had been accomplished. But the Western Allies mistrusted the whole undertaking. Dulles suspected that "the Russians may have cooked something up acceptable to the Austrians but not to us."[64] After the Soviet Union formally proposed a meeting of the foreign ministers to sign the State Treaty without further ado, the Western powers demanded that a conference of ambassadors first scrutinize the agreement. On May 1, *Pravda* publicly fretted about "New Maneuvers of the Opponents of Austria's Independence."[65]

The Soviets thus found themselves in a predicament at the conference, which met in Vienna from May 2 to 4. An anonymous Russian diplomat privately admitted to Swedish Ambassador Sven Allard that "since we have decided on neutrality as a basis of the new line, we can't allow the negotiations to fail."[66] He expressed particular resentment at the tough bargaining by the chief US representative, Llewellyn E. Thompson, Jr., which he viewed as blackmail.

Whatever the proper word for the US tactics, the continued negotiations extracted additional Soviet concessions for the Austrians. Moscow abandoned some of the restrictions it had originally sought to impose on Austria's armed forces. Eventually, too, it agreed to delete from the State Treaty the offensive formula about Austrian complicity in Hitler's war. The Soviets finally drew the line, however, by refusing to incorporate in the document the compromise on economic matters spelled out in the Moscow memorandum. In a curious face-saving exercise, they kept the treaty's original provisions about "German property," but simultaneously agreed to append, as an integral part of the whole document, an annex that incorporated the memorandum's passages nullifying those same provisions.[67]

The ambassadors' conference of May 2–4 inaugurated the most eventful month in East-West relations since the onset of the cold war. On May 5, West Germany formally entered NATO, and the European members of the Soviet bloc announced that they would meet in Warsaw to form their own pact. Before they did, the formalistic Soviets revoked their wartime alliances with Great Britain and France, although these had long been defunct anyway. More to the point, they now gave proof of their concern about the Western defense system by submitting their most elaborate disarmament proposal so far.[68] Against this background, the actual conclusion of the Warsaw Pact on May 14 did not mean nearly so much as two announcements made on the same day: the announcement of the forthcoming summit in Geneva and especially the stunning news that a top-level Soviet delegation would soon visit Yugoslavia.

The ceremonial signing of the Austrian State Treaty took place in Vienna on May 15. The day before, Molo-

[62] Kindermann, op. cit., p. 79.

[63] Rauchensteiner, op. cit., p. 332; Bohlen, op. cit., pp. 373–74.

[64] "Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, John Foster Dulles and James Hagerty, Apr. 15, 1955, telephone conv.—White House Mar. 7, 1955 to Aug. 29, 1955 (3)," Papers of John Foster Dulles, 1951–59, Eisenhower Library, Abilene, KS.

[65] *Pravda*, May 1, 1955.

[66] Allard, op. cit., p. 194.

[67] Rudolf Kirchschläger, "Remembrances of the Vienna Foreign Ministers' Conference of 1955," *Zeitgeschichte* (Vienna), No. 2, 1975, pp. 177–79. The text of the treaty and its revisions are printed in Stourzh, op. cit., pp. 243–318.

[68] "Proposal of the Soviet Government on Reduction of Armaments, Prohibition of Atomic Weapons, and Elimination of the Threat of Another War," May 10, 1955, *New Times*, Supplement, May 14, 1955, pp. 2–8.

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tov had taken his Western colleagues by surprise when he produced a draft of a four-power declaration that would not only recognize but also guarantee the integrity of a neutral Austria. Evidently, he would have welcomed the declaration, as an additional safeguard against *Anschluss.* So would the Austrians, though for a different reason—to better fend off any future Soviet attempts at interference. But neither the British, haunted by the memory of their fateful guarantee to Poland in 1939, nor the Americans were interested. Molotov genially did not insist; he impressed British Foreign Secretary Harold Macmillan as showing his "softer side" in Vienna, even posing as "something of a philosopher."[69]

In his address at the conclusion of the ceremonies, the old "cold warrior" rhapsodized that "in addition to Switzerland, there will henceforth be a neutral Austria in the center of Europe," adding that perhaps "this course will be followed by other states as well." Allusions in the Soviet media fomented speculation about whether West Germany might be one of these states.[70] But the allusions actually served to emphasize the difference rather than the similarity between Austria and Germany. During the Moscow talks, Vice Chancellor Schärf, in behalf of West German Social Democratic chief Erich Ollenhauer, had inquired whether the Austrian solution could apply to Germany, but Molotov's answer had been a flat no. Mikoyan's subsequent remarks were no more encouraging.[71]

Disengagement and Eastern Europe

Following the signing of the Austrian State Treaty in May, the Soviet policy of disengagement emerged even more clearly. At the beginning of June, the Soviet Union proposed to Bonn the establishment of diplomatic relations, thus signifying its acceptance of NATO's latest member and acting to add permanence to the division of Germany. Later that year, the Red Army evacuated the Porkkala military base in Finland.

At the same time, Moscow took measures to strengthen its hold on Eastern Europe. As early as May 22, an authoritative *Pravda* article warned against any Western attempt to question the Soviet-imposed order in Eastern Europe, thus leaving no doubt that the enviable status granted Austria was not applicable there.[72]

Nevertheless, the Soviet leaders differed over the vulnerability of their East European empire and, by implication, over the risks that they could take in pursuing a new course toward the West. The differences over policy were apparent in a seemingly esoteric controversy in the pages of the ideological journal *Kommunist,* concerning the level of development attained by the other bloc countries. Molotov, by downgrading the East Europeans' accomplishments on the road to "socialism" in his speech of February 8, had indicated skepticism about their ability to hold their own against an ascendant Western Europe, thus presumably justifying a policy of reduced tension in Austria and elsewhere. In contrast, Bulganin in his speech at the inaugural session of the Warsaw Pact had attributed to the East Europeans a level of political maturity equal to that of the Soviet Union, thus implying less concern about their resilience amid increasing East-West tension.[73]

Khrushchev's trip to Belgrade served as a test of disengagement. His debut in high international politics, it fell short of expectations in ways apt to vindicate Molotov's misgivings about the venture. Tito snubbed Khrushchev publicly by giving no reply to the latter's clumsily worded conciliatory statement at the airport. During the subsequent talks, the crafty Tito also resisted being drawn into any entente between parties, thus limiting the accommodation to that between governments, as Molotov had preferred in the first place.[74] These awkward results of the incursion into Yugoslavia by Khrushchev, a still inexperienced diplomatic upstart, contrasted vividly with the graceful retreat that Molotov, an accomplished professional, had arranged in Austria.

For Khrushchev, however, the Belgrade visit, though not a striking success, was not a total failure either. It was not so bad as to threaten his rise to supreme power. But it was bad enough to require action to secure his position against Molotov. As the showdown drew near, Molotov struck Bohlen as a man "on the way out."[75] While in San Francisco for a United Nations conference at the end of June, he was evidently not in a position to discuss any specifics of the summit meeting he was soon to attend together with Khrushchev and Bulganin. Nor did Molotov ever return to the proposal for a four-power guarantee of Austrian neutrality that he had tabled in Vienna the month before. The impending denouement of the Kremlin power struggle augured ill for the conception of disengagement with which Molotov had been so prominently identified.

[69] Harold Macmillan, *Tides of Fortune, 1945–1955,* London, Macmillan, 1969, p. 601. Text of Molotov's proposal in *Pravda,* May 15, 1955.

[70] "Statement by V. M. Molotov . . . ," *New Times,* Supplement, May 28, 1955, p. 3; Radio Moscow, May 19, 1955, quoted in Stearman, op. cit., p. 164.

[71] Interview with Bruno Kreisky, Vienna, Apr. 29, 1982.

[72] "Negotiations or Discussions About Negotiations?" *Pravda,* May 22, 1955, p. 1.

[73] See *Kommunist* (Moscow), No. 15, 1955, which cites the Molotov speech; and "Statement by N. A. Bulganin," May 11, 1955, *New Times,* Suppl. May 21, 1955, p. 14.

[74] Carl Gustav Ströhm, "The Soviet-Yugoslav Negotiations," *Osteuropa* (Stuttgart), No. 5, 1955, pp. 284–89.

[75] Bohlen, op. cit., p. 379.

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The confrontation between Khrushchev and Molotov came at the beginning of July, shortly before the East-West summit convened in Geneva. During a secret session of the CPSU Central Committee, Khrushchev accused Molotov of hindering the rapprochement with Yugoslavia—a fair accusation though hardly the true reason for the shortcomings of his Belgrade mission.[76] More disingenuously, Khrushchev assailed his faltering rival for hampering the Austrian settlement as well. Isolated, this seasoned veteran of many a Kremlin intrigue ritually admitted erroneous judgment about Yugoslavia, although he did defend its 1948 excommunication from the Soviet bloc as justified by Tito's recalcitrance. But as far as Austria was concerned, Molotov could not easily rebuff Khrushchev's brazen claim—unsubstantiated by any contemporary evidence—to all the credit. Only after the Austrian settlement proved a success did Khrushchev begin to propagate the myth, in various public and private statements, that he had been its main architect.[77]

More important, Khrushchev began to alter the thrust of disengagement. Rather than accommodation, Khrushchev sought confrontation. As he explained the principle of "peaceful coexistence" at the July session of the CPSU Central Committee, compromises or even concessions in one area were justified to facilitate more tangible advances elsewhere.[78] Rather than stable East-West relations, Khrushchev wanted a new focus of East-West confrontation, notably the Third World. As early as June, he was publicly courting visiting Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and secretly beginning negotiations for massive arms deliveries to Egypt. Nor did Khrushchev call for a "zone of peace" in Northern Europe in order to strengthen the existing East-West balance; his purpose, rather, was to weaken the position of NATO.[79]

Khrushchev henceforth called the tune by enforcing his different brand of détente, even though Molotov remained foreign minister in name for another year (he was dismissed on the day Tito arrived in Moscow to reciprocate Khrushchev's visit). Khrushchev's ascendancy bred the barren "spirit of Geneva," where the

[76] Seweryn Bialer, "I Chose Truth," *News from Behind the Iron Curtain* (New York, NY), 1956, No. 10, p. 11.

[77] Steiner, "Report," p. 46; *Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament*, Boston, MA, Little, Brown, 1974, p. 493; and Kreisky, op. cit., p. 5.

[78] Bialer, "I Chose Truth," loc. cit.

[79] Cf. Wolfgang Höpker, *Europäisches Niemandsland: Moskaus Zwischeneuropa vom Nordkap bis Kreta* (Europe's No-Man's-Land: Moscow's Middle Europe from the North Cape to Crete), Düsseldorf, Diederichs, 1956.

A scene in Moscow during Indian Premier Jawaharlal Nehru's June 1955 visit to the Soviet Union. From left to right: Lazar Kaganovich, Georgiy Malenkov, Indira Gandhi, Nikita Khrushchev, Anastas Mikoyan, Premier Nehru, and Nikolay Bulganin. Kliment Voroshilov is partially visible behind Nehru.

—Sovfoto.

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Soviet Union avoided any substantive discussion. It led to an uneasy normalization of relations with West Germany—but only after Khrushchev's petulance had almost caused Chancellor Konrad Adenauer to break off the negotiations and leave for home. It also resulted in near-disastrous miscalculations. Swayed by rising Soviet prestige in the Third World to overestimate actual Soviet power, Khrushchev became dangerously prone to test the very foundations of that power. In particular, his denunciation of Stalinism in February 1956 touched off a chain reaction, which, by leading to explosions in Poland and Hungary, vindicated Molotov's forebodings about the vulnerability of Moscow's East European possessions.

There was an uncanny linkage between Austria in 1955 and Hungary in 1956. The alluring example of the Austrian solution helped precipitate, even though it did not cause, the upheaval in Hungary. But a neutral Austria also made it easier for Moscow to master the challenge once it came. The absence of NATO troops from neutral Austria provided perhaps the critical margin of safety that prompted the visibly hesitant Soviets to suppress the Hungarian rebellion by force of arms. Moreover, Khrushchev's accommodation with Yugoslavia had, despite all its limitations, further extended that margin. Tito had by then acquired enough stake in a partnership with Moscow to endorse Soviet intervention when, during a hurried secret visit before the Red Army moved in, Khrushchev solicited endorsement.[80] The Hungarians lost their freedom, the Soviet empire gained a new lease on life, but the brief détente that had brought freedom to Austria was at an end.

Conclusion

A rare international settlement without losers, Austrian neutrality was the happy result of a right decision made for the wrong reasons. Soviet leaders, mesmerized by the resurgence of a rearmed West Germany within NATO, were impelled toward concessions. But they misjudged the necessity of countering the rearmament of Germany through the demilitarization of Austria. There was something of a perverse historical justice in this development: for the Germans, it dimmed the prospect that Moscow would ever agree to their reunification, yet for the Austrians, it restored the freedom of which Hitler had robbed them 17 years before.

The Soviets would not have been so concerned about the growing strength of the West if they had been more certain about their own. But they were hesitant, for the East European empire Stalin had acquired as the main safeguard of Soviet security had already become a major source of Soviet insecurity. Because of this growing sense of internal insecurity, the ascendancy of the West was therefore nothing short of alarming to a ruling group steeped in the notion of an all-embracing rivalry between the two power blocs.

Stalin's successors still need not have responded by loosening their grip on Austria. As Stalin used to do in similar circumstances, they could have held all the more tightly to what they had. That they chose conciliation instead was the result of their collective weakness at a time when their individual rivalries and policy disagreements had reached a breaking point. The emergence of so inveterate a Stalinist as Molotov as an instrument of relative moderation indicated the gravity of the crisis amid the bankruptcy of long-standing policies. Molotov's reputation for intransigence concealed Moscow's genuine readiness to cut its losses.

The Austrians detected and cultivated this change in Soviet attitudes more promptly than their Western protectors. But in the end, the Western allies mustered the requisite mixture of firmness and flexibility that yielded the successful bargain.

It is tempting but idle to speculate whether greater Western faith in Soviet disengagement would have made a difference, or perhaps even have saved the budding détente. The point is that on the Soviet side the promise of moderation was never allowed to run its course regardless of anything the West did or failed to do. By the summer of 1955, once he had outmaneuvered Molotov, Khrushchev was already embarked on his destabilizing policies, which were bound to seal the fate of détente. Only later, after much trial and error, would this capable learner resume the interrupted quest for accommodation, thus preparing the ground for another, more durable détente in the mid-1960's. It was more than merely his personal tragedy that by the end of the 1970's the promise would in turn succumb to mismanagement by those who ousted him from power.

The Austrian solution offers more than passing lessons about Moscow's conduct in the enduring East-West confrontation. The product of a convergence of circumstances unlikely to recur, it can hardly offer a detailed model for other situations. But it does illuminate what opportunities for change in Soviet foreign policy may occur, especially at times of leadership crisis. Although it was an internal imperative that generated the Soviet leaders' readiness for new departures in foreign policy, it was their sizing up of their external adversaries that determined the direction of their new policies. Only Western strength provided the necessary incentive for accommodation, but only Western responsiveness to

[80] Veljko Micunovic, *Moscow Diary*, Garden City, NY, Doubleday, 1980, pp. 131–42.

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legitimate Soviet concerns produced actual results.

As the current crisis of the Soviet empire deepens, the Austrian experience highlights the expediency of abandoning direct controls for indirect safeguards that better promote stability with justice. It also proves that Moscow's notions of security are not unchanging but subject to calculations of cost and benefit. The conclusion for both East and West is self-evident and compelling.

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Books

The Kissinger Years

by Frank K. Roberts

HENRY KISSINGER. *The White House Years* and *Years of Upheaval.* Boston, MA, Little, Brown and Co., 1979 and 1982.

A COMPLETE review of Henry Kissinger's memoirs would involve a commentary on all major international issues between 1969 and 1974. It would require psychological insight into one of the most complex characters and unusual foreign ministers of any country in modern times, operating in the fantastic and debilitating climate of post-Vietnam and Watergate Washington. I have had little or no connection myself with China or Vietnam, which marked, I suppose, the peaks of Kissinger's achievements, at least during his four White House years as national security adviser. I mean, therefore, to concentrate upon the other main themes—the Soviet Union and détente diplomacy, the Middle East, and America's relations with its allies in Europe, with each of which I was professionally and am still closely concerned.

In the last pages of *Years of Upheaval,* Henry Kissinger records his attempt to comfort President Richard Nixon on the eve of the latter's departure from the White House by saying that the judgment of history would be less severe and would remember his major achievements. Nixon replied that it depended upon who wrote the history. This reminded me of Winston Churchill's advice to a Labour Party minister, who had attacked the Conservative Party's prewar record in a debate in the House of Commons in the late 1940's, to leave history to the historians, adding "more especially as I intend to write the history myself." Kissinger has taken Churchill's advice and seen to it that posterity has on record his own views of the great events which he did so much to shape.

Toward the end of *Years of Upheaval,* he summed up President Nixon's achievements—and therefore his own—in the following sentences:

In his way, in the field of foreign policy Nixon met the test of his encounter with destiny. He understood what was at stake in the world. In the midst of unbridled emotions, he held fast to the truth that America's credibility must not be squandered, especially by its leaders. He fought for America's honor in distant jungles into which his predecessors had committed our troops, convinced that we had no right to abandon those who had depended on us and that tens of millions would curse the abdication his critics wished to impose on us. Against the rhetoric of a lifetime, he bravely affirmed the impossibility of an international order that excluded China, a quarter of the human race. Contrary to the simpler categories of an earlier period, he perceived that resistance to Communist aggression requires a psychological foundation that positions America as the defender of a structure of peace open even to our adversaries should their ambitions yield to the imperatives of coexistence. He identified the need of the industrial democracies for a moral rededication to common purposes. He broke through the congealed hatreds of the Middle East and at the very height of his agony showed a road toward peace where all had been frustration. And he was beginning to educate the American people to the permanent challenge of responsible American involvement in the world so that they might avoid their historical oscillation between extremes of crusading and of abdication, between impetuosity and naiveté.

It is by these criteria that Kissinger invites the judgment of history—and of his contemporaries—in an international climate more critical of his record and less inclined to see in him the miracle-worker of the secret diplomacy that extricated the United States from Vietnam and brought China back into the world concert, as well as of the shuttle

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diplomacy that brought at least a temporary peace to the Middle East in 1973–74. In a May 1982 BBC television interview with Bernard Levin, Kissinger said that his two greatest regrets were not having, in 1969, seen to it that fuller consideration was given to a possible alternative Vietnam policy designed to win the war quickly, although no doubt at the cost of even greater effort and sacrifice; and, not having, in 1974, also involved Jordan in the successful shuttle diplomacy with Egypt and Syria, when the "Jordanian option" for solving the Palestine question might still have been open. In the same interview, he claimed as his proudest achievement having contributed to holding the country together by a strong foreign policy, despite the aftermath of Vietnam and the shame of Watergate. He also emphasized: (1) the continuing need in a world dominated by the two nuclear superpowers for a sensible détente policy, involving a working—although adversary—relationship between them; (2) the ever-increasing need for Western unity and strength, involving, particularly, real sacrifices to build up conventional defense forces; and (3) the education of American public opinion toward a more realistic and less ideological assessment of international affairs, since even America could no longer safely oscillate between the extremes of crusade and isolationism.

Kissinger is the first to admit or rather to take pride in the fact that he was anything but a natural choice for the office of secretary of state, or indeed that of national security adviser. Perhaps only Ernie Bevin, foreign secretary in Britain from 1945 to 1951, was an equally unlikely prospect. And yet they proved to be two of the most outstanding foreign ministers of this century. Their characters and backgrounds were poles apart. Bevin was self-educated, Kissinger a highly distinguished academic. Bevin was a team man, adored by his staff in the Foreign Office as formerly in the trade unions; Kissinger was a brilliant but lone comet, few of whose admirers were to be found in the State Department. Bevin had a lifetime's experience in tough politics in the trade unions and above all in Churchill's wartime cabinet. Kissinger said to Levin on TV that he had no thought of a political career before 1969 and plunged more or less straight from Harvard University into the White House. Bevin had a deep personal knowledge of economics and labor relations, whereas Kissinger, in a world where politics and economics are increasingly interwoven, made his proclaimed ignorance of economics almost into a virtue. But they had two major assets in common, rare in contemporary busy and harassed politicians and even in foreign ministers, who have to react constantly to this or that crisis. They each had an overall and long-term concept of the international scene, into which to fit their own national interests and potential. They never lost sight of this, even under great pressure and in the most detailed negotiations. And each of them had studied and understood the main adversary, the Soviet Union—itself a state with an overall concept, conducting, if not always skillfully, a long-term rather than a reactive foreign policy. Kissinger, in addition to his deep knowledge of European history, had studied and written about nuclear armaments, which have transformed the international scene and forced a working relationship upon the two superpowers. But Bevin had a better understanding of the so-called Third World, acquired partly through his concern with the devel-

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oping Commonwealth. Another contrast—Bevin's greatest achievements (brought about in close cooperation with the American secretaries of state George Marshall and Dean Acheson), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, were European and Atlantic, whereas his greatest failure was in the Middle East. Kissinger's greatest failure was his ill-timed and inadequately prepared "Year of Europe" in 1973, while one of his greatest successes was in the Middle East. The objectives in each case were similar—failure lay in the existing climate, in the timing, but perhaps also in the tactics employed.

MANY HISTORIANS will, I suppose, consider the major achievement of the Nixon-Kissinger era—and much of the credit is properly awarded to Nixon by Kissinger—to have been the establishment of an effective Sino-American relationship without destroying the all-important Soviet-American relationship. Thus, America was left at the key angle of the triangle (however geometrically absurd this may seem). I have been told that China and the Orient generally were previously unknown territories to Kissinger. This increases admiration for the skill of his negotiations, but may also explain what at times seemed an excessive and almost uncritical admiration for Zhou Enlai and indeed all things Chinese—even Red Chinese. This admiration contrasts with a much lower regard for his Russian interlocutors and all things Russian.

Kissinger, however, won his Nobel Peace Prize for bringing the Vietnam war to an end. Alas, as he himself admits, the results of the settlement did not come up to expectations. The present situation in a reunited Vietnam, in Kampuchea, and in Laos is hardly a source of pride. Kissinger is probably justified in claiming that American revulsion against the dirty war and the clouds of Watergate ruled out effective US support for the non-Communist regimes in Indochina. Whether he is equally justified in his strong refutation of the bitter attacks made upon him for allegedly having brought civil war and the subsequent horrors of the Khmer Rouge to Cambodia, I am not qualified to judge. In general, however, history will probably conclude that an American withdrawal from Indochina was inevitable and necessary, both for the Americans themselves and for American relations with other democracies in Europe and elsewhere. In my opinion, it will give Kissinger high marks as a most skillful agent of Nixon's policy in his interminable discussions with Le Duc Tho. Indeed, this was where Kissinger established his deserved reputation as a formidable negotiator, able to use the carrot as well as the stick even in such unpromising circumstances. The result was also an example of his overall concept and the continuity of his strategic thinking. I recall my first meeting with Henry Kissinger at a conference in England in 1968 where he gave a talk on the Vietnam problem, i.e., before there was any question of his joining the administration. The ideas he then sketched out for a solution proved very near to those he developed into the final agreement some years later as national security adviser.

Kissinger's references to Le Duc Tho, as well as his tributes to Zhou and other Chinese leaders, show his intellectual regard for worthy opponents and indeed, although he himself denies this, the greater fascination such tough adversaries had for him than had most of his colleagues in the Western alliance, so often dismissed by Kissinger as unworthy defenders of the common cause. Other such cases were Syrian President Hafiz al-Assad and at the outset Anwar El-Sadat himself. While Sadat and Zhou, in their different ways, proved more than worthy of Kissinger's regard, I still find it difficult to understand, except on abstract intellectual grounds, Kissinger's obvious admiration for Le Duc Tho or Assad. Even within the Western alliance, where only Alex Douglas-Home and Hans-Dietrich Genscher receive honorable and even affectionate mention, the one man who really attracted and fascinated Kissinger was Marcel Jobert, the French foreign minister who successfully obstructed and undermined Kissinger at every stage during the "Year of Europe."

HENRY KISSINGER's personal shuttle diplomacy in the Middle East provided perhaps the most remarkable example of his virtuosity as a negotiator and above all as a master in the art of handling personal relations, even more essential in the Arab world than elsewhere. Until President Jimmy Carter's Camp David agreement, Kissinger's was, I think, the only successful example of Western diplomacy in the Middle East after World War II—and the Soviet record in the Middle East has been equally if not more unsuccessful. He not only stopped and defused the 1973 war but, with Sadat's enthusiastic help, transferred Egypt, the major Arab country, from the Soviet to the Western camp, weakened Soviet influence throughout the area, and laid the foundations for President Carter's Camp David reconciliation between Egypt and Israel. All this was accomplished while preserving both America's position as Israel's sole but effective supporter and also the vital superpower working relationship, despite military mobilization on each side during the October War and a degree of Soviet humilia-

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tion—at least in Arab eyes—in the subsequent settlement. These were major achievements, more difficult in many respects than renewing ties with a China fearful of the Soviet Union and more positive than getting the United States out of the Vietnam war.

As a former professional diplomat, I am skeptical of the long-term virtues of repeated summitry and of continuous personal high-level diplomacy involving the short-circuiting of ministers of foreign affairs and their staffs. But Kissinger's Middle East success, conducted against the background of Jewish influence in the United States and the imminent departure of President Nixon under Watergate pressures, weighs heavily in the balance on the other side. During Kissinger's White House years, the Middle East had been left to Secretary of State William Rogers and the State Department. Although the comparison is hardly a fair one, given the different circumstances in the Middle East, things certainly changed for the better when Secretary of State Kissinger took over.

CHINA, Vietnam, the Middle East, for all their importance, are sideshows compared with the superpower relationship, now covering global and no longer only continental issues. There are no easy successes in East-West relations. Like our English national sport of cricket or the Russian national game of chess, East-West relations is also a long-drawn-out affair in which a draw can sometimes be as notable an achievement as victory. Berlin in 1949 and again in the 1960's and Cuba in 1962—and for that matter the escape from the Soviet sphere of influence by such major countries as Indonesia and Egypt, not to mention Yugoslavia and China—have been defensive victories, rather than advances toward the liberation of parts of the postwar Soviet empire. But this does not diminish their importance.

Nixon and Kissinger, however, were operating for the first time in dangerous circumstances, when American self-confidence after Vietnam and its military strength relative to that of the Soviet Union had diminished and when the Russians could perceive the "correlation of forces," at least in military terms, as having moved far in their favor. Although still the strongest country in the world, America found its preeminence no longer unchallenged, whether by its adversaries, by its allies, or by the nonaligned countries. However, Nixon and Kissinger did not hesitate to face what seemed great risks, for example, over the Hanoi bombings or the threatened Soviet intervention in the Middle East war of 1973. Many earlier American leaders, most notably Harry Truman in 1948–49 and John Kennedy in 1962, had successfully called a halt to Soviet aggressive actions. But they did so from a position of assured and recognized strength. In addition, Kissinger also wanted to show the Soviets some carrots, which could be theirs in return for more cooperative behavior. Kissinger would, I think, accept the following three guides to Western policy advanced recently by *The Times* of London: (1) that the Russians are not responsible for all our troubles worldwide; (2) that they will nevertheless seek to profit from each of them; and (3) that any hope that the Russians might ever settle for a stable world in the Western sense is an illusion. And he would also agree, I expect, with the 19th-century French ambassador in St. Petersburg, who said that the Russians were never as strong or as weak as they looked. "Détente" is now a dirty word in some American circles, and Kissinger has been under attack for appeasement of the Russians. Nothing could be further from the truth; indeed, in my view, the détente diplomacy of Nixon and Kissinger, in which—as Kissinger put it in his recent Levin interview—any Soviet aggression must be toughly resisted but some vision of advantage also shown to the Russians if they behaved themselves, was their greatest achievement.

ODDLY ENOUGH, Kissinger was less successful with his allies than with his adversaries, and he himself admits the disappointments of the "Year of Europe." He was unlucky in his timing. In 1973, Europe was concerned with strengthening its own unity—incidentally a long-standing American policy objective—after the delayed entry of Britain, Ireland, and Denmark into the European Economic Community. This required, as Kissinger himself recognized, very careful diplomacy with France. Europe was not in a mood for a new look at the seasoned and dependable Atlantic Alliance. The tact and the skills that he so readily lavished on his adversaries in Moscow, Beijing, Hanoi, Cairo, or Damascus were singularly lacking in his relations with Europe. His comment that Europe's interests were only regional, whereas those of America were global, was all the more resented for its relative truth. Europe was offered its "Year of Europe" almost, it seemed, as an afterthought and without the careful preparation which had ensured, mainly through Bevin's spadework and quick reactions, the success of the Marshall Plan in 1948 and of the Atlantic Alliance in 1949. Kissinger's choice of Marcel Jobert as his main European interlocutor was as odd as it was disastrous. Also, he did not appear to realize that the growing clouds of Watergate were a much greater deterrent to closer allied concert in the democratic states of

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Europe than to US relations with the dictatorships of the Soviet Union, China, or the Middle East. And yet, however unfortunate the timing and tactics in 1973, Kissinger foresaw clearly that allied institutions required adaptation to a different international situation and to very different inter-allied relationships from those of the late 1940's. These problems are still with us and no one has yet done better than Kissinger to find a solution for them. Fortunately, the failure of the "Year of Europe" does not appear to have soured Kissinger toward Europe. This he made clear in a lecture at Chatham House in London in May 1982, which met the preoccupations of Atlanticists and Europeans alike and left no doubt about the value he placed on the "special relationship" between the US and England.

Space does not permit more than a passing reference to Kissinger's other less-than-successes in the Western and non-Communist world. His support for Pakistan over India in their 1971 war was hardly statesmanlike (even though understandable, in light of the help he had been given by Pakistan for his China enterprise); nor were his policies toward Greece and Turkey in the Cyprus crisis. There are even, I understand, versions of the removal and death of Salvador Allende in Chile differently slanted from that given in *Years of Upheaval.* Arguments about the degree of involvement of members of the White House staff and Nixon's cabinet in the Watergate scandal will also no doubt continue.

More relevant to my theme, Kissinger himself seems to have realized, even before he left the White House for the State Department, that conducting diplomacy in secrecy from the State Department had long-term dangers and disadvantages probably outweighing the admitted successes in the short term. Nor should shuttle diplomacy on one issue by a secretary of state retaining day-to-day responsibility for all American foreign relations, as conducted in the summer of 1974 in the Middle East, be regarded as a pattern for the future. Not only heads of government but also secretaries of state should not normally put their own and their country's credit so frequently at risk in this way. Personalized diplomacy on the model of such past masters as Metternich, Talleyrand, or Bismarck has its uses, but should not become the sole or even the main vehicle for international exchanges in the more complicated and technological world of today.

These, however, are relatively small blemishes on a considerable achievement, all the greater because it was accomplished in the post-Vietnam and Watergate climate in the United States. Thus, the claims made for the Nixon foreign policy executed by Kissinger, quoted earlier from *Years of Upheaval,* are not simply special pleading. The case made by Kissinger to Bernard Levin—that he had contributed to holding the country together in dangerous circumstances by a strong foreign policy—is convincing. And, for my money, the most important element in that foreign policy was neither China, nor Vietnam, nor the Middle East, but the realistic and tough, yet also open and receptive, conduct of relations with the Soviet Union, to which the current American administration seems now to be returning.

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Negotiating, Soviet Style

by Hannes Adomeit

LOUIS J. SAMUELSON. *Soviet and Chinese Negotiating Behavior: The Western View.* Beverly Hills, CA, Sage Publications, 1976.

US HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS. *Soviet Diplomacy and Negotiating Behavior: Emerging New Context for US Diplomacy.* Study prepared by Joseph G. Whelan, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1979.

CHRISTER JÖNSSON. *Soviet Bargaining Behavior: The Nuclear Test Ban Case.* New York, NY, Columbia University Press, 1979.

UPON his appointment as head of the foreign ministry (the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs) of the newly established Bolshevik government, Leon Trotsky thought that he would "issue a few revolutionary declarations to the peoples of the world and then shut up shop." As we know, this did not happen. Created in 1917, the foreign ministry is still going strong and is now, as Soviet party leader Brezhnev was to say in 1976, "taking into account, in one way or another, the state of affairs in virtually every corner of the globe."

Like the ministry itself, charges have also persisted through the years that Soviet methods and negotiating style do not conform to accepted diplomatic standards. Many Western political leaders and diplomats have repeated such charges—for example, a German envoy in a letter to his family:

You can't imagine how much stubbornness and suspicion we have to struggle with. The Soviets don't trust each other, and they don't trust us. Their peasant anxiety that they might be taken advantage of impedes the negotiation as much as the fact that all the substantive decisions are made "higher up." Soviet sensitivity, real and pretended, makes it necessary to handle the Soviets like so many raw eggs, whereas their own "proletarian manners" do not make the slightest provision for such considerations. Thus, to negotiate with them is a real pain in the neck, and this pain has now been bothering us for more than eight months.[1]

More recently, Henry Kissinger has made similar observations about the conduct of Soviet diplomacy: Foreign Minister "Gromyko's method of negotiation approached a stereotype. It seemed a reflection of the national character and of Russian history." His negotiating method and style as well as that of other Soviet diplomats, according to Kissinger, showed a preference for "steady pressure to the bold move." The style and technique were characterized by a patient accumulation of "marginal gains until they amounted to a major difference . . . endless haggling over 'general principles' . . . innate suspiciousness compounded by the congenital insecurity of the system and the bureaucratic structure . . . [a] profound absence of self-confidence . . . [and] fear of being tricked in the end despite one's most strenuous efforts."[2]

GENERALIZATIONS of this sort about how the Russians negotiate abound. Less prevalent are attempts to examine such generalizations in depth. The books under review represent rare examples of such attempts.

In his brief study, Louis Samuelson compares Soviet and Chinese negotiating behavior in order to determine whether a model can be developed for the seemingly unorthodox conduct of diplomacy by Communist states. In the volume that he prepared for the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Joseph

[1] Rolf Lahr, Special Envoy to Moscow in 1957 to negotiate with the Soviets about the repatriation of an estimated 130,000 German civilians deported to the Soviet Union during and immediately after World War II. Ambassador Lahr's notes and letters have been collected in *Zeuge von Fall und Aufstieg* (Witness of the Fall and Rise), Hamburg, Albrecht Knaus, 1981; the above quotation is from excerpts of the book published in *Der Spiegel* (Hamburg), October 5, 1981, p. 126.

[2] Henry A. Kissinger, *White House Years*, Boston, MA, Little, Brown, 1979, pp. 789–91.

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Whelan provides a survey of the evolution of formal diplomacy in the West and then proceeds to a detailed discussion of the history of Soviet diplomatic practice and Western assessments of it and its practitioners. However, I shall concentrate my discussion primarily on Christer Jönsson's *Soviet Bargaining Behavior.* Jönsson proposes to test assumptions about Soviet negotiating behavior against actual Soviet behavior in the course of the nuclear test ban negotiations. Thus, Jönsson's book is explicitly a case study on Soviet diplomatic bargaining.

The structure of Jönsson's book is sound and sets the study on a solid course. Jönsson provides a definition of bargaining, a brief but adequate conceptual framework, and an overview of the background and course of the test ban negotiations from October 1958 to August 1963. He informs his readers that he intends to examine Soviet bargaining at three different levels of analysis: (1) Soviet-American interaction, (2) intra-bloc bargaining between the Soviet Union and China, and (3) internal bargaining between pro-treaty and anti-treaty forces within the Soviet Union. The concluding chapter is to compare the relative influence exerted by the different factors on Soviet bargaining.

This promising endeavor soon runs into difficulties. The first problem is the absence of analysis at level one, that is, on the impact of general East-West interaction on the test ban negotiations. There is no examination of the political, military (nuclear or conventional), economic, technological, or ideological dimensions of the relationship between the two superpowers and the impact of these dimensions on Soviet negotiating behavior in general or negotiations on the test ban issue in particular. The section that the reader was led to expect to feature such an analysis merely advances a set of "prevalent assumptions about a characteristic Soviet negotiating behavior." Oddly enough, the views of both Western and Soviet analysts are lumped together here. These assumptions are then summarized into questions, which are answered in turn by references to Soviet behavior during the negotiations.

At one point, it seemed as if Jönsson were going to analyze the Soviet-American interplay, when he asked: "What effect, if any, did international tension have upon Soviet negotiating behavior?" (p. 75). Not so. On half a page, he touches upon the U–2 incident and the Cuban missile crisis, saying: "Both involved direct Soviet-American confrontation." He then scatters references to these two events throughout his book without ever really examining how they influenced the test ban negotiations.

Even more curious, particularly for a European, is Jönsson's failure to examine possible connections between the Berlin crisis of 1961 and the test ban issue. There is no trace in the book of either the November 1958 or the June 1961 Soviet ultimatums on Berlin. There is no hint that these overshadowed East-West relations for most of the period about which Jönsson is writing. There is no treatment of the fact that Soviet spokesmen put the dramatic unilateral resumption of nuclear testing into the appropriate international context.[3] There seems to be no awareness on Jönsson's part that on July 23, 1962, after the USSR had again resumed testing of nuclear weapons—a significant fact in itself, given the incipient Cuban venture—an editorial in *Pravda* asserted that a similar resumption of tests in the autumn of 1961 had inhibited the reactions of the USSR's Western adversaries to the erection of the Berlin Wall. There is also no inkling of an attempt to analyze connections between the Berlin crisis and the Cuban missile crisis, even though other authors, for example, Arnold Horelick and Myron Rush, have convincingly demonstrated that such connections do exist.[4]

ANOTHER PROBLEM with Jönsson's study is the emphasis on domestic political conflict as a factor influencing the negotiations. Such emphasis arises quite logically from the lack of analysis at level one: if "rational actor" explanations are not even attempted, "nonrational" explanations will inevitably take over. In fact, the latter's dominance is clearly foreshadowed in the question-and-answer section, where Jönsson states: "In the West it has become habitual and almost axiomatic to characterize Soviet negotiating behavior as propagandistic" (p. 52). When rephrased into a question, the issue is presented as follows: "Was propaganda rather than agreement the primary Soviet objective of the negotiation, or was propaganda at least equally a means of achieving agreement?" The expected reply is: "It seems improbable that propaganda was the primary Soviet objective of the negotiation," because the Soviet Union "willingly deprived itself of important propaganda potentials" (p. 74). Moreover, Jönsson continues, other studies suggest that what little

[3] The decision was taken despite the Soviet government's often repeated assurances that it would not resume testing unless the West did so first and despite the fact that the announcement that the tests would be resumed coincided with the convocation of the conference of nonaligned countries in Belgrade.

Concerning interrelationships between the resumption of nuclear testing and the Berlin crisis of 1961, see Hannes Adomeit, *Soviet Risk-Taking and Crisis Behavior: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis,* London, George Allen & Unwin, 1982, pp. 238–56.

[4] See their *Strategic Power and Soviet Foreign Policy,* Chicago, IL, The University of Chicago Press, 1966, pp. 105–56.

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propaganda accompanied the negotiations might have been instrumental in bringing about agreement because it was aimed, as Walter Clemens and Franklyn Griffiths have argued, "at least in part . . . at covering the Soviet left flank against internal and external criticism from 'orthodox' Communists."[5]

In citing these two authors, Jönsson seems to have in mind only one aspect of propaganda, namely, that for domestic consumption. This propaganda portrays the "madmen" in the imperialist circles as wrecking the prospects of peace and disarmament and thus seeks to dispel illusions about the nature of imperialist policies. However, in order to obtain a balanced picture about the role of propaganda, one should not overlook that part which is clearly and unambiguously directed to Western public opinion. This aspect was quite apparent in Khrushchev's extensive campaign—at times directly linked to the test ban issue—for "general and complete disarmament"; it was present in Stalin's use of the peace movement in the early 1950's; and it is discernible today in Brezhnev's campaign against the deployment of medium-range nuclear weapons in Western Europe. In all three instances, propaganda in Soviet foreign policy has performed the important function of constraining Western negotiating options.

Furthermore, the strict separation of "agreement" and "propaganda" is not very helpful in any case. Many agreements, such as those on nuclear testing, on renunciation of first use of force, on the prevention of nuclear war, or even on strategic arms limitation, have included "propagandistic" elements. That is, they are eminently political.

Let me return to Jönsson's assessment of the role of domestic politics in Soviet negotiating behavior. There is merit in his compiling and commenting on the numerous Soviet statements concerning nuclear testing and disarmament. Yet, disappointingly, he continues to use the very same framework of analysis so often used by others. There is a clear lineup of hawks and doves in the Soviet leadership and institutions: Presidium members Kozlov and Suslov, together with the military, form the core of a hard-line opposition which takes the offensive after the U–2 incident in order to force upon Khrushchev a series of measures which he really does not want to adopt, including the resumption of nuclear testing. However, all's well that ends well, and the forces of peace, détente, disarmament, and economic cooperation win the upper hand in 1963 and triumphantly conclude the test ban agreement. Jönsson does not explain why this should happen after the Cuban missile crisis. Should not this humiliation of the Soviet Union have strengthened the anti-imperialist, proarmament hard-liners?

Included in this analytical framework are some of the more questionable tools of Kremlinology. One is the attribution of attitudes and policies to the military by drawing inferences from *Krasnaya Zvezda.* To do this, one must be able to disregard the fact that this newspaper is edited under the auspices of the Main Political Administration, an institution of the party. Another is "locusology,"[6] the dubious principle that "when the cat is away, the mice will play." This art, developed to perfection by Robert Slusser and seemingly received as conventional wisdom by Jönsson, postulates that whenever Khrushchev was on vacation in Sochi, the hard-liners in Moscow would take over and change the course of Soviet foreign policy.

Drawing heavily on Slusser, Michel Tatu, Carl Linden, and Sidney Ploss, Jönsson sets out to prove a point. Unfortunately, it is not the one he promised to prove, i.e., to demonstrate the complex *interplay* between internal and external forces. His primary concerns, perhaps unintended, become twofold: to prove the dominant role of domestic politics in shaping the Soviet negotiation stance on the test ban issue, and to do away with the idea that there is anything different about the way the Soviets negotiate. Perhaps his points are valid. Jönsson, however, undermines his case by instances of questionable methodology and by giving inadequate representation to alternative explanations. It is almost as if such analysts as Thomas Wolfe, Hans Speier, Arnold Horelick, and Albert Wohlstetter had never existed.

MY PRINCIPAL quarrel with Jönsson's book arises from the section dealing with his reconstruction of prevalent Western assumptions about how the Soviets negotiate—a section which appears to be a substitute for the promised analysis of East-West interaction and its influence on Soviet negotiations concerning the test ban treaty. In my opinion, Jönsson's presentation of Western assumptions is neither as differentiated nor as fair as it ought to be. This may have much to do with the author's negative predisposition toward Western analysts who have advanced propositions about recurrent patterns and a specific style of Soviet behavior. Jönsson

[5] Jönsson (pp. 52–53, 74–75) refers to Clemens and Griffiths, "The Soviet Position on Arms Control and Disarmament: Negotiations and Propaganda, 1954–1964," Research Paper, Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1965.

[6] This is the criticism Arnold L. Horelick, A. Ross Johnson, and John D. Steinbruner make of Robert Slusser's *The Berlin Crisis of 1961: Soviet-American Relations and the Struggle for Power in the Kremlin, June-November 1961,* Baltimore, MD, and London, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973; see their research paper, *The Study of Soviet Foreign Policy: A Review of Decision-Theory-Related Approaches,* Santa Monica, CA, The Rand Corporation, December 1973, p. 44.

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calls this a "mystifying tendency" (p. 77). Among these analysts he counts scholars and diplomats of quite diverse views, including George Kennan, Stephen Kertesz, Philip Mosely, Nathan Leites, Dean Acheson, W. Hayter, Fred Iklé, Richard Pipes, and Vernon Aspaturian (p. 220, fn. 1). Notwithstanding their diversity and the fact that they may have been writing about specific diplomatic instances occurring during any one of four different eras of Soviet policy (under Lenin, Stalin, Khrushchev, or Brezhnev), Jönsson states:

The Western view of Soviet negotiating behavior shows a high degree of consistency. First, there seems to be considerable consensus among Western observers. This can in part be explained by the fact that they apparently draw heavily on each other as can be seen from the frequent references to each other's works. Second, the set of assumptions about Soviet negotiating behavior discussed in the previous sections displays a considerable degree of internal consistency. They all add up to a picture of Soviet ***inflexibility.*** (p. 54)

It would be interesting to discover whether any of Jönsson's scholars and diplomats actually hold such a view or subscribe to the related assumption that "compromise is excluded from Soviet expectations of outcome" (p. 44). They could not possibly if they—as some of them do—regard Soviet negotiating techniques and operational principles as more or less a continuation of the Bolshevik tradition. Or if they have read—as most of them surely have—Lenin's *One Step Forward, Two Steps Back* or his *"Left-Wing" Communism: An Infantile Disorder.* Or if they have pondered the lessons to be drawn about Soviet diplomacy from the negotiations leading to the ratification of the Brest-Litovsk treaty in 1918.

Contrary to what Jönsson would have us believe, "the Western view," to the extent that it exists, posits the necessity of drawing distinctions between strategy and tactics in Soviet foreign policy, between long-range objectives and day-to-day business, and between goals and their implementation. It also encompasses the notion that Soviet strategy and long-range goals have been fairly constant while the pursuit of these goals—by negotiations or other means—has been characterized by flexibility, pragmatism, and even opportunism.

Since Pipes, together with Mosely and Kertesz, is used by Jönsson as one of the star witnesses for "the Western view" that Soviet negotiating tactics are rigid and inflexible and that compromise is excluded from Soviet expectations of outcome, it may be useful to read what Pipes actually does say:

Frustrations experienced in negotiating with Communists derive from the fact that the latter often engage in talks in order not to reach an agreement but to attain some other, incidental objective, such as ascertaining how strong is their opponents' determination on a given issue, splitting hostile alliances, or influencing world opinion. When they intend to use negotiations in this manner, Communist diplomats indeed display an intransigence which can be mollified only by full acceptance of their terms. . . .[7]

In other words, it depends on the international circumstances and the objectives to be pursued whether Soviet diplomats are using intransigence as a tool or not. On the other hand; "Whenever they are interested in a settlement, Communist diplomats act in a traditional manner, efficiently and undeterred by difficulties.[8] There is no need to belabor this point further.

Another Western observation or assumption, one that is indeed widely shared, is that suspicion is deeply engrained in the Russian psychological makeup and influences Soviet negotiating behavior. However, Jönsson's rephrasing of the problem into the following question—"Were Soviet expectations of U.S. behavior invariably characterized by suspicion and anticipated hostility?"—makes the issue disappear as if by sleight of hand. Hardly anyone is *invariably* clever, stupid, silly, or suspicious. Hence, the answer is foreordained: The Russians, contrary to what the Western analysts say, are not invariably suspicious. "In short, Soviet expectations of U.S. behavior were not unchanging over time. Neither were they characterized exclusively by suspicion and anticipated hostility" (p. 60).

ONE OF THE REASONS why Jönsson's reconstruction of prevalent Western assumptions about Soviet negotiating behavior must remain unconvincing may have something to do with the fact that almost all the observations by Western diplomats and scholars which he quotes apply to or were written in the 1940's and 1950's. They were, thus, appraisals of Soviet wartime and cold war diplomacy. This is a problem of which Louis Samuelson, in his booklet *Soviet and Chinese Negotiating Behavior*, is at least conscious. He writes:

[7] Richard Pipes, "Some Operational Principles of Soviet Foreign Policy," memorandum prepared for US Senate, Committee on Governmental Operations, Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1972, p. 1.

[8] Ibid. Although Jönsson does quote this latter observation by Pipes (p. 77), he does not draw any conclusions from it for his assertion of "considerable consensus" and "internal consistency" of views among Western analysts about Soviet "inflexibility."

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Indeed, much of what appears in the present study represents western attitudes and perceptions formulated during that time of overt East-West political hostility; and it is recognized that if the writers of that period . . . were to reevaluate their work in view of contemporary political conditions, many might choose to revise their views. (p. 55, fn. 2)

Being aware of the problem, Samuelson does at times provide some hints and clues about differences in the Western view and about *changes* in Soviet (and mutatis mutandis, Chinese) negotiating behavior. This can be seen, for instance, when he writes: "Negotiations are most properly viewed as dynamic processes wherein the choice of methods does not remain static, but is subject to important forces of change." Such forces include changes of leadership, e.g., from Stalin to Khrushchev, or changes in international conditions, e.g., from cold war to détente (pp. 7–9).

Whereas Samuelson limits himself to hints and clues about changes in Soviet negotiating behavior and Western perceptions, Joseph Whelan deals quite extensively with this problem in his voluminous study, *Soviet Diplomacy and Negotiating Behavior.* He does so by assembling an impressive number of case illustrations, ranging from Soviet negotiations at Brest-Litovsk in 1917–18 to Genoa in 1922; from the negotiations for collective security against Nazi Germany in the 1930's to the establishment of the postwar international order at Teheran, Yalta, and Potsdam; from the management of the East-West confrontations such as the Berlin blockade and the Cuban missile crisis in the era of the cold war to cooperation in the era of détente with the adversary superpower, as shown mainly by SALT I. In the process, he provides assessments—his own and those of contemporaries—of the major figures in the evolution of Soviet diplomacy: party leaders as well as commissars and ministers of foreign affairs (Trotsky, G. V. Chicherin, M. Litvinov, V. M. Molotov, and A. Gromyko) and other Soviet diplomats and negotiators (A. Dobrynin, V. V. Kuznetsov, V. S. Semënov, N. V. Ogarkov, and L. V. Smirnov). This is indeed a very commendable job of compilation as well as analysis.

What emerges from Whelan's material, vividly and clearly, is that changes have taken place over time, both in the institutional setting and in the style of Soviet negotiation. There is today a greater degree of professionalization and sophistication of Soviet diplomats and negotiators. In recognition of the increasing complexity of international issues, there is a much greater input and sometimes participation by experts from the various international relations institutes at the USSR Academy of Sciences in the preparation and evaluation of Soviet negotiating positions. In contrast to the rough-and-tumble in-fighting, abuse, distortion, crude deception, rude behavior, and shock tactics of the past, there are approaches that are more and more polished, polite, and "businesslike." Compromise, even more than in the past, seems to be regarded by the Soviet leadership as a necessary and useful tool of foreign policy. And there appears to be a greater Soviet readiness to look for possible agreements on a broader range of issues than in the past.

It is tempting, on the basis of this evolution, to agree with Jönsson after all and to dismiss the idea of a specific, unique Soviet negotiating style as a "mystifying tendency." Whelan, too, concludes that "there is no single comprehensive style in [Soviet] diplomacy and negotiations, but rather a behavior that is generally adapted to the specific needs of the times," e.g., unmitigated hostility toward the Western powers in the periods of the Nazi-Soviet pact and the cold war, or calculated conciliation during the wartime Grand Alliance and the Khrushchev-Brezhnev era of peaceful coexistence and détente (p. 521).

Nonetheless, Whelan's study also notes that this temptation should be resisted, since "certain characteristics . . . are common to all eras" of Soviet diplomacy and are "enduring" (p. 521). Among them are:

- a strong sense of realism, which Soviet negotiators demand of themselves and respect in others;
- toughness, i.e., the attempt by Soviet negotiators to take what they can get and then demand more;
- the distrust of agreements and understandings based on goodwill rather than on the balance of forces and interests;
- the view that negotiation at the conference table is but one aspect of a broad bargaining process that often necessitates the use of a variety of supplementary instrumentalities, including military maneuvers, threats, the launching of peace campaigns, and the mobilization of "progressive forces" to exert pressure on opposing governments and negotiators;
- secrecy, more specifically, the disinclination to provide information conducive to the speedy conclusion of agreements or to facilitating the course of future negotiations (e.g., the refusal to provide reliable statistics on agricultural output, on the production rates and probable depletion of oil and gas fields, and on weapons expenditures, deployment, and programs);
- the tendency—a corollary to secrecy—to let the other side take the initiative and offer proposals, thus to encourage it to reveal its

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plans and dispositions, and possibly to confuse it to the point of bringing on a process of "self-negotiation."

WHELAN'S conclusions also throw some light on the purposes and, as Soviet analysts would put it, the "motive forces" behind Soviet negotiations. Among them is a relentless accumulation of power, notably military power. In all arms control negotiations so far, the Soviets have allotted an important role to the military establishment and to military rationales. They have done so, it would appear, as an integral part of their attempt to establish, as the current jargon has it, "escalation dominance" at every level of the East-West military balance—conventional, theater nuclear, strategic nuclear—and to gain the ability to project power along the periphery of the Eurasian landmass.

Another "motive force" is ideology, and the constraints set by the Soviet system, a point on which many observers agree. Kissinger has suggested there can be "no doubt [that] the Soviet system shaped Gromyko's style."[9] US Ambassador Jacob Beam has commented that negotiating with the Russians is "always unpleasant" or at least "mostly unpleasant" since they "antagonize you right away when they start out; they try to put you on the defensive right away" (Whelan, p. 50). This is, of course, not surprising since Soviet ideology posits the existence of an unbridgeable, "antagonist" relationship between two radically opposed social and economic systems and requires constant initiative so as not to be left behind and thrown upon the proverbial "rubbish heap of history." Probably for the same reason, Helmut Sonnenfeldt has observed that when negotiating with the Russians "you do not ever have the sense of the degree of comity, commonality of approach; there is always a strong residue, and more than a residue, of antagonism so that you recognize that by and large negotiations with the Soviets are adversary proceedings" (ibid., p. 507).

The determined Soviet effort to gain military advantages despite (or perhaps with the aid of?) arms control negotiations and the perceived lack of a basic commonality of approach ought to serve as a necessary reminder not to pay too much attention to the form—the techniques and style—of Soviet negotiating behavior, important and interesting though the subject may be. Matters of content, that is, the possible reasons for such behavior, the meaning of Soviet proposals and counterproposals, and the likely goals such proposals are meant to achieve, must ultimately take precedence in any analysis of Soviet foreign policy. After all, polite manners, professional competence, and occasional concessions do not add up to a qualitative difference in the substance of Soviet policies.

[9] Kissinger, *White House Years*, p. 790.

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The Politics of Economic Crisis in Eastern Europe

by Jacques Rupnik

US CONGRESS, JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE. *East European Economic Assessment,* 2 Parts. Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1981.

NATO, ECONOMICS and INFORMATION DIRECTORATES, Eds. *Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Prospects for the 1980's: Colloquium, 16–18 April 1980, Brussels.* New York, NY, Pergamon Press, 1980.

EGON NEUBERGER and LAURA D'ANDREA TYSON, Eds. *The Impact of International Economic Disturbances on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.* New York and Oxford, Pergamon Press, 1980.

AT THE TIME of the great depression of the 1930's, the Soviet economy—whatever its other problems—found itself effectively insulated from the disruptions of the international market by Stalin's "socialism in one country." By contrast, the international economic crisis of the 1970's has revealed a "parallel" and to some extent related economic crisis in the Soviet bloc, particularly among its East European components. This development raises a number of intriguing questions of economic and, perhaps even more important, political analysis.

Coming a decade after the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia had put an end to the theories of "convergence" popular in the 1960's, the crisis suggests a remarkable degree of interdependence between the economies of Eastern and Western Europe, or at the very least a common vulnerability to similar phenomena. The difficult task is to assess the degree to which dislocations in the East European economies can be attributed to this mutual dependence on the international economic environment and the degree to which they have specific indigenous sources.

The three volumes under review provide considerable information for examining this issue. The first two collections—the one assembled under the aegis of the Joint Economic Committee of the US Congress (hereafter, *JEC*) and the other compiled for the Economics Directorate of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (hereafter, *NATO*)—offer surveys of domestic economic trends and policies in individual East Europe states. The volume edited by Egon Neuberger and Laura D'Andrea Tyson provides a fruitful complement,[1] addressing the critical question of whether international economic disturbances have been transmitted to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and if so, how. The work is the most comprehensive and theoretically elaborate attempt yet to address this subject.

THE SIGNS of crisis in Eastern Europe are unmistakable. The combined average annual rate of economic growth (in GNP) of the European members of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA—including Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Romania) has dropped from 10 percent in the 1950's, to about 7 percent in the 1960's and to less than 5 percent in the 1970's, and forecasts for the early 1980's are extremely gloomy (at best, half the rate of growth of the last decade).[2]

While performance to date might seem "adequate to excellent" by international standards, as John P. Hardt suggests in his introduction to the JEC volume, it is certainly not viewed that way by either the ruling elites or the populations of Eastern Europe. Economies historically geared to achieving growth at all costs are now moving

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[1] This complementarity is further evident in the considerable overlap among the contributors to the three collections.

[2] For assessment of economic performance in the 1970's, see Paul Marer in *JEC*, Part 1, p. 35; and "Comecon's Widening Gap Between Plan and Reality," *The Economist* (London), May 29, 1982.

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toward zero growth. Czechoslovakia and Hungary have already reached that mark—set by the Club of Rome, though not by their own economic planners. The Romanian slowdown is as rapid as was its growth a decade ago (the annual rate of growth in Romania has dipped from an average 11.3 percent in 1971–75, to an average 7.2 percent in 1975–80, and was only 2.5 percent in 1980).[3] Thus, the dramatic collapse of the Polish economy does not represent, in our opinion, an exception. Rather, it magnifies a trend and crisis features present in the whole Soviet bloc.

SEEKING EXPLANATIONS for this trend, some observers have argued that the East European economies have been victims of circumstances, that major dislocations in the international market occurred just when the East European countries had decided on a major expansion of economic ties with the West. Such an approach tends to cloud what is a considerably more complex reality.

This, as Professor Richard Portes points out in his essay in the Neuberger-Tyson volume (p. 28),

was not a coincidence at all. Those impulses from the world market which the centrally planned system could not avoid, and which were transmitted to the domestic macroeconomy, contributed to the pressures which were then reflected in the foreign trade, especially with the West. But this could happen only because the West was willing to accommodate the needs of the East European economies or at least the needs perceived by the planners, for more absorption than production. This was by definition impossible within CMEA as an isolated bloc.

There is little doubt that the growing ties of the East European economies with the West and the size of their energy imports made them more sensitive to the international economic crisis. But the reasons underlying the expansion of East-West ties are integrally related to this sensitivity.

Extended ties with the West related not so much to détente (even if the relaxation of relations did create a favorable climate) as to the general attempt by the Soviet-bloc economies to shift from an "extensive" model of growth inherited from the Stalinist era (a model emphasizing massive investment programs aimed particularly at the development of heavy industry) toward an "intensive" model involving greater reliance on technological innovation and efficient use of inputs. Instead of pursuing this goal through simultaneous structural economic reforms such as were introduced by the Czechoslovak reformers in 1968, the Soviet leadership opted in the aftermath of the August 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia for a strategy of using imports of Western technology as a substitute for change. These imports were financed by heavy borrowing on Western capital markets, where funds were readily available, especially after the 1973 oil crisis. Moreover, member-governments of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development—in an attempt to ease the impact of recession on domestic industries—were prepared to sponsor loans financing some three quarters of capital goods exports to the Soviet bloc.[4]

The assumption behind the borrowing and the related Western extension of credit was that the borrowing countries would increase their exports to the West and thereby pay off the hard-currency debt incurred. But things did not work out as planned. First, the recession that began to take on momentum with the 1973 increase in international oil prices shrank Western markets for Soviet-bloc exports. Second, and more important, the goods produced for export were of generally poor quality, ill-suited to compete in international markets.

The countries hit hardest by the international crisis were, indeed, those that in the 1970's tended to rely most overtly on this strategy (namely Poland and Romania) or that conducted the largest portion of their trade outside the CMEA area (Hungary). At the same time, it should be noted that Hungary—because of its more flexible, reform-oriented economic system—was able to cope with the situation better than the other two (more on this in a moment). Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria, which—as shown in the respective surveys by Friederich Levcik and Marvin R. Jackson in *JEC* (Part 1, pp. 377 and 571)—pursued more "conservative" trade policies, were clearly less affected by the international economic turmoil. Yet Czechoslovakia, too, suffered economic failure, and the setback could not be blamed on the harshness of Western bankers.

A second dimension of Eastern Europe's external economic exposure relates to energy and raw materials. Industrialization strategies were predicated on the availability of a steady and relatively inexpensive Soviet supply of such essentials. Although the pricing system used by CMEA tended to cushion the impact of the drastic increases of international oil prices in 1973 and 1979, the relative advantage has diminished with time. Moreover, Soviet oil supplies, which account for some 80 percent of East

[3] See George Schöpflin, "Romania's Blind Alley," *The World Today* (London), April 1982, p. 151.

[4] See Richard Portes, "Effects of the World Economic Crisis on Eastern Europe," *World Economy* (London), June 1980.

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European needs,[5] seem increasingly limited. This will require Eastern Europe to make additional purchases in hard-currency markets.

As with East-West trade, sweeping generalizations in the case of energy trade can be misleading. As Paul Marer points out in the JEC volume (Part 2, p. 32), Poland and Romania—the two countries with the worst debt problem—are also the only two East European countries which until recently were net energy exporters; thus, their terms of trade did not deteriorate after the 1973 energy crisis. By contrast, Hungary, whose terms of trade did deteriorate by some 20 percent and which exports half of its national product, proved much better equipped to deal with the international disturbance. Clearly, there are other factors than the degree of trade dependence at work here.

A COMPARATIVE analysis of recent economic trends in Poland and Hungary suggests that internal factors related to economic structures and policy account for the differing abilities of the two countries to cope with international economic crisis.

As the Polish case shows, the grafting of Western technology onto an inefficient economic structure is not sufficient to make the latter productive. The Hungarian case suggests that only if such a graft is combined with an element of systemic reform and an economic strategy adapted to the international situation can one expect more positive results.

Analysts tend to argue that Hungary resisted the external shocks of the 1970's better not so much because of greater political stability as because the authorities understood promptly the nature of the crisis and adopted policies of cautious retreat.

[5] See the chapter by Jan Vanous in *JEC*, Part 2, p. 549.

Writing in the Neuberger-Tyson volume (pp. 250–79), Alan Brown and Martin Tardos accept the official Hungarian line and directly link the temporary abandoning of the economic reform to the changes in the international economic situation: i.e., recentralizing of control in 1974 was undertaken with a view to managing better the disruptions of the international market. However, a closer examination of what actually happened at the time indicates that the recentralization decision had already been made in 1972, and for essentially domestic political reasons—namely, the resistance of the central party bureaucracy to losing control over economic decision-making. The international economic crisis was more a pretext than a cause for cutting back on the reform.[6] Hungarian policymakers responded very differently to the second wave of the oil crisis, in 1979. They gave the green light for a return to market-oriented reforms, again associated with the name of Reszo Nyers.[7]

This variation in the Hungarian responses highlights an essential political dilemma facing the whole Soviet bloc. Does the international economic crisis make the application of cautious reformism difficult if not impossible, because of adverse international trading conditions and the risks of internal social instability? Or, on the contrary, does the crisis make reform even more necessary in order to adapt to the new conditions? Put differently, what balance can each regime work out with respect to what Richard Portes calls the "trade-off between macro-stability and micro-rationality" (Neuberger-Tyson, p. 24)? Hungary seems to have been able to maintain the first without completely sacrificing the second. In Poland, this proved impossible because of a combination of factors involving the international context, political instability, and mainly inept economic policy.

Zbigniew Fallenbuchl (in his contributions to both the JEC and Neuberger-Tyson volumes) does not overlook the impact on the Polish economy of Western recession and inflation or the deterioration in the country's terms of trade with the Soviet Union, but he places prime emphasis on Warsaw's overambitious economic strategy of simultaneous rapid growth of investment and of consumption. Even after 1973, Poland persisted in overinvesting in the wrong industries on borrowed money while at the same time pursuing political stability through massive wage increases that overstretched the domestic market without actually increasing productivity.

Hungary and Poland were thus in very different situations when the second oil price shock hit in 1979. In Hungary, it meant the resumption of reform, which continued to be accepted as a legitimate substitute for political change. In Poland, the shock was the last straw, one which precipitated the great crash of 1980–81, confronting the party leadership with a stark choice between radical political reform or militarization as a prerequisite for a complete overhaul of the economy.

[6] The anti-reformist group led by Karoly Nemeth was able soon thereafter (in March 1974) to remove from the Politburo of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (HSWP) Reszo Nyers, the main spokesman for the reformist wing. For detailed analysis of Hungarian politics in that period, see George Schöpflin, *Hungary Between Prosperity and Crisis*, Conflict Studies No. 136, London, The Institute for Conflict Studies, 1981.

[7] Nyers has been strongly critical of CMEA practices. In an article in the May 1982 issue of the Hungarian economic monthly *Koskasdasagi Szemle* (Budapest), he observed that long-term collective plans of CMEA lack rational economic foundations, and that integration policies tend to slow rather than stimulate individual economies. Nyers was also critical of the weaknesses of CMEA's International Investment Bank and of Soviet moves to reduce supplies of oil and raw materials. Similar criticism of CMEA practices was voiced by Hungary's representative at an April meeting of CMEA economic experts. See the May 1982 issue of *World Marxist Review* (Prague).

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Thus, Edward Gierek's Poland and Janos Kadar's Hungary, which at the beginning of the 1970's seemed to share a common technocratic, postideological approach to economic problems, a decade later are at opposite extremes of the spectrum within the Soviet bloc.

This diversity suggests that there has been some room for local initiative in national economic policies in Eastern Europe. As Hardt puts it:

Circumscribed by Soviet tutelage as the power of the East European leadership is in military, political and ideological matters, economic policy remains the area of greatest indigenous autonomy and responsibility. (*JEC*, Part 1, p. 6)

Nevertheless, all three levels—economic, political, and military—are closely intertwined.

ONE OF THE MOST significant developments of the past decade was the way international economic crisis revealed both a considerable degree of East European interdependence with Western economies and at the same time the Soviet ability to turn the crisis into a powerful factor forcing political dependence upon its allies. International market mechanisms have altered the economic balance between the Soviet Union and its East European partners in intra-CMEA trade. Already shortly after the 1973–74 oil crisis, Chris Cviic observed:

Eastern Europe needs the Soviet Union more than the Soviet Union needs it, especially now that Russia is better able to pay for its own imports of technology and know-how from the West. Indeed, in the new pattern of economic relations that is emerging in the mid-1970's, an important instrument of political control has been put into the Russian's hands.[8]

These relations included a new stress on integration, featuring joint programs of investment primarily in the extraction and conveyance of Soviet energy resources and in a massive CMEA nuclear energy program.

From the Soviet point of view, the main purpose of the increased emphasis on CMEA integration appears to have been to obtain a growing East European commitment to the Warsaw Pact military effort, both directly, through increased defense expenditures, and indirectly, through economic aid to those countries more recently associated with CMEA and involved with Soviet foreign policy ambitions—Cuba, Vietnam, and, most recently, Afghanistan. East Germany, for instance, plays a very active economic and military role in Africa, and Czechoslovakia is developing a "special relationship" with the Afghan regime of Babrak Karmal. Thus, the international economic crisis, as much as the deterioration of détente and the reassertion of bipolarity in East-West relations, contributed to a greater identification of CMEA with the Warsaw Pact, i.e., of the economic with the military aspects of Soviet–East European relations.

At the same time, the region's ability to contribute economically to Soviet foreign policy ventures is being diminished. When the CMEA was set up in 1949, there was no mutuality about it: it tended to provide assistance mainly to the Soviet Union. Hence the image of the CMEA (to a large extent accurate in the 1950's) as primarily a tool of Soviet "exploitation" of Moscow's economically more advanced partners. The trouble with this view is that it is no longer supported by fact. Since 1975, world prices of energy and raw materials have been rising much more rapidly than those of manufactured goods, and because intra-CMEA prices are lagged five-year averages of world prices the Soviet Union has found itself in the de facto position of subsidizing Eastern Europe.[9]

This relationship would appear to tilt even further against the USSR in light of the heavy debt which the East Europeans have incurred in the West. Although Moscow denies the validity of the "umbrella" theory, whereby the USSR ultimately stands behind Eastern Europe's debts—a theory on which Western bankers were so keen to base their lending policies vis-à-vis East European economies—recent Soviet assistance to Poland (including hard-currency loans) is suggestive of the growing economic burden that Eastern Europe is likely to be on Moscow in the years to come. It is of note that after each major crisis in Eastern Europe, it has been the USSR, rather than CMEA as a whole, that ultimately picks up the pieces. This was the case after 1956 in Hungary, after 1968 in Czechoslovakia, and even more explicitly in 1981. If the CMEA pricing system could be described as an "imperial subsidy," the cost of managing economic crises and preventing social unrest in Eastern Europe has stretched this imperial logic to its utmost limits. In the words of Michael Kaser of Oxford University, the economic crisis has turned Eastern Europe from an asset into a liability for the Soviet Union.[10]

[8] See C. Cviic, "Soviet-East European Relations," in Richard Pipes, Ed., *Soviet Strategy in Europe*, London, Macdonald & Janes, 1976, p. 113.

[9] This subsidy is well documented by Jan Vanous's article in this issue of *Problems of Communism*. This reviewer has discussed the matter in "East European Economics and the World," *Europa* (New York, NY), No. 1, 1981, pp. 38–45. See also J. Stern, *East European Energy and East-West Trade in Energy*, London, Policy Studies Institute, Chatham House, 1982.

[10] Michael Kaser, "The Cost of East Europe to the Soviet Economy," *Contemporary Review* (London), January 1982, p. 24.

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MOSCOW'S decision to accord primacy to its political and military interests in Eastern Europe at the expense of economic rationality has important domestic and foreign policy implications for the region. We shall concentrate on the political aspects.[11]

As one reads in the NATO volume the country-by-country survey of the state of economic reformism—whether the "decentralizing centralization" in Czechoslovakia described by the late Vaclav Holesovsky or the "streamlined centralized system with decomposition [sic]" in Bulgaria described by Paul Weidemann—one gets a true sense of impasse. Unfortunately, these discussions pay little attention to the causes and implications of the phenomenon, i.e., to the political constraints preventing greater changes in the economic structure. While, of course, one welcomes "depoliticization" of economic debates among specialists on Eastern Europe, one is left a bit skeptical after reading three volumes in which Western analysts desperately attempt to leave political analysis out of their interpretations of the failure of economic reforms in Eastern Europe.

It is perhaps significant that it is Wlodzimierz Brus, a former professor from Warsaw University now at Oxford, who has produced the most provocative analysis of the subject.[12] Brus constantly focuses on the way that economic and political structures of the Communist system are closely intertwined. He observes that 25 years of attempts at economic reform in the Soviet bloc have foundered on the extraordinary resilience of the economic structures inherited from the Stalinist era, which in turn reflects the no less impressive staying power of the basic totalitarian features of the Soviet political system. In another recent essay, Brus analyzes the fundamental conservatism (curious outcome of a "revolutionary" venture) of a Soviet Union that he views as a "powerful and threatening giant."[13]

Since 1968, reforms in the economic structure in Eastern Europe have been—except in Hungary—frozen by the political constraints imposed by Moscow. This Soviet clinging to the political and economic status quo has been the prime cause of economic and social instability in the region. Observing the situation in their homeland in 1979, a group of critical Polish intellectuals wrote:

Any plan for the resolution of the crisis which is based strictly on the use of economic means is now unrealistic, since the underlying causes of the crisis are not economic. Unless the system of management is reformed and unless the general climate of social life is altered, it is inconceivable that any way will be found to harness any untapped resources in the economic realm.

Even in the case of an alternative scenario which makes allowances for the scoring of occasional successes by the "survival tactics" policy, the threat of an outbreak of civil unrest has not been eliminated; rather it has merely been postponed, while tensions continue to build up all the while. The social consciousness is crystallizing, and it is being pushed in the direction of open revolt by unavoidable lines of reasoning.[14]

Reflecting on the events of the intervening two years, one recognizes the astuteness of that analysis. Clearly, both East European policymakers and Western analysts should pay closer attention to the contribution of critical voices from within Eastern Europe to our understanding of the political economy of the Communist systems.[15] The impact of the international economic crisis on the Soviet bloc merely brought into the open in a more acute form existing systemic crisis symptoms. But more than 20 years after the first attempts at a complete overhaul of the economic system, the dilemma of political control vs. economic efficiency remains unresolved in Eastern Europe, at great cost both to the societies involved and to the Soviet Union.

[11] On the foreign policy implications of economic decline and increasing militarization in Eastern Europe, see C. Castoriadis, *Devant la guerre* (Before the War), Paris, Fayard, 1981; Ch. Schmidt-Häuer, "The Arms Buildup Is Devouring the Empire," *Die Zeit* (Hamburg), No. 1, January 1982; and Jacques Rupnik, "From Party State to Army-State," *The New Republic* (Washington, DC), Jan. 5, 1982.

[12] See, for example, W. Brus, "The East European Reforms: What Happened to Them?" *Soviet Studies* (Glasgow), April 1979, pp. 257–67.

[13] W. Brus, "The Economic Consequences of Stalinism," *Revue européenne des sciences sociales et Cahiers V. Pareto* (Geneva), Vol. 19, 1981, No. 57, pp. 45–60.

[14] A "Report on the State of the Republic," written by the Polish group Experience and Future (DiP) and translated in *Survey* (London), Special issue on Poland, Vol. 1, 1980. See also *Poland, the State of the Republic*, London, Pluto Press, 1981.

[15] Among the most recent such documents is the lengthy analysis of the ills of the Czechoslovak economy, produced by specialists associated with the Charter 77 movement. See *L'Alternative* (Paris), Nos. 16–17, 1982, pp. 21–29. See also the DiP report "Poland Under Martial Law." For a summary, see *International Herald Tribune* (Paris), May 20, 1982.

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An Unsentimental Journey Across Russia

by Alexander Kazhdan

ELIZABETH POND. *From the Yaroslavsky Station.* New York, NY, Universe Books, 1981.

LIFTING the heavy lid of Soviet secretiveness to capture the essence of Russian life is no easy task. Elizabeth Pond's *From the Yaroslavsky Station* is a most creditable effort. Embarking on a week-long rail journey across the Soviet Union with Pond, the reader can look forward not only to fascinating vignettes and scenes. The author draws on personal reminiscences, rumors, conversations, and readings of Soviet publications—accumulated while Moscow correspondent of *The Christian Science Monitor*—in an attempt to present an "encyclopedia of Russian life." Through well-arranged storytelling, witty observations, and an honest and objective approach to this "harsh, betrayed, and still promised land" (p. 277), Pond provides one of the best general surveys of contemporary Russian life—comparable to the works of Hedrick Smith and Robert Kaiser.[1]

Among her commentaries, the classification of the Russian intelligentsia is perhaps the most personal and therefore the most valuable. Within this group, she distinguishes the humanist intelligentsia, who have managed to establish a certain standard of conscience that nobody can ignore; the careerists, who deliberately compromise conscience; and the majority of intellectuals, who are "neither humanist saints nor opportunist bastards" (p. 50), and who try to maintain self-respect without taking any significant risk.

Whereas the expectation of an imminent ethnic explosion in the USSR is still quite prevalent among Western Kremlinologists, Pond is much more skeptical. She argues that "any real nationalities crisis would seem unlikely in this century" (p. 142). Police control is only one factor in this assessment. The Soviets do tolerate some national diversity. Furthermore, many non-Russians derive economic and technological benefits from assimilation; and some have even garnered high-level, if noninfluential, sinecures in government, science, literature, and art. It is also true that economic abuses are frequently more indulgently treated in the non-Russian republics.

Pond might also have considered the hatred and contempt cherished by various nationalities toward others. Animosity flourishes between Georgians and Armenians, Georgians and Abkhazians, and so forth. Strong national feelings are not necessarily centrifugal—quite the contrary. By hampering unity among small nationalities, nationalism contributes to the reinforcement of the power of the "elder brother."

FOR ALL of its merits, Pond's journalistic account fails to give a fully satisfying image of Soviet reality. In this, it shares some of the inevitable shortcomings of the genre.

A simple illustration concerns the Russian language. American correspondents, after a two- or three-year stay in Moscow, develop a tremendous desire to see profound meanings in the Russian idiom. Thus, Robert Kaiser, commenting on the term "efficiency" observed in a short and categorical footnote that the word "does not exist in Russian."[2] Such a statement, if true, is hardly innocuous; it leads automatically to the severe conclusion that Russians are by nature inefficient. Suffice it to recall that Stalin himself praised "the American *delovitost'*" and dreamed to mate it with "the Russian revolutionary range."[3] *"Delovitost'"* as a dictionary will show, means "efficiency."

[1] Hedrick Smith, *The Russians,* New York, NY, Ballantine Books, 1979; and Robert Kaiser, *Russia,* New York, NY, Pocket Books, 1976.

[2] Kaiser, *Russia,* p. 350, fn. The same assertion can be found in Smith, *The Russians,* p. 294.

[3] Iosif Stalin, "The Fundamentals of Leninism," in his *Voprosy Leninizma,* (Problems of Leninism), 2nd ed., Moscow, Gosudarstvennoye Izdatel'stvo, 1930, pp. 92, 93.

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Pond is not happier in her dealing with Russian vocabulary. She claims to discern radical distinctions between *"istina"* and *"pravda,"* and between *"svoboda"* and *"volya,"* and from them draws significant conclusions concerning the Russian character. "The manipulated truth of *pravda* won out over the pure truth of *istina*," she writes (p. 225). Unfortunately, the distinction is inaccurate. Even in a famous Russian fairy tale entitled *Pravda i Krivda* (The Truth and the Lie), created by storytellers who knew and helped shape their language, *"pravda"* meant the pure truth, not a manipulated one. The only real distinction that I can find—one which is irrelevant for Pond—concerns the scientific connotation of the word *"istina"*: one can say *"nauchnaya istina"* meaning "scientific truth," whereas *"nauchnaya pravda"* is an improper construction. Nor does Pond's second distinction hold. The word *"volya"* has two major meanings: "volition" and "freedom." In the latter sense it is completely identical with *"svoboda."* For instance, we can interchangeably use *"na svobode"* or *"na vole"* when meaning that a criminal is "at large."

Habits and customs of a nation's people are even more difficult to generalize about than the idiom of their language. Pond asserts that sexual discrimination still exists in Russia. Yet, although a woman's life *is* hard in Russia, and although there are indeed no women members of the Politboro, the question is clearly a dynamic not static one. Are Soviet women being restrained or supported in the pursuit of their careers? My personal experience is that not only is a woman's salary consistently equal to a man's salary for the same job, but often women are purposely promoted because of their sex. I know of no case (nor does Pond) where a dissertation was rejected on the basis of sex (by contrast, many dissertations by Jews have been turned down because of the Jewishness of their authors). Family life in the Soviet Union is much like elsewhere, with burdens divided into equal parts. Perhaps a Russian joke reflects better the real family situation than verbose lamentations about sexual discrimination in the USSR. The wife says, "There is a division of labor in our family: my husband makes the important decisions and leaves the unimportant ones to me. That means I decide whether to buy furniture, where to go for vacations, and whether we should have a baby. He decides whether there will be a revolution in Cuba and if there is life on the moon."

THERE IS, of course, more to the problem of understanding "the harsh, betrayed, and still promised land" of the USSR than cutting through misinterpretation of language and habits or the curtain of false statistics and official lies. For foreigners to unwrap this enigma, they must jettison two major, arbitrary assumptions that thwart their understanding of contemporary Russia. The first is that Russia is simply an imperfect attempt to develop the way the West has, and the second is that Russia is completely Russian. Both ideas are very appealing to Westerners: the first allows them to look down on Russians, and the second says that Russian misfortunes are inbred and of little concern to the West. Bits of both are implicit in Pond's passage about the 1968 Prague Spring, in which she recalls that "when Prague was acquiring its Renaissance loggia and Reformation fascinations with the individual, Ivan the Terrible was founding the personal *oprichnina* terror squads" (p. 253).

The type of civilization upon which the Soviet Union is modeled is not an imperfect version of the kind found in the West. It is a civilization resembling an ant hill, in which the individual is subordinated to a higher principle, human activity is directed from above, and an unquestioned ideology seeks to determine human minds and behavior. This society creates an antiworld, inextricably bound to the first, in which personal relationships, introversion, and profound spiritual life are highly valued. The strong tension between the two levels brings forth double standards of morality, of behavior, and even of art.

This type of civilization may be contrasted to that found in the West, where the individualistic principle reigns universally. The principal ideals are materialistic: to have one's own house, one's own car, one's own yacht. At the same time, the government is helpless to protect its citizens from robbery and rape, and to protect its own political interests from the permanent onslaughts of various factions. A futile social life without stable social links serves as the antiworld of this infinite individualism.

Both descriptions are, of course, caricatures, and as such they overdraw relative advantages and disadvantages of the two types of civilization. Few, if any, Western observers of the Russian "ant hill" society have adequately studied the system of heating in Moscow. Like all the major elements of the Russian economy, it is centralized. There are no small boilers in single buildings, no menace of fire or explosion; there is constant warmth despite severe winters, and costs are low. Clearly, labor camps would be an inappropriate price to pay for a centralized heating system, or for convenient public transportation, free education, and free medical care. Yet centralization has provided Russia certain very substantial and identifiable benefits.

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Extremely centralized organization of societies is not of recent origin; it reaches back in early history to the socialized societies of militarized Sparta or of the Egyptian pharaohs. The organized or planned society is a recurring phenomenon in the history of mankind—a fact that refutes naive progressionist theories claiming that humanity is steadily moving from Oriental slavery to Teutonic freedom.

WESTERN OBSERVERS must also avoid the conclusion that the Soviet Union is thoroughly Russian, a perspective suggested by Hedrick Smith when he wrote, "the longer I stayed in Moscow, the less impressed I was by how Communist the country was and the more I thought how Russian it was."[4] Although Pond joins Smith and others in pointing out many similarities between Brezhnev's Russia and Rasputin's Russia, such as the cultural traditions and popular desires and antipathies, the structure of society has changed radically.

A prerevolutionary nobleman usually built his mansion on an open hill, freely demonstrating his wealth and authority to the whole world. A Soviet "aristocrat of the desk," however, strives to avoid all conspicuousness. His mansion is hidden in the depths of the forest, surrounded by high fences and sometimes by barbed wire, and a guard is always on the alert to prevent a casual passerby from casting an indiscreet glance at the concealed dwelling. A prerevolutionary nobleman possessed his own property; he was undisputed and independent master of his riches. A modern "aristocrat of the desk" is only a usufructuary, although his wealth may be enormous and the period of his possession unlimited. The social and psychological differences are immeasurably great.

A prerevolutionary merchant or manufacturer was above all an organizer of production: he founded and expanded factories, developed progressive farming, built railways, and tried to conquer international markets. A Soviet "bourgeois" is merely a parasite on the body of the country, and his extraordinary efficiency is directed not to the production of wealth, but to its plunder. And even more so than today's aristocrats of the desk, the operators of the Soviet black market run their underground counter-economy under the constant menace of confiscation, prison, or execution, and consequently must hide their illegal wealth. Again, the social and psychological differences for them are immeasurably great.

HEDRICK SMITH asserts that, given its "essential Russianness," Soviet society cannot "become more like us."[5] Yet, the Soviet system is of social rather than ethnic origin, and hence such an evolution cannot be precluded in theory.

Ironically, the more practical question may be whether Westerners are becoming more like the Soviets. For the Soviet system is not suited just to Russians with their alleged long sufferance, poverty, love of vodka, and nostalgia for a strong leader. It is also astoundingly seductive and has exerted a colossal impact all over the world; an impact undiminished by the drastic discrediting of Stalin's regime. Wherein lies the appeal?

The Soviet system is based on dissemblance as a principle of human behavior. It calls for a consistently graduated society even while denying class division within its framework. It refutes all religious ideology and yet substitutes a solid religion of the state, including the "cult of personality." This ambiguity of Soviet words and deeds can be traced on every level of social existence. What is attractive in the system is not the empty slogans or the manifold freedoms promised by laws and propaganda. Rather the attraction seems to be more subconscious: fascination with the bureaucratic organization of power which step by step conquers the world; with the conception of labor as a cover for leisure and theft; with the illusion of economic stability—free from slumps, unemployment, and personal responsibility—built on thoughtless plundering of natural wealth; with the abolition and even the physical annihilation of the creative elite; and with the triumph of ultimate mobility whereby anyone can—regardless of skill—fill the highest administrative or academic post. It may be that, in the end, these attractions of the Soviet system are even more dangerous than the growing Soviet military power.

[4] Smith, *The Russians*, p. 676.

[5] Ibid., pp. 655, 676.

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Crime and Punishment Under Socialism

by Louise I. Shelley

KONSTANTIN M. SIMIS. *USSR: The Corrupt Society: The Secret World of Soviet Capitalism.* New York, NY, Simon and Schuster, 1982.

ILYA ZELDES. *The Problems of Crime in the USSR.* Springfield, IL, Charles C. Thomas, 1981.

LUIS SALAS. *Social Control and Deviance in Cuba.* New York, NY, Praeger, 1979.

HANNA MALEWSKA and VINCENT PEYRE. *Délinquance juvénile, famille, école et société* (Juvenile Delinquency, Family, School, and Society). Vaucresson, Centre de formation et de recherche de l'éducation surveillée, 1973.

CONTRARY to the expectations of Marxist ideologues, crime has not begun to disappear under socialism. In Poland and Cuba—to cite examples covered by two of the books under review—the authorities no longer speak of achieving a crime-free society. In the Soviet Union, the authorities remain more steadfast, at least in their public utterances, predicting the disappearance of crime under communism. In most socialist countries, officials try to explain away, in various ways and in acute embarrassment, the persistence of a phenomenon that was to fade away as the material conditions of life improved and the socialist way of life was introduced.

What effect has the introduction of the socialist system had on the nature and extent of crime? On the evidence of the books under review here, it seems clear that far from eliminating crime, socialism has in fact created new categories of criminal conduct. In the economic realm, this proposition may be as simple as saying that where the means of production have been nationalized and the state runs the economy, theft is much more likely to be directed against public property than against private property. Thus, as the books under review note, "theft of socialist property" is one of the most common crimes in the socialist countries. In politics, the picture is considerably more blurred. For example, socialist regimes claim that they do not have "political crimes" as such. However, they do distinguish "antigovernment crimes," such as slander against the state, the dissemination of forbidden literature, and membership in illegal organizations. In addition, of course, political dissidents are often tried on trumped-up charges as ordinary criminals.

It is less clear that socialism in fact creates crime, although it is possible to make the argument. This question involves more than saying that in the socialist countries crime rates have risen as urbanization and industrialization have proceeded. As the books under review show, there is a great deal of evidence that the existing socialist systems force their average citizen into illegal activity of some kind—usually connected with the economy or the bureaucracy—simply in order to achieve bearable conditions in daily life. Ultimately, of course, the concentration of absolute power in a self-sustaining elite also has profound implications for the questions of crime and deviance, although it is extremely difficult to demonstrate the precise causes and processes.

THE FOUR BOOKS under review are especially helpful in answering such questions. All have the ring of authenticity, for four of the five authors are specialists—either lawyers or sociologists—who grew up and worked in the countries about which they write. Beyond that, however, the books diverge greatly in approach and scope. Three of the books are descriptive and anecdotal. Their authors are now émigrés, and the books piece together personal experiences with information gained from official publications. The fourth, the joint Polish-French study on juvenile delinquency, is highly quantitative. Its authors enjoyed the support and

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cooperation of the Polish government and were able to amass an imposing array of statistical data. Considered together, the four books significantly expand our knowledge of crime and deviance under socialism.

Konstantin Simis, in *USSR: The Corrupt Society*, concentrates on the problem of corruption. He is by no means the first author to discuss Soviet corruption. Like Hedrick Smith in *The Russians*, Yuri Brokhin in *Hustling on Gorky Street*, and Valery Chalidze in *Criminal Russia*, Simis presents a wealth of detail on the nature and extent of Soviet corruption. But the Simis book is more than a popular book. Simis worked for more than 17 years as a defense attorney (*advokat*) in Moscow, and his book, based on his trial experiences and supplemented by careful and extensive research, provides new insights not only into areas of corruption familiar to Western observers but also, and especially, into corruption in the police and in the courts. Unlike many other authors, furthermore, Simis goes on to search more deeply for an explanation of Soviet corruption and to provide an analytical framework for his detailed discussion.

What emerges clearly from Simis's account is the pervasiveness of corruption in Soviet life. Simis carefully documents corruption in the party, in the criminal justice system, in economic enterprises, and in medicine and education. So rife is corruption in the Soviet Union, according to Simis, that only the overthrow of the existing order can rid society of the problem.

In some instances, corruption merely ensures the proper working of the system. In his discussion of the courts, for example, Simis points out that bribes to judicial personnel often result only in a sentence in keeping with the law. To substantiate this point, he cites evidence from the corruption trials of hundreds of former criminal investigators, prosecutors, and judges in the 1960's, trials in which skilled jurists were assigned to study whether these judicial personnel had made extralegal decisions as a result of bribes. In 65–75 percent of the bribery cases, it was found, the decisions were fully in accord with the law, and the bribe only ensured that one received his due. My own research among former Soviet lawyers reveals that as judges must enforce a punitive policy, those defendants who proffer bribes receive the more lenient sentences permissible and defendants who offer nothing receive harsher sentences, at or near the maximum allowable.[1] Clearly, those Soviets who resorted to corruption here did not necessarily receive outsized benefits.

It comes as no surprise, either, that party officials manipulate the law not only to enrich themselves but also to impose their will on family and political enemies. What is startling, however, is the length to which they can and on occasion do go. A vivid illustration is the story Simis tells of the romance between the daughter of a raykom first secretary and the son of a humble postal employee. The girl's father opposed the mésalliance, ordered the district *ZAGS* (the office responsible for registering marriages) not to issue permission for his daughter's marriage, and demanded that any complaints submitted by the couple be forwarded to himself or the raykom. Unable to register the marriage, the couple moved in with the boy's mother. Once again, the raykom secretary intervened, so that the boy's mother was illegally dismissed from her job and evicted from her apartment. Eventually, the "tyranny and lawlessness" of the father led to the collapse of the romance. This story as well as several others told by Simis show that control of the law is one of the instruments by which party officials are able to act as powerful local "tsars."

The most fantastic tales told by Simis are about the underground Soviet businessmen, some of whom accumulate so much money through their illegal workshops and factories that they are able to hand over $350 million rubles (nearly $500 million at the official exchange rate) to judicial officials and still have money to pass on to their families. Most of these enormous fortunes seem to have been accumulated in the postwar period. Unfortunately for them, these underground millionaires are rarely able to enjoy the fruits of their business acumen, because conspicuous consumption might result in their arrest.

The sorry consequences of even discreet extravagance are illustrated by the story of an Armenian brother and sister, who raised flowers in the south and sold them at an enormous profit in Moscow and Leningrad. The brother lived an abstemious existence, denying himself decent clothing and food. Instead, he lavished his enormous profits on the purchase of antique furniture and Western masters. Unfortunately, his collection was so good that it attracted the attention of the Armenian Ministry of Culture. Upon the flower-dealer's refusal to donate his collection to the state, he and his sister were tried on the charge of "large-scale speculation," and the collection was confiscated. Other Soviet millionaires, not choosing to follow such a course, live in utter simplicity, even going so far as to prepare two separate meals—a meager one to pass muster with their prying neighbors and the

[1] See Louise I. Shelley, "Law in the Soviet Workplace: The Lawyer's Perspective," *Law and Society* (Madison, WI), June 1982, pp. 501–26; and idem, *Comrades, Rubles and Law: Lawyers in Soviet Work Life*, New Brunswick, NJ, Rutgers University Press, forthcoming.

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other, more lavish one that they actually eat.

One can go even further than Simis does in documenting corrupt legal practices. Simis does not generally touch on the illegal and semilegal behavior of his fellow *advokaty*, only alluding to the fact that some defense counsels transmit bribes to judges and prosecutors and omitting discussion of *mikst* (semilegal payments in addition to the regular fees paid lawyers by defendants before and after trials). But because fees for defense attorneys are established by the bar, paying *mikst* is often the only way that a client can ensure that his counsel devotes adequate attention to his case. Soviet authorities generally ignore this kind of corruption among *advokaty,* although the collection of excessive *mikst* has resulted in disbarment or even criminal prosecution. In another example, one former lawyer from the Caucasus secured the acquittal of his brother by bribing the defense attorney of his brother's codefendant, who had turned state witness. The defense attorney purposely gave the codefendant erroneous advice, making it impossible for the state to prove its case against the lawyer's brother. And Simis's tales of police use of informants and safe houses represent just two of the questionable practices of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD). According to former police personnel interviewed, physical abuse of witnesses and defendants still prevails in certain republics, and the police and KGB sometimes cooperate in the most underhanded ways to trap large-scale embezzlers and illegal businessmen.[2]

What are the origins of such pervasive corruption? Simis refuses to fault the ordinary Soviet citizen:

> *Homo Soveticus is not immoral, he simply has two separate systems of morality. . . . He will lie to a representative of the government administration but be truthful and honest in relations with friends and neighbors; he is happy to steal twenty packs of cigarettes from a tobacco factory where he works but will not steal a penny from another person.* (p. 16)

Rather, as Luis Salas does in the case of Cuba, Simis blames much illicit economic activity on the fact that there is more money in circulation than consumer goods to purchase. Most important, however, Simis suggests that it is the absolute power of the party leadership that is conducive to the proliferation of malfeasance and illicit economic activity. Because party leaders are responsible to no one, often not even to the law itself, they are able to commit crimes with nearly total impunity.

ILYA ZELDES, in *The Problems of Crime in the Soviet Union,* covers a broader range of topics than Simis does. His general approach and conclusions are for the most part consistent with those of Simis. On corruption, for example, Zeldes writes:

> *One of the essential causes of economic crimes, such as embezzlement of socialist property, is the socialist management system itself, with its amorphous, enormous and inexhaustible wealth. . . . Embezzlement under socialism is not directed against individuals, but against the state as a whole.* (p. 34)

Unlike Simis, however, Zeldes moves on to treat crime in the Soviet Union more generally—its extent, its causes, and its prevention. In so doing, he highlights the weaknesses of Soviet theories on crime, the divergence between theory and practice, and the enormity of the Soviet crime problem. In particular, he blames postwar industrialization for the recent growth of crime and juvenile delinquency in the Soviet Union.

Zeldes also deals with the measures of social control—which reach "gigantic proportions. Everything is subject to social control" (p. 43)—undertaken in the USSR in response to the increasing challenges crime poses to the socialist order. Zeldes's best illustration is the system of special commissions and schools devoted to the problem of controlling juvenile delinquency. At the top of the system is the Commission for Minors' Affairs, which enforces the measures that "constitute borderline cases between governmental coercion and societal actions" (p. 111). It can impose a great variety of measures, ranging from simple criticism of the juvenile to control over his actions and even to incarceration in special penal institutions. One component of the control mechanism is the special school. Founded in the mid-1960's by restructuring former correctional colonies, these schools handle youths 11 to 16 who are too young for criminal prosecution. Most such youths spend less than a year in these schools, where efforts are made to curb antisocial behavior. Another component, not mentioned by Zeldes, is the *detskaya komnata* (minors' division) of the police. This special police division keeps track of problem youths in its district and often directs them to nearby community centers for structured leisure-time activities.

Luis Salas, in *Social Control and Deviance in Cuba,* covers much the same ground for Cuba. Using the Cuban press and academic literature extensively as well as the works of non-Cuban scholars, Salas provides a detailed and coherent account of the nature and extent of

[2] Interviews conducted in the United States and abroad, October 1980–April 1981.

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crime in Cuba, including such questions as suicide and homosexuality. He also analyzes Cuba's criminal justice system and the societal measures used to curb crime and deviant behavior. In all, the Salas book is a fine contribution.

Salas carefully documents the evolution of the Cuban regime's reaction to crime in the 20 years since the Cuban revolution, showing that the regime introduced changes only after it realized that existing crime control strategies were not working. In 1969, a major reorganization of the Cuban judiciary was initiated in response to an increasing problem of social disorder among juveniles and workers. In 1973, a more centralized court structure was introduced, and in 1977, further changes followed, as a result of which "party influence over judicial procedure was increased" (p. 225). Moreover, the tightly structured Cuban judiciary is supplemented by a relatively small police system as well as by numerous Committees for the Defense of the Revolution (citizen anticrime groups).

Despite such changes, Salas suggests that criticism of the independence of the Cuban judiciary may not be warranted, because many judges in Western countries are subject to "the same, and sometimes greater, political pressures" (p. 228). But Salas is too sanguine. If one is to compare the positions of judges in different countries—Salas makes much of Harold Berman's statement that the consciences of Soviet judges are molded by the demands of party campaigns, a statement that represents only part of the truth—one must have a true basis of comparison. As former Soviet judicial personnel would attest, party pressures in the Soviet Union are more continuous and far-reaching than Salas seems to suspect.

The influence of the Soviet model on the Cuban judiciary is itself an interesting question. Salas believes that "one of the cardinal principles to be followed in the examination of socialist institutions and laws is that . . . many of these institutions are reflective of a national past rather than Marxist ideology. The same general statement is applicable to Cuba" (p. 331). Consequently, he fails to appreciate the extent to which Soviet legislation and enforcement patterns have shaped Cuban justice—in such matters as definitions of crime, the structure of the judiciary, citizen involvement throughout the criminal justice system, and the criminal prosecution of homosexuality. Salas mentions none of these matters. Only in the case of the procuracy, the comrades' courts, lay assessors, and legislation against "parasitism"—where the Soviet debt is clear—does Salas acknowledge Soviet influence.

Even after major changes in its criminal justice system, Cuba has not recorded any long-term decline in crime rates. Salas's research indicates that despite extensive controls over Cuban society and despite all efforts to detect and deter crime and punish criminals, Cuban crime, while it "generally decreased during the first years of revolutionary rule, . . . has begun to rise again" (p. 44). Cuban scholars have therefore been more open than many of their socialist counterparts in asserting that "although socialist society does not produce crime, it permits the existence of objective conditions that allows these remnants to survive" (p. 130). What better evidence of the endurance of crime in Cuba than the large numbers of former Cuban inmates in the recent wave of emigration to the United States?

The study by Hanna Malewska and Vincent Peyre has one great advantage over the other three books under review. Although Simis, Zeldes, and Salas do an admirable job in describing Soviet and Cuban crime and deviance, they are hampered by the unavailability of crime statistics and by the limitations placed on independent researchers. The Malewska-Peyre study, in contrast, represents a collaborative effort by researchers at the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the Polish Academy of Sciences in Warsaw and at the Center for Supervised Education in Vaucresson, near Paris. The result is a revealing statistical analysis of crime in two different types societies. (It is unfortunate that this and two substantial companion studies conducted in Hungary and Yugoslavia, *Juvenile Delinquency in Europe* (1968) and *Juvenile Delinquency and Socio-Economic Development* (1975), have received almost no notice in English-speaking countries.[3])

The Malewska-Peyre study is doubly remarkable as a fine example of comparative criminology. Is juvenile delinquency more extensive and severe in areas of recent economic development? Malewska and Peyre's research reveals that within an individual country, differences in economic development are significant in explaining regional variations in crime rates—for example, that in Poland, crime rates are higher in highly urbanized areas such as the cities of Warsaw and Rybnik than in economically less developed cities such as Zamosc and Koszalin. Do different social and economic systems create different problems of juvenile delinquency? As Malewska and Peyre note, the likelihood that a juvenile will commit a crime is influenced by his environment. Polish delinquents often come from disad-

[3] Free University of Brussels, Institute of Sociology, *La délinquance juvénile en Europe*, Brussels, 1968; and Yves Chirol et al., Eds., *Délinquance juvénile et développement socio-économique*, The Hague, Mouton, 1975.

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vantaged homes, but the disadvantages cannot always be measured in socioeconomic terms. Because alcoholism figures so prominently in the homes of Polish delinquents, juvenile law-breakers in Poland are less likely to come from families at the lower end of the socioeconomic spectrum than are their counterparts in France. Other disadvantages are also important: less attentive parents, more physical abuse from parents, and poorer housing than in the case of law-abiding youngsters. On the whole, however, the Malewska-Peyre study indicates that the larger social force of urbanization is more important in explaining crime patterns than are national differences in education, family structure, and child-rearing techniques.

The strong social-control measures typical of socialist regimes are again noted in the Malewska-Peyre study. For example, more Polish delinquents have police encounters at an earlier age than their counterparts in France. By 14, almost half of Polish delinquents have already had police contact.

THE FOUR STUDIES show that socialist societies are not passive observers of their crime problems. They use diverse and encompassing control measures to enforce social conformity. These include both punitive measures and measures intended to prevent crime and social deviance.

The punitive measures are generally quite strong. Much as socialist officials are often willing to ignore the all-pervasive corruption, (because they themselves reap tangible benefits from it), the perpetrators of ordinary criminal offenses can expect a harsh societal reaction early in their deviant career. Incarceration is relatively more common than in the West and reduces crime rates by comparison. Tighter controls placed on released prisoners also reduce the incidence of crime.

The general social control measures are varied and much more extensive than in the West. They include mass youth involvement in such organizations as the Pioneers and Komsomol (or their equivalent), the monitoring of leisure-time and after-school activities of problem teenagers, and controls over the movements of the population. In the West, such measures would be considered obtrusive. In socialist societies, however, they are viewed as the basis of social order.

Such restrictions on personal choice have undoubtedly eased the crime problem, or helped slow the rise of crime, in some socialist countries. If a socialist society in fact registers a decline in criminality, it is arguably due to the tight social controls rather than the intrinsic virtues of the socialist system. In this sense, the elimination of crime has remained as elusive a goal for the socialist countries as it has been for the developed countries of the West and the developing countries of the Third World.

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The Turkic Past in the Soviet Future

by Daniel C. Matuszewski

YU. V. BROMLEY with I. S. GUREVICH et al., Eds. *Sovremennyye etnicheskiye protsessy v SSSR* (Contemporary Ethnic Processes in the USSR). Moscow, Nauka, 1977.

T. YU. BURMISTROVA, Ed. *Nauchnoye rukovodstvo natsional'nymi otnosheniyami v razvitom sotsialisticheskom obshchestve* (The Scientific Management of National Relations in a Developed Socialist Society). Leningrad, Leningrad University Press, 1981.

S. A. TOKAREV with G. I. ANOKHIN and T. D. ZLATKOUSKAYA, Eds. *Sovremennyye etnonatsional'nyye protsessy v stranakh zapadnoy yevropy* (Contemporary Ethno-national Processes in West European Countries). Moscow, Nauka, 1981.

ERNEST GELLNER, Ed. *Soviet and Western Anthropology*. New York, NY, Columbia University Press, 1980, and London, Duckworth, 1981.

ASKAD MUKHTAR. *Chinara* (The Plane Tree). Moscow, Sovetskiy Pisatel', 1977.

MIRMUKHSIN. *Zodchiy* (The Architect). Moscow, Sovetskiy Pisatel', 1978.

OLZHAS SULEYMENOV. *Az i ya*. Alma-Alta, Zhazushy, 1975.

CHINGIZ AYTMATOV. *I dol'she veka dlitsya den'* (A Day Lasts Longer Than an Age). Frunze, Kyrgyzstan, 1981.

OVER THE LAST 20 years, there has been a striking emergence of new and intense forms of ethnic and cultural identification in the Soviet Union. The tentative and artificial constructs of official "Soviet" culture have, for a variety of reasons, not satisfied the needs of the scores of nationalities and peoples who make up the multiethnic mosaic of the USSR. A search has begun by Russians and non-Russians alike for more genuine and satisfying social and cultural forms, for more personal and comforting types of human community. Not surprisingly, the search has come to focus on ethnic and religious communities with roots deep in the pre-Soviet past. It is not an exaggeration to say that we are witnessing the reversal of an old Stalinist slogan: the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is increasingly becoming socialist in form, but national in content.

In this process, the Turkic peoples in the USSR have become increasingly assertive. Much of the recent Turkic literature in the Soviet Union is nothing less than an attempt to resurrect the past, a proud and accomplished past which had been forgotten or suppressed in the political transformations of the first decades of the Soviet period. This resurrection involves in part facts and in part interpretations. It is almost always undertaken cautiously, within the complex ground rules of current Soviet literary production and criticism. As in certain areas of contemporary Chinese literature, devices such as allusion, circumlocution, allegory, and symbolism are used in handling issues of political sensitivity. On occasion, however, the approach is surprisingly outspoken and blunt. Yet, whether the writers choose discretion or audacity, the important fact is that the Turkic past is being recovered piece by piece, and the outline of a great cultural legacy is being revealed and restored.

Soviet ethnographic writings and theoretical work on the structure and trends of ethnic management provide an important functional counterpoint to such assertive cultural renewal. Developing industrial societies often display signs of social discontent and sometimes witness the emergence of countercultures in reaction to oppressive homogenizing pressures of modernization. In the USSR, however, the

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kaleidoscopic profile of the Soviet population, combined with the intensely managerial characteristics of state policy, creates an especially severe set of challenges. The Soviets are acutely aware of the urgency of nationality issues; specialists and policymakers alike are attempting to reconcile the powerful tensions between two official goals: the "flourishing" (*rastvet*) of individual nationalities, and their "convergence" (*sblizheniye*) into a single, united Soviet people and culture.

The result is a substantial and growing body of Soviet research and publications on the dynamics of ethnic processes and on the management of nationality issues. While this literature is still frequently marked by overly general analysis and stereotyped judgments, it has begun to display some sophisticated examination of ethnic phenomena.

IN 1975, a special council was formed within the USSR Academy of Sciences for the systematic study of Soviet nationality issues. This council is headed by Yulian Bromley, director of the Academy's Institute of Ethnography, who has assembled a group of distinguished analysts to conduct complex multidisciplinary studies of ethnic and national factors. One result is the volume on *Contemporary Ethnic Processes in the USSR.* History, linguistics, physical anthropology, ethnography, sociology, psychology, economics, and political science are all combined in an attempt to provide a comprehensive assessment of critical ethnonational structures and trends. The undertaking is propelled by a belief in the existence of scientific and managerial solutions to these issues, and by the search for the right social mechanisms and levers to bring about the eventual harmonious rapprochement of the individual nationalities.

An important characteristic of this research is the interest in the structural and historical dimensions of national questions, an interest almost as great as the concern with current sociocultural dynamics. Thus, at several points the authors of the collective volume on the *Scientific Management of National Relations* call attention to the subtle structural processes in the Austro-Hungarian Empire during the decades before its collapse and the emergence of the successor national states after World War I. It is impossible to understand what happened in 1918 and why, they argue, without tracing a set of subdued, often obscure, cultural processes which had been at work for almost a century. This admonition is, of course, appropriate to the study of any major multinational structure.

Soviet analysts seem unanimous in stressing that essential to the successful management of centrifugal trends among the nationalities are the unifying principles or cornerstones (*nachala*) of the state—the socialist economy, the socialist way of life, the ideology of socialist internationalism, and the common task of building communism. These are the major functional imperatives which will lead to the surmounting and blending of individual nationalisms. Central and statist trends are clearly to be fostered over and against multiple and diffuse minority patterns. Soviet analysts argue that an important role in this process is to be played by the administrative-political structure of the state and by the development of new traditions of all-Union rituals, holidays, and ceremonies.

The authors in the Burmistrova book point out that a critical difference has been introduced into rituals in the Soviet period. While in tsarist times, rituals were essentially ethnic and religious phenomena which served to exclude other groups and thus performed a disunifying function, new Soviet rituals have been elaborated which are secular, inclusive, and all-Union in character. Many of these new rituals were, according to the authors, grass-roots efforts to replace outmoded, sectarian practices. It was the so-called "creative masses" themselves, in various remote corners of the state, who began to destroy the old religious ceremonies which marked the life cycle.

While the older external forms may have been preserved in many cases, it is argued, the substance has often radically changed. Religious and magical symbols are consciously transformed into playful, entertaining charades and games. Many traditional events have become secularized through the participation of administrative, political, or economic functionaries, whose presence in essence transforms the occasion into a state affair. In the opinion of Soviet ethnographers, this is the proper administrative and managerial path to take, and it should be encouraged.

The Soviets are fascinated by multinational state systems in other parts of the world, and have begun to look closely at trends outside the Soviet Union for comparative purposes. The volume on *Nationality Dynamics in West European Countries* is an extremely careful exercise in this regard. From the perspective of Soviet analysts, West European nationalist phenomena exhibit three basic trends or goals: the preservation and development of the native language; the retention of a distinctive native cultural tradition; and the search for self-government and administrative autonomy, if not for a separate state. The Soviet authors are wary about the issue of native-language use. While acknowledging the right and value of such linguistic retention, they point out that in any federated or multiethnic setting, exclusive official use of the native

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tongue would do Basques or Bretons very little good. Bilingualism, through the mastery of Spanish, French, English, or whatever the case might dictate, is essential. Intelligent bilingualism does not conflict with careful nurture of the mother tongue. In fact, it can produce a higher level of indigenous culture. Soviet analysts and policymakers are extremely concerned about potential progressions from linguistic and cultural assertiveness to political autonomy. Thus, they are looking for precisely those mechanisms that will "manage" and contain national processes within a centralized state system. Aspirations toward self-rule among certain West European minorities could set troublesome precedents.

Soviet ethnographers also utilize a broad range of disciplinary approaches as they engage in large-scale, intensive fieldwork among Soviet nationalities—Uzbeks, Tatars, Georgians, Moldavians, Estonians, and Russians. This work involves the increasingly sophisticated use of questionnaires, interviews, and computer techniques to gauge respondents' ethnic and social attitudes—their views on the economic situation, on material and cultural conditions, on the factors affecting life and work satisfaction. While some idea of the practical slant of this research can be gleaned from the title of one of the team projects—"Optimization of sociocultural conditions for development and for bringing the Soviet peoples closer together"—the published scholarly results are solid and respectable, and have induced Western specialists to consult more closely with their Soviet colleagues.

The collective volume *Soviet and Western Anthropology* contains articles by both Soviet and Western specialists. Initially, they were prepared for a joint conference on the dynamics of ethnic processes held in 1976 in Austria. The Soviet contributions—nine in all—treat such issues as the theory of socio-economic formations (Yu. I. Semenov), the ethnic sociology of present-day life (L. Drobizheva), ethnography and psychology (I. S. Kon), the role of religion (V. Basilov), and changing demographic patterns (V. I. Kozlov). Their Western counterparts—ten in all—handle a variety of similar, though somewhat narrower, topics.

The conference participants seem to have made a valiant effort to lift the intimidating veil of differing habits of thought, terminology, and professional jargon. On the whole, the results are encouraging. It is evident that the two sides are at least attempting to begin a dialogue on a major theoretical and practical issue: the social management of ethnicity as a cultural and political force. This initial effort is of course a tentative one, with heavy emphasis on theory, primitive societies, and deep structural patterns. But it represents a start, a base from which the two sides can proceed (under suitable conditions) to a review of contemporary areas of concern. In fact, parallel efforts are now being undertaken in the USSR and the West, so that one may look forward to further discussion and, one hopes, to a more detached manner of inquiry, analysis, and dialogue.

THE TURKIC peoples of Central Asia and the Caucasus will play a special role in the evolution of the nationality question. Of the roughly 262 million Soviet citizens counted in the last census, only 137 million were Russians. The patterns of birthrate and demographics continue to shift that balance in favor of the rapidly expanding Turkic peoples, now numbering approximately 45 million.

Yet, the extraordinary cultural renaissance which has taken place within the last two decades among the Turkic peoples of the Soviet Union is, except in its broad contours, poorly appreciated in the West. Possessed of unique and vigorous cultural legacies, the Turkic peoples played an influential role both in the Russian past and in the formation of the Soviet present. Furthermore, their centrality in a complex of urgent economic, social, political, and cultural issues ensures them a major role in the developments which will determine the shape of Soviet society in the 21st century. The significance of the Turkic cultural renaissance is compounded by the vital geopolitical location of those expansive minorities along the Soviet Union's volatile borders with the Middle East, Inner Asia, and China.

One extremely promising area of inquiry into this cultural revival is the contemporary Central Asian literary scene. It has undergone a striking transformation from novels about bringing in the cotton and love for one's tractor to a belletristic search for cultural roots and the heritage of the past. Contemporary Uzbek, Kirghiz, Kazakh, and Tadzhik literatures have been marked by changes of direction which throw a special light on the social dynamics of those societies. Issues of tradition, change, modernization, and cultural integrity have increasingly provided the subject matter of the novel, short story, and essay.

This new infatuation with memory and with the legacy of the past is understandable. The effect of the alphabet and language changes introduced in Turkestan in the 1920's and 1930's was to divorce the Turkic peoples from a significant portion of their traditional literature, and to make much of it unintelligible. They suddenly found themselves cut off from their literary and cultural past. Heavy emphasis was placed at that time in official social and cultural circles on the ignor-

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ance, poverty, and backwardness of Central Asia's history.

For a variety of reasons, not the least of which has been a growing dissatisfaction with the grayness and homogeneity of official Soviet culture, the Turkic peoples have come to discover that their past is not one of cultural gloom and doom. They are assiduously engaged in resurrecting their ancient past, and the contemporary Central Asian novel testifies to this. Each of the four literary works under review here is intensely preoccupied with memory, with tracing vital roots to the Turco-Persian past of Inner Asia.

In *Chinara* (The Plane Tree), by the Uzbek writer Askad Mukhtar, a cycle of ancient legends and folk tales is tightly intertwined with the life and experiences of the central figure, the old patriarch Achil Buva. The plane tree is the symbolic heart of the tale. According to popular wisdom, it is 1,000 years old, and its roots extend deep below the village to the very bowels of the mountain on which it stands. Achil Buva himself is a match for the tree. Aged 94, he has 137 children and grandchildren, not counting great-grandchildren and great-great-grandchildren. Every year, he makes a complete round of his family.

The story unfolds around one of the annual visitations, which Achil Buva makes in the company of a 40-year-old grandson, Azimdzhan, who is himself on a visit to the Soviet Union. A wealthy foreign businessman, he was born and raised abroad by his Uzbek mother who had been forced to leave the Soviet Union years ago for Afghanistan. Through personal experience and the legends recounted by the family patriarch, Azimdzhan's eyes are opened during his trip to the richness of his ethnic and cultural heritage. Contemporary moral lessons are underlined by myth, and the odyssey of Achil and Azimdzhan is paralleled by a hardly secondary excursion through Soviet history and the Turkic past. When a surprised Azimdzhan asks why Central Asians before the Revolution were often portrayed as only miserably ignorant, poor, and backward, Achil answers: "We still have a lot of those who love to simplify things. History didn't begin today."

In *Zodchiy* (The Architect), the Uzbek writer Mirmukhsin reconstructs in fictional form the days of cultural splendor and power under the Timurids (the dynasty of Tamerlane) in the 15th century. Historical figures are woven into the novel: the astronomer-ruler Ulugbeg; the Timurids Shahrukh, Baysunkur Mirza, and Ibrahim Sultan; the architects Nadzhmeddin Bukhari and Kadam; and the great poet Lutfi. The glorious civilization of that time, which united the cities of Herat, Balkh, Samarkand, Bukhara, and Kokhand, is presented in loving detail. Mirmukhsin paints on a large canvas, resurrecting the period to show the greatness of which his people were capable in the past.

Mirmukhsin writes consistently of a common Turkic heritage. His characters are Turks, not Uzbeks, Kazakhs, or Kirghiz. His heroes and poets know, and speak, and compose in the Turkic tongue. His heritage is that common to virtually the whole of Inner Asia, and the empire he glorifies is that of Timur, which was larger than the empires of Darius, Alexander, or even Chinghiz Khan. All this is done with such casualness and understatement that it is easy to miss its significance.

The Kazakh poet and novelist Olzhas Suleymenov has published several extraordinary pieces in the last 15 years, pieces which lovingly explore the ancient myths and Turkic traditions and stress their vitality and importance for today. Not only have these myths and traditions become the focus of intense interest and research by scholars, but they have been popularized for the broader public by essayists and poets such as Suleymenov. In fact, Suleymenov has gone one daring step further. In 1975, he wrote an analysis of the early Kievan epic "Tale of the Host of Igor." He attempted to show that it was permeated by Turkic epic motifs and vocabulary, with whole passages paraphrased or translated directly from the Turkic. This monograph was published in Alma-Ata in 1975, and is replete with outspoken accusations of Russian chauvinism and of distortion of early Turkic history. It is remarkable that the work was published at all. Entitled *Az i ya* (a clever play on words, but denoting "Asia"), it has triggered an acrimonious debate with political and ethnic overtones as Slavic and Turkic scholars have begun to reassess early relations.

This debate is illustrative not only of passionate new interest in cultural origins, but also of current social and political sensitivities. In 1977, Suleymenov was summoned to a special session of the Academy of Sciences in Moscow, where his monograph was attacked by leading historians, literary scholars, writers, and public figures. Although Suleymenov made a statement of contrition and promised to rectify his errors, veiled debates on these issues continue in the Central Asian press. The intense discussion of cultural roots and the increasing insistence on preserving past legacies have become hallmarks of contemporary Turkic literary life.

THE BEST-KNOWN figure in Soviet Central Asian literature is the Kirghiz writer Chingiz Aytmatov. Besides being a novelist, a poet, a playwright, and a filmmaker, Aytmatov is also a member of the editorial board for the influential Moscow weekly

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Literaturnaya Gazeta and a member of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. Despite these positions and his corresponding reputation as an establishment writer, Aytmatov is the author of a number of remarkable pieces subtly criticizing abuses by the party and state bureaucracy, and deeply marked by and respectful of the Kirghiz epic tradition. Aytmatov escapes the narrow parochialism of ethnic self-concern while raising serious and moving questions about the relationship between modernity in its Soviet form and the old values of the pre-Soviet and even pre-Islamic past. Moreover, he has raised some larger questions about the integrity and structure of Soviet society in his play, *The Ascent of Mount Fuji,* which was not only translated into Russian but was also sent briefly on tour to the United States. This play remains one of the few popular pieces presented in the USSR which asks not only about the crimes of the Stalin era but about the possible collective guilt of the citizenry. Aytmatov has become a major cultural force. A number of his stories (*Dzhamila, White Steamship,* etc.) have been made into films in recent years. The strong Turkic motifs of his work have assumed a cultural significance beyond the borders of the Kirghiz republic. Commenting not long ago on a new piece by a Kazakh writer, Aytmatov not only praised the work, but added: "My heart beats with common Turkic pride."

In his recent work, *I dol'she veka dlitsia den',* Aytmatov utilizes a Kazakh setting, at a time perhaps later in this century. The novel is a complex interweaving of two parallel plot lines which eventually come together to form a powerful climax. In the first plot, two cosmonauts—one Soviet and one American—manning a space station in connection with a joint project make contact with another intelligent civilization beyond the galaxy. Without informing control authorities on Earth, they abandon the station to visit and initiate talks on the other planet. The reaction of Soviet and American officials, once they learn of this action, forms one of the themes of the book. In the second plot, Yedigey, an old Kazakh railway worker at an isolated switching station deep in the Kazakh steppe, sets off with camel and tractor, three co-workers, and the son and son-in-law of the deceased to bury his oldest friend and colleague, Kazangap, at an ancestral Muslim cemetery.

The theme which unites both stories and brings them together in the end is the pivotal importance of memory in forming a truly human present and giving hope for a just future. As the Kazakh colleagues move slowly toward the burial ground, Yedigey mourns his friend and begins to recall key moments in the decades he and Kazangap had spent together, the joy and dedication of their work, the bitterness and pain of their defeats. Yedigey recalls the anger of Kazangap over the tragedy of the Kazakh and Kirghiz herdsmen who fled to China during the collectivization, only to find oppression and disillusionment there as well and to meet a reception that was neither gentle nor warm on their subsequent return to the Soviet Union. Yedigey also recalls Kazangap's silent bitterness over the arrest, exile, and death of his father in the 1930's, all because of a false accusation by informers. It was something Kazangap would never discuss as he bore this grief in grim but dignified silence, yet it was the central event in his life, which underlay his attitudes on justice and social obligations. Sensitive to the inequities of the past, Yedigey and Kazangap were determined that nothing must be forgotten, for memory is sacred and shapes mankind's mind and the vision of the future.

The injustice suffered by his old friend finds an echo in another incident in Yedigey's past—the arrest and death in 1953 of an unhappy former schoolteacher, Abutalip. Abutalip had had the misfortune of being captured by the Germans early in World War II. Although he managed a daring escape and made his way to the Balkans where he fought heroically alongside the Yugoslav partisans, he suffered great difficulties in repatriation at the end of the war and continued to live under a cloud in the Soviet Union in the late 1940's. Ironically, what eventually damages him most is his wartime association with the Yugoslavs. When an informer, learning that Abutalip spends his evenings writing his memoirs of those events, casually turns in the information, Abutalip is hauled away from his wife and two adoring children by three security men. He never returns, and it is later learned that he "died" during interrogation. When Yedigey later attempts to learn what happened and confronts one of the security people, Tansykhbayev, the latter informs him that it is inappropriate to have certain affairs dredged up out of the past: "Lord knows what sorts of things may have happened and how! What's important is to recall the past and depict it exactly as we need to have it told today, in a form that is necessary for us, whether orally or all the more so in written form." History, in other words, has no meaning other than what Tansykhbayev wants it to mean.

Yedigey recalls how he accompanied Abutalip's wife to the post office to receive the cable informing her that her husband had died, and the bitter irony of the fact that it occurred on the same day that Stalin's death was announced. As he attempted to comfort her, he was shocked by the voices of passers-by lamenting "the passing of our be-

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loved father."

Yedigey also recounts several folk legends in the course of his journey, legends which add special meaning and poignancy to his story. The most gruesome is the tale of Nayman-Ana and the mankurt. Legend has it that the fearsome Zhuan-Zhuan nomads had the custom of depriving their captives of memory and recall of the past, rendering them pliant and passionless slaves. This was done by plastering their shaven heads with the skin of a freshly killed camel, which would then dry and shrink under the hot sun in the desert where the captives were left bound for several days. Only a few would survive. Driven mad by the unbearable pain, the survivors would be left without memory or will and were thereafter considered to be the best possible slaves. Such a slave was called a mankurt. When a distraught mother, Nayman-Ana, attempted to reclaim her mankurt son, the latter, no longer recognizing or remembering her, killed her. The place where she was buried was Ana-Beyit, the ancient cemetery to which Yedigey is now taking Kazangap.

As they cover the last few miles to the cemetery, Yedigey and his friends suddenly come up against a solid barbed wire fence stretching into the distance across the open steppe. It is the outer perimeter of a Soviet cosmodrome, the base responsible for the errant cosmonauts. The burial party can go no further. Talks with the guard at the gate and with the security officer who is sent to adjudicate, get them nowhere. The security officer, named Tansykhbayev like the official responsible for Abutalip's arrest in 1953, refuses to speak Kazakh with Yedigey "since he is on duty," and listens coldly to him. He explains that the old cemetery is scheduled for liquidation, and that housing for cosmodrome workers will be built there, according to the latest plan. Frustrated and furious, Yedigey withdraws to a nearby hill and buries his friend there within sight of the base. In his farewell to Kazangap, he cries "Don't think that I will let this matter drop. I will go where I need to go . . . I won't be silent."

Yedigey then asks Kazangap's insolent and condescending son, the bureaucrat Sabitdzhan, to intervene through his connections in the city to prevent the cemetery's closing. Sabitdzhan laughs at him: "A plan is a plan. . . . Global, cosmic questions are being decided here, and we're supposed to go off with a complaint about some kind of cemetery!? Who needs it? . . . Why should I piss against the wind? So that one phone call from here and I'm out with a kick in the ass?" Yedigey is stunned by Sabitdzhan's insensitivity and recalls with horror and aversion the latter's recent enthusiastic description of the coming radio technology which will permit total control of human beings. Radio waves will eliminate all deviant behavior and will erase the unnecessary memory of individuals. Everything will be done according to a central plan. In his revulsion with Sabitdzhan, Yedigey hisses: "You're a mankurt, a real mankurt."

As the group departs, Yedigey attempts to return to the cosmodrome gate for one last word, but he is astonished and overwhelmed as a chain of rockets suddenly roars into the sky in a series of tremendous fireballs. Yedigey races from the scene in fright, unaware of the significance of what he had seen.

What has happened is that the Soviet and American leaders had decided that it was too hazardous—given the strife, conflict, and delicate geopolitical balance on Earth itself—to enter into contact with another intelligent civilization from space. To ensure Earth's security, they had ordered the cosmonaut team never to return, and both the Soviets and Americans had simultaneously launched a series of rockets to establish an impenetrable barrier in space and seal the planet off forever. A veil of secrecy was thrown over the event, the project was dismantled, all records were destroyed, and the technicians were sworn to silence under the threat of the most dire penalties. All memory of the event was to be erased.

The two stories come together to counterpoint and reinforce each other. Aytmatov's imaginative combination of tradition, legend, themes of modernization, and science fiction is impressive, and his point is clear. As the novel ends, Yedigey goes off to town to see the local authorities and to press his case for saving the cemetery.

WHAT IS CLEAR from Aytmatov's pointed themes or even a cursory perusal of contemporary Turkic belles lettres in the USSR is the existence of an active search to retrieve an accurate understanding of the past and to restore a sense of historical and cultural identity. Most Central Asian writers have sought this in the high culture and civilization of the distant past as well as in the centuries-old folk and religious customs of Central Asia. Some, such as Aytmatov, have also taken up more sensitive issues from the more recent past in an unusual and intriguing way. However, it would be misleading to exaggerate the dissidence or political intent of such work. Aytmatov himself is an establishment figure who writes in Russian as easily as he writes in Kirghiz, he is almost completely bicultural, and in many ways, he is an excellent example of the Russian-speaking, native-cadre, establishment figure extolled by Soviet managers of ethnicity. In his case, at least, the proposition that intelligent bilingualism will lead to a higher cultural level than monolingualism is undoubtedly

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correct.

What is less clear is that such patterns of syncretism and biculturalism will lead either to a unified Soviet culture and people or to a sterile disregard for the complex and rich mosaic of the past. Such figures as Aytmatov are asking more rather than fewer probing questions about such legacies and about patterns of human political behavior. None of this literature or these writers have separatist or secessionist purposes. They seek to reestablish the truth and to define their specific identity and prerogatives within the Soviet system.

The potential for conflict will arise when such aspirations are mishandled. Too primitive an emphasis by the periphery on national themes with separatist potential will bring reaction and repression. On the other hand, too repressive an approach by the center to legitimate ethnic and cultural expressions will catalyze precisely those potentially centrifugal national sentiments that the regime wants to avoid. Currently, the political and sociocultural aspirations are limited: the establishment and nourishment of a firm sense of legitimate cultural identity within a more truly federated and balanced republican system. In theory, this does not contradict the principles and guidelines of the managers of Soviet ethnicity. The impasse may come if the Tansykhbayevs of the Soviet system continue to insist that history can only be what they want it to be, while influential segments of the Turkic intelligentsia begin to insist that this will no longer do.

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Notes & Views

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POLISH BRINKSMANSHIP

TO THE EDITORS: It is only recently that I ran across Tadeusz Szafar's article "Brinksmanship in Poland" in your May-June 1981 issue, where on seven pages he reviewed nine (bulky!) books on Poland. Since he is so widely read, I wish he could also have seen my *Poland's Politics: Idealism vs. Realism* (1967), for perhaps then he would have given me credit for first observing a cycle: resistance-defeat-resistance in Polish history. He would also have noted that I have no aversion to resistance, but only to one which is doomed to fail and unnecessarily exposes the Poles to losses and suffering.

ADAM BROMKE
McMaster University
Hamilton, Ontario

EDITORS' NOTE: Two of the books discussed in the essay-review mentioned by Mr. Bromke contained chapters written by him. The books were Peter J. Potichnyj, Ed., *Poland and the Ukraine: Past and Present,* and Maurice D. Simon and Roger E. Kanet, Eds., *Background to Crisis: Policy and Politics in Gierek's Poland.*

MR. SZAFAR RESPONDS: Prof. A. Bromke apparently has missed one essential point: his 1967 *magnum opus* on Poland's politics was not among the books I had reviewed. I had, therefore, no reason to explain how deeply we differ in our opinions on Polish history and traditions and, in consequence, on Poland's contemporary political scene.

I have only pointed out that Prof. Bromke's introductory chapter to the collection of essays edited by Simon and Kanet ignored in a very cavalier manner the emergence of political opposition to Gierek's Communist regime. Since I do not believe that an eminent historian and political scientist did so by inadvertence, I am forced to conclude that in this case it was the politician in Prof. Bromke who had gained the upper hand.

And finally, throughout Polish modern history—including the last couple of years—every act of resistance was indeed "doomed to fail" and "expose the Poles to losses and suffering." Prof. Bromke qualifies this statement—undoubtedly true—adding the adverb "unnecessarily," and here I beg to differ. Even with the benefit of hindsight, few outside the ruling establishment would qualify the unique experience of Solidarity as "unnecessary." And were it not for previous generations of "romantic" resisters, whom Prof. Bromke thinks so little of, who knows whether Polish would still be spoken today in the "Vistulaland" on the western extremities of the Russian/Soviet Empire.

TADEUSZ SZAFAR
Cambridge, MA

NATIONAL LIBERATION

TO THE EDITORS: I have a "beef" with Wallace Spaulding's excellent article "Checklist of the 'National Liberation Movement'," appearing in the March-April 1982 issue of *Problems of Communism.* It stems from the fact that in presenting a checklist of the "National Liberation Movement," Mr. Spaulding limited himself solely to pro-Soviet or Communist organizations. What about all those organizations that may be anti-Soviet in orientation yet fall into the category of "National Liberation Movements"? Is it really proper or wise to simply limit enquiry to one side? I shouldn't think so!

Keep up the good work, but try to bring into it a bit of balance.

PETER J. POTICHNYJ
McMaster University
Hamilton, Ontario

MR. SPAULDING RESPONDS: My article on the "National Liberation Movement" was limited to the apparent Soviet perception thereof. Material that had become available over the last few years gave one a fighting chance at ascertaining this perception.

To redefine the category so as to include additional groupings would have involved a possibly complicated process of establishing additional criteria. Certainly, more work can be done in this field, and I will read with interest any efforts to develop such new criteria.

Incidentally, in the April 1982 issue of Moscow's *Voprosy istorii,* Yu. V. Irkhin's article "Revolutionary Vanguard Parties of Working People in Liberated Countries" (pp. 55–67) names the same seven "vanguard" parties noted in my Checklist and further states that they are in a transition phase between "revolutionary democratic" and "Marxist-Leninist" (i.e., Communist) parties. In addition, the author cites the following additional countries where parties are in the process of developing into the "vanguard category: Nicaragua, Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde Islands, Sao Tome and Principe, and Bahrain (presumably the National Liberation Front in this last case—see Checklist). Finally Irkhin notes that "revolutionary democracy" is important in "certain countries of Latin America" as well as in Asia and Africa, and he appears to treat Grenada and "the revolutionary struggle in El Salvador" along with Nicaragua in this context.

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